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## ANALYZING POST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAHARASHTRA

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### ABSTRACT

The article examines the evolving character of the Maharashtra state – an important sub-national state in India. State politics changed in 1978 and then again in the 1990s. The current moment (2014) may be viewed as the third shift that pushes the state out of control of Congress. This growth has led to a restless condition of the major governing community, the Marathas. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee scheme is characterized by the scale, duration, generosity of its financing arrangements and the political complexity of its design among rural public works projects. Its goal is extremely ambitious: to provide jobs flexibly and quickly via public works opening and shutting in response to local, unpredictable weather changes in a weak agriculture economy.

### Introduction

Although India's federation has established a consistent government structure across subnational constitutional entities and referred to as "states," state policy always has varied and unique patterns. In the first decade following independence, these developments were largely obscured by the continuing dominance of the Congress party in most states. However, even within this broader framework, states have evolved extremely diverse political features, which stem from local governance patterns and socioeconomic configurations specific to every state, as well as from their political history (Yadav-Palshikar; 2008). Therefore, examining state power sharing patterns and political economy is an essential method of understanding India's political dynamics.

The Samyukta Maharashtra, established on 1 May 1960, was the culmination of "a process that began many decades before. The geographically adjacent units of Marathi-speaking people were united under a single governmental body. Prior to the formation of Samyukta Maharashtra, Vidarbha Region belonged to the Central

Province, which subsequently became Madhya Pradesh. His legal name was 'MP and Berar.' He was lawful. The area of Berar [Vidarbha] was linked to Maharashtra. The Marathwada area was also part of the State of Hyderabad which, until September 1948, was governed by the Nizam. Nawab of Hyderabad was compelled by police to incorporate his State into the Union of India. The Marathi spoken region of the state of Hyderabad [Marathwada] was thus part of Maharashtra. The new entity is thus referred to as 'Samyukta Maharashtra.' To comprehend the political process in Maharashtra, one must understand the historical factors underlying it. As we know, there is no political process in the vaccine. Therefore, the history of this area in the contemporary period must be understood.

The west and centre portion of India is occupied by Maharashtra. It is the country's second biggest population state (11 pounds) and its third largest in terms of geographical size (3.08 lakh square kilometers). Maharashtra has a rich historical and cultural heritage and was also a prominent area in the fields of education, literature and culture in India. In the years after independence, Maharashtra was one of the most sophisticated economies. Maharashtra now accounts for 9.3 percent of India's total population and its share in domestic income is about 15 percent, which is the largest among all states. Maharashtra's per capita income is Rs. 1,17,091, which is also the highest in the country<sup>1</sup>. It is one of the most urbanised and industrialised countries in India, with 45% of the urban population, compared to 31% in India as a whole. The development of the industry in Maharashtra in the industrial belt, primarily including Mumbai-Thane-PuneNashik and Aurangabad, is nevertheless concentrated.

During the 2014 Maharashtra Assembly elections, every political party chose to compete individually for the polls, instead of establishing an alliance or a front. There was a lot of uncertainty until September 2014 when candidates were nominated for the October 2014 elections. This caused uncertainty among supporters and voters, but it did not affect the political parties at all. BJP, Shiv Sena, Congress and the NCP agreed to run for their own elections. From Congress and the NCP have their roots in politics since the foundation of the state of Maharashtra, both parties had no lack of contestants.

### **Literature Review**

Francesca R.Jensenius, RikhilR.Bhavnani (2019), Governments across the globe have skewed the allocation of government resources for political advantage. But is such a politicalisation of the distribution of resources affecting growth paths in the long term? We concentrate on the long-term consequences of elementary education voting for the governing alliance in India. We look at whether the region covered by members of the governing coalition had more literacy gains over the last 30 years, using a proximate-election instrumental variable design and relying on a new socio-economic dataset from Indian assembly districts in 1971 and 2001. In the general data or the relevant sub-samples, we find no indication of this. The null findings are accurately calculated and compatible with OLS and 2SLS and various robustness tests. These results indicate that the political allocation of certain money in the near term does not alter the trajectory of long-term development.

BenaraMisraShuchi (2014), In the post-liberalization framework, the creation of jobs in the rural non-farmer sector showed significant increase throughout India, while growth in employment was somewhat static in Maharashtra. The aim of the present

study is to investigate the structure, growth and potential for development of non-farm activities for rural Maharashtra employment generation and the determinants of entry into this sector of employment after liberalisation since Maharashtra is one of the most urbanised states in India and also has the greatest incidences of farmers sui. The paper therefore proposes the implementation of appropriate education and training programmes, taking into consideration the local conditions of the state region, in order to increase the skills of the rural population that would benefit and give better opportunities for employment in the non-farm sector.

Wankhede Harish S (2019), The modern Dalit movement in Maharashtra is characterised by five separate trends: increasing militancy, sub-caste affirmation, middle class activism, public symbols and a shift to the right. This is mostly shown not through political mobilisation but in socio-cultural areas. The congruence and difference between these and the normative political goal of B R Ambedkar must be examined.

Rosamond L Naylor, Ju Young Lee, Anjuli Jain Figueroa and Steven M Gorelick (2020), Sugar is India's second biggest agricultural sector and has a significant impact on water, food and energy security throughout the nation. In this article, we utilise a nexus method to evaluate the interrelated problems of India's water-food energy sector, with an emphasis on the political economics of the sugar business in Maharashtra, one of the biggest countries in the world. Our study highlights three things. First, official backing for the sugar sector is likely to continue since politicians are closely connected to it. Continued measures that stimulate sugar production have sealed political interests. With the production of surplus sugar, the government has implemented new measures to minimise this excess and safeguard the sugar sector. This strategy has the advantage of improving energy security and establishing the Indian market for excess sugar. Our analyses demonstrate that a national biofuel strategy encouraging the development of sugar cane juice ethanol vs molasses can contribute to reducing human consumption subsidised sugar without necessarily increasing water and land use in further sugar cane cultivation.

### Status of Electricity Sector in Maharashtra

In Maharashtra there are four distribution licensees: Maharashtra State Electricity distribution Company Ltd (MSEDCL), Reliance Infrastructure Limited (RInfra), Bombay Electricity Supply and Transportation (BEST), and Tata Power Company (TPC). Of the overall state-level charge of 20,147 MW, MSEDCL provided about 17,694 MW during 2015, while the rest 2,453 MW was delivered by the other three distribution licensees. The Mumbai utilities have already achieved 100% power generation and 24X7 power deliveries for its customers.

Table 1: Distribution Companies in Maharashtra

Licensee	License Area	Number of Consumers	Energy Sales (MU)
MSEDCL	Entire State	2,31,28,000	90,433 (82%)
R-Infra	Suburban Mumbai	23,91,639 (Retail)	7675 (7%)
BEST	Town Area Mumbai	10,10,299	4419 (4%)
Tata Power	Suburban Mumbai and Town Area (Parallel License)	4,92,610	6261 (7%)
Total		2,70,22,548	1,08,788 (100%)

Of the 21,4 million customers of the MSEDCL, 14,3 million are residential, 3,7 million farmers, 1,47 million commercial and 3, 70, 000 are industrial, 12,000 are high-voltage power users in the late category and consumption is one or more MW per month. As of March 2014, the state has about 18.73 rural lakhs and 0.63 urban lakhs which were yet to be electrified. Over the last several years, the financial situation of MSEDCL has been severely affected by issues such as lower than 100% collection effectiveness and the increase in bad debt. MSEDCL supplies energy to farmers representing more than 26 percent of its overall sales. The government's subsidies to farming and electricity use was a subject of heated political controversy in Maharashtra. Not only did the government maintain the subsidy for such groups, but the level of subsidy rose continuously even after the reforms, from Rs. 493 crore in 2001–02 to Rs. 4057 crore in 2011–12.

In recent years, the growing cost of electricity has been a significant problem for the industry. The cost of MSEB/MSEDCL for electricity procurement rose from 25% (2003) to 80% (2013) of the overall income need. MSEDCL's exercise in power buying has been controversial for a long time.

### **Increasing Domination of Industry and State Balance**

In Maharashtra, the SS-BJP alliance was unable to maintain its control. In addition to its lack of performance at several levels, the signing of a deal with Enron substantially led to its electoral default. The Nationalist-Congress Party (NCP) coalition came to power for three consecutive terms in November 1999. The major power and water portfolios were maintained by leading NCP leaders such as Padmasinha Patil, Dilip Walse-Patil, Sunil Tatkare, and Ajit Pawar.

In the Enron era, the openness provided by 1998's Law of the Regulatory Commission was seen by social and political activists in Maharashtra as transformational after the opaque decision-making and non-responsive State administrations. This phase was characterised by the successful involvement of the CSOs in Maharashtra in the utilisation of newly created regulatory mechanisms to guarantee the MSEB is accountable and to fight firm interests in the sector. The regulatory committees were reformist in character and sought to discipline commercial and public services. On the other side, the state administration and the MSEB were defensive and sought to limit the destruction created by transparency and customer involvement in the tariff process. In order to reduce the influence of the political class, the Maharashtra administration was not in favour of setting up a state energy regulating body during the SS-BJP regime. The expert organisations like Prayas were also dubious of the Orissa restructuring model because they believed it was extremely "disposed to sabotage," as the Commission lacked compulsory measures on openness and direct public liability. After the rate increase by MSEB in 1998, several consumer organisations moved to the High Court to ask for a commission. In March 1999, the High Court decision granted the State Government the ultimatum to appoint the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission within six months. MERC was thus formed on 5 August 1999. The first MERC chairman was P. Subrahmanyam, Maharashtra's former chief secretary. The two other members were former chief secretary (home) Venkat Chary and independent industrial engineer Jayant Deo.

The initial tariff proposal states that 84 percent of farmers' customers have been charged a flat rate tariff. The statistics showed that only 50% of the usage of the MSEB

was measured, of which over 50% were charged on the basis of either average or minimum charges<sup>35</sup>. According to MSEB, there were 22 lakh farmers<sup>36</sup>. It mandated the measurement of unspecified users (e.g. farmers, poultry, power lines, waterworks and high-voltage industrial users) within 3 years, by 31 March 2003.

### **New Challenges and New Interests**

Two main processes characterized this period along with the clash between industry and agriculture. One is the rivalry between private companies in Mumbai, while the other is the growing impact of private power producers with which MSEDCL has inked electricity buying agreements. The involvement of the APTEL and the Supreme Court was also important in this phase, emphasizing that procedures in the energy industry are clearly juridical. Although the old actors and old problems continued, the new players and the new procedures further complicated the situation and presented new challenges to many actors in the industry.

### **Private Utilities in Mumbai**

There are four firms in Mumbai: RInfra, (formerly BSES), BEST, TPC, MSEDCL. TPC has traditionally produced and provided energy to BSES, BEST and individual big customers. While RInfra was electricity reliant on the TPC, it did not enter a long-term treaty with the TPC. When TPC demonstrated that it could not provide RInfra with electricity, it went to legal struggles in 2007 and 2009<sup>77</sup>. The decision of the court was nevertheless in favour of the TPC. To prevent load shedding, RInfra bought expensive electricity from the market, resulting in higher power costs and therefore higher losses. The TPC requested the right to parallel licencing in the RInfra licencing region during that time. Again a lengthy legal fight took place, which took place in different fora and concluded in favour of the TPC. Since the tariff of TPC was much cheaper than that of RInfra, many big industrial customers moved to TPC-D. Finally, the MERC interfered, first of all by imposing different fees to customers moving and, secondly, by limiting TPC's usage of the RInfra distribution network.

The situation in the electricity industry in Mumbai has grown very complicated, with a host of regulatory directives and judgments by APTEL and the Supreme Court giving conflicting interpretations of laws. In addition, the anticipation that competition would lead to tariff cuts was not met. In reality, both private firms failed to acquire electricity via competitive bidding, claiming many reasons.

### **Increasing Role of Private Power Producers**

MSEDCL has implemented a competitive capacity-adding bidding procedure in light of the increasing demand gap in the State. By signing a deal with private power manufacturers including Adani Power Maharashtra, LancoKondapalli Power, JSW Energy, Indiabulls Power Research and Emco Energy<sup>80</sup>, it contracted 6.115 MW of capability. In the first bidding round, MSEDCL signed PPAs for about 2 000 MW. However, the PPAs with Lanco have been disputed by MSEDCL due of procedural delays. The agreements with JSW and Adani were also contested because they requested tariff adjustments on the grounds that coal prices were increasing after the lowest price in the offer process had been quoted. The MERC, however, approved these private businesses' case and granted them compensating tariffs. It was the APTEL case, which rejected Adani's compensating tariffic, which said that regulatory

bodies had no authority to award compensation tariffs if the competitive bidding procedure was discovered<sup>82</sup>. Meanwhile, the CERC urged the Department of Power to amend the legislation appropriately in order to expand the scope of regulatory involvement in the compensating tariff decisions<sup>83</sup>. MoP wrote to state commissions on the recommendation of CERC and urged them to deal with these problems case by case. Almost all projects in Maharashtra filed complaints before the MERC for adjustment of the tariff found after issue of this letter. Thus, all of the capacity contracted by MSEDCL via competitive offerings has been litigated and upgrading rates are very likely.

### **Ambition: Employment Guaranteed Scheme (EGS) in the Context of Public Works Programmes**

There is a clear appeal for the notion that public money should be spent on employing individuals who would otherwise be without jobs and nourishment if rains or crops fail in impoverished agricultural economies. Most of the same reasons are applicable whether the local weather patterns are unexpected or predictable seasonal unemployment periods in highly seasonal agricultural settings. Employing needy people in earth-movement activities not only provides them with income but also allows them to build up the types of infrastructure that would help diversify the local economy in future and protect it from bad weather or excessive seasonality - such as irrigation, drainage, land, water and conservation facilities, new forests or local roads. In addition, there should be not too many difficulty diverting these public resources to the unnecessary, because only truly needy individuals will find themselves doing arduous physical labour. Aid donors were frequently eager to finance this type of activity by buying and transferring food excess from agricultural protection and subsidies in the wealthy nations to impoverished ones. No explanation is needed for the predominance of rural public labour programmes in impoverished agricultural nations.

One approach is to set up labour-intensive programmes for public work. Few governments responsible for significant rural impoverished populations were able to withstand pressure to do so. Another issue is to perform the task given for the EGS well: a) construct a decent, long lasting local infrastructure, and b) offer jobs, at the appropriate volumes and at the right places, to satisfy unexpected local requirements. Why is it so hard? Three major explanations exist.

The first is short-sighted: corruption. It is particularly simple for supervisors to cheat on the job done and the number of persons engaged in labour-intensive tasks. In a monsoon environment as in India, it's much easier: in one year or less, any visible earth shortages which should be relocated may be attributed to heavy rains washing the soil.<sup>5</sup> Substantial amounts of public works funds might, without adequate monitoring, be diverted to the wrong pockets.

The other reason is the issue of the weak client: impoverished rural people who require physical jobs, since the rain usually doesn't have the political voice until it's too late. If desperate enough, people could start flocking to town and protesting and forcing government to provide employment or else offer assistance. But this is both inefficient and cruel. It is much better for prospective employees to unite early to beg for employment if they see difficulties in their area. Part of the brilliance of the EGS design was the inclusion of an early warning system.

The third factor is complicated planning issues. Even the most labor-intensive public work projects need much more than a bunch of eager workers to take picks and shovels on site. Prior planning and other contributions are required. The bigger and more advanced the project, the more compelling these planning and logistical concerns are. The ditches around local roads may be cleared with just unskilled workers with minimal planning and few additional resources besides supervision and permission of financing. On the other hand, the first building of the road - or irrigation or soil protection facility - is a more complicated undertaking and the planning horizon considerably longer: I the locations of the project must be studied and the plans drawn up and authorised.

- (ii) Expenditure plans must be developed and integrated with the designs concerned.
- (iii) In many instances the acquisition and/or due legal procedure of land must be done, either via the authorization of private owners or appropriate government authorities (Lieberman 1985: 114-16; Echeverri-Gent 1988).
- (iv) Assembly and deployment of a variety of complementary inputs, as needed. These could include, inter alia: supervisors to organise the work on a daily basis and technicians to monitor and authorise payments on a regular basis; qualified or specialised labour to perform work of masonry or carpentry or break stones; tractors and other mechanics for the transport of materials from distant places, including steel, water or impermeable soils.
- (v) Where construction is not complete prior to the beginning of the new agricultural season and needs to be delayed for several months, washout proof during the upcoming monsoon rains may be necessary. In the first few years of the EGS, we describe the issue of unfinished works.

### **THE POLITICAL NEXUS OF SUGAR COOPERATIVES**

The Maharashtra state has one dominating caste, the Marathas, which spans the whole state and also dominates the political landscape. The relative unity and stability of the Congress Party in Maharashtra is mainly attributed to the predominance of Maratha. In contrast to Maharashtra, none of India's other countries have a regional hegemonic supremacy equal to the marathas (Lele, 1981). In Maharashtra, the Marathas are believed to account for 40% of the population and have control of over 80% of political power positions. Its prevalence is seen in the western Maharashtra area in particular. Beside its closeness to the state capital, Mumbai and a strong transportation network, it is the sugar lobby or sugar 'baron' which provides the west area in state politics the advantage over others.

The sugar plant is managed by a board of directors. The prestige, financial gain and patronage associated with the management and chairmanship of a sugar cooperative are significant. Baviskar (1980) gives a fairly clear explanation of the position of elected Board members. The prestige and authority of a president and the directors makes them very popular with political parties that give them tickets for elections - both state and municipal. Therefore, these posts are extremely desirable and much sought after by local leaders. Factory elections are thus heavily fought. Khekale (1999) observed in his 1952-72 research that 74% of the sugar cooperative chairmen were elected lawmakers and MPs. Controlling large cooperatives, such as sugar companies, enables political leaders to develop a hierarchy of parties and governments and in turn helps them to get nominated on the boards of many other cooperatives, particularly

cooperative banks. Thus, a "two-way" connection has flourished between cooperatives and other power institutions.

In turn, the sugar sector contributed greatly to electoral money during electoral elections. Baviskar (1968) has sufficient evidence to support this. Sugar co-operatives occasionally even hosted political party election gatherings and offered different amenities. Sugar cooperatives usually supply the workforce and cars for election campaigns.

Being the relationship between sugar cooperatives and politics, the birth of cooperatives itself is inclined to ascribe to the political influence of the wealthy Maratha farmers. However, Attwood (1993) warns against 'reading history back' and crediting early cooperatives to the state's Marathas' political authority. In his opinion, the fact that, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, State could adopt land reform laws that were contrary to the interests of cane farmers indicates that cane growers lacked the political strength to prevent legislation from being enacted. It is a different problem because wealthy farmers then bypassed the barrier by relocating the land among family members.

### **Post-1990 Political Economy**

The above parts record the development and subsequent waning of the Congress Party's political supremacy and the shaping and weakening of Marathe's hegemony on the one hand. As far as the fortunes of parties are concerned, we must recognise the capacity of democratic competition to regularly disrupt established political supremacy. Electoral politics and party politics have their own autonomy in that they form both on the basis of their internal dynamics and the environment in which they function. However, in the political economy, a deeper knowledge of the political process must be found. But in most scholarly and popular studies, party politics is viewed in isolation as if it had nothing to do with the political economy. In this part, we will place Maharashtra politics in the wider social and economic characteristics that are vital to understanding the policy of the state.

If Maharashtra now has different distortions and insufficiencies, the roots of these distortions may be found in the government's political economy. The distortions are evident in the (im)balance between agriculture and the economy's non-agrarian sector; in the character of urban expansion and regional development imbalance. These inequalities and distortions are closely associated with the state's political process. We are discussing this problem because the political process appears increasingly unable to interfere with the chain of distortions and this failure has become a fundamental feature of state politics and governance.

By political success in the upheaval of the Marathi-speaking State, Maharashtra won control of Mumbai, but it did not imply that Mumbai really controlled the direction of growth that Mumbai-based materials wanted and dictated. In the 1950s and 1960s the approach of pumping resources in the cooperative sector was successful. The "Green Revolution" also enabled the state to maintain an acceptable difference between urban and rural areas. The political master stroke of the Employment Guarantee Scheme differentiated the state administration from others in the 1970s, when droughts devastated the agricultural sector. During the era 1960-1975, these variables controlled the distortions. In the Mumbai-Thane-Raigad-Pune-Nasik region (and subsequently in a lesser sense Aurangabad), while permitting industrial growth, the



state has chosen a plan to alleviate agricultural pain via cooperatives, irrigation and a green revolution.

In the course of the green revolution, agricultural development created a part of the agricultural classes which derived their material power from agriculture but increasingly allied with non-agrarian objectives. The conflict between agricultural and non-agrarian interests was therefore addressed at one level—at the top level. It did not disintegrate at the level of subalterns. Furthermore, the rural agricultural elite which allied with non-agrarian interests had to rely on the rural subordinates for political support. This required politics to dictate and govern the economy only nominally, and political elites would attempt to divorce "electoral support" from political choice (PalshikarDeshpande; 2003). Many of the post-1980 policies may be explained in terms of this new structure and the origins of the downfall of Congress can also be found in this trend.

### **Conclusion**

Now the Energy Ministry intends to create a differential farm pricing structure depending on the size of its land and crops it cultivates. It involves metering all agricultural customers, which is an unattainable job according to MSEDCL. Data acquired from MSEDCL at the last tariff hearing showed that half of the circulars and 83 percent of the 4021 feeders, for which there are data, had negative losses indicating flagrant MSEDCL data manipulation. It would thus seem that the governing coalition now has little scope to manoeuvre and effect behavioural changes, either through bureaucracies or by dominating interest groups. The trajectory of the EGS was similar to that of a number of other comparable programmes: it was built in a breath of excitement and political activity; it became routineered and lost its glamour; it was originally a godsend for rural workers, and was 'exposed' to rural employers as a disguised giveaway. The Scheme has failed to live up to its supporters' extremely high hopes or the overblown concerns of its opponents about its possible harmful consequences.

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