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THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON THE IRAQI MILITARY INSTITUTION 1976-1979

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the research is to shedding light on the Iraqi Military Institution between 1976-1979, because it was an important period that this institution went through, and was greatly affected by the internal political events and developments that the Iraqi political arena witnessed. The research concluded that the Iraqi military establishment witnessed during this period a struggle between its main members to control it and take over the political affairs in Iraq. It has been exposed to a process of ideological organization organized by the Baath authority to conform to its vision and achieve its goals, and to ensure the loyalty of its leaders to the authority, by appointing Baathist officers in important positions within the military Institution and granting them broad powers that exceed the powers of the two leaders. It granted members of the Arab Socialist Baath Party the authority to manage military units, not military commanders and commanders who did not belong to the party, all important decisions within this institution were taken by the Baathists, to achieve the party's goals. The Iraqi military Institution became a tool to establish the rule of the Baath authority and to suppress its opponents, so it participated in practically suppressing the uprisings that took place against it.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of this research stems from the fact that it sheds light on the Iraqi military institution that was affected by the internal political events that Iraq witnessed and affected it greatly, and played an important role in consolidating the authority of the Baath in the second half of the seventies of the last century, and enabled it to suppress its opponents, and among the reasons for choosing the topic (the impact of The internal political developments on the Iraqi military establishment (1976-1979) is to reveal the

extent of the impact of the political events and developments witnessed by the Iraqi political arena on the military establishment, and to show the ways and methods adopted by the Baath authority to control it, as well as the close connection between the Iraqi military establishment and the political events that occurred in Iraq in the period (1976-1979).

The research dealt with the exposure of the Iraqi military establishment to a purge of non-Baathist military leaders, the Baath authority's control over it and its role in suppressing the opposition for the period between 1976 and 1977, and the struggle for power and the control of the Arab Socialist Baath Party over it. In July 1979, and the methods he used to ensure his loyalty to him. The research relied on a group of sources, most notably the documents of the US State Department (Foreign Relations of the United State), which stands for (F.R.U.S), from which the researcher drew information about Saddam Hussein's rise to power, the liquidation of his political and military opponents, and the appointment of loyalists to the Baath authority in the military establishment.

The research also benefited from some Arab and foreign books and encyclopedias, including Con Coughlin's book (Saddam: The Secret Life), which provided the research with information about granting Saddam Hussein influential military positions to his relatives, and his methods to weaken his rival Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, and the Hassan Latif al-Zubaidi encyclopedia (Encyclopedia of Iraqi Politics), from which the study benefited by identifying some personalities. As for the most prominent foreign books that provided the research with valuable information, the book of the Iraqi armed forces was an analytical history (Iraq's Armed Forces an Analytical history) by its authors (Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama), which provided the research with information about the purification of the institution The Iraqi military and the control of members of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party over it.

First. The control of the Baath authority over the Iraqi military establishment and its role in suppressing the opposition 1976-1977

As soon as the Baath authority succeeded in getting rid of most of the influential military leaders in the Iraqi military establishment in the first half of the seventies of the last century, and was able to end the Kurdish armed movement, it began in the second half of that decade to seek to restore its internal situation and strengthen its grip on the military establishment More importantly, to make it affiliated with the party and the civil authority, and on this basis, the Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (Al-Zaidi, 1990,) on January 6, 1976 granted the highest military rank in the army to his deputy, Saddam Hussein (Zenati, 2007), so he became a staff team (Al-Husseini, 2015), to be able to impose his control over all security institutions and the Intelligence Service (Hashem, 2015).

After this promotion, Saddam Hussein began the process of slow encroachment and ideological domination of the military institution to make it a tool in his hand first, and in the hands of the Baath authority second, and invested the efforts of his loyalists to

liquidate his opponents in it, and to prevent any coup attempt, and to be able to carry out modernizations on the military institution without concern (Al-Hakim, 2007), and began Putting the security services under his direct supervision, which resulted in the appointment of a large number of loyalists to the authority, especially after an explosion occurred in the center of Baghdad on December 23, 1976, so the authority deployed a group of secret informants within the military establishment (Al-Haddad, 2009).

This procedure led to the transformation of the Iraqi army and the entire military establishment into a tool of internal repression in the hands of the Baath authority, and an implementer of the policy of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. , which was supervised by the Higher Committee for Northern Affairs headed by Saddam Hussein (Al-Douri, 2014).

At the beginning of 1977, Saddam Hussein began preparing to assume the role of the first man in the political authority and the military establishment, and his first step in this direction was to take over his cousin and brother-in-law, Adnan Khairallah Talfah (Sebahi, 2004), gradually important positions in the party and the army, which began by appointing him as a member of the party's regional leadership. In January of the same year (al-Mu'min, 2004), and he pushed him to suppress movements opposed to the authority, when the Safar uprising (Abdul-Jabbar, 2010) broke out on February 5, 1977, Adnan Khairallah Talfah participated in suppressing it in a sectarian manner, and the Shiite military found themselves accused of plotting against the Baath authority, for their sympathy with the Shiite masses Which was performing the ceremonies commemorating the Husseini rites (Al-Khafaji, 2016) on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him), by walking on foot from the province of Najaf and nearby cities to Karbala, after the security authorities warned them and prevented them from commemorating this occasion, which led to clashes between the two parties , made the authority issue orders to the army leadership to suppress the participants in the Husseini rituals, and this task was supposed to be undertaken by the First Mechanized Military Division, which was based in Diwaniyah, and it is the military unit closest geographically to Najaf. Since most of its officers and ranks are Shiites, and they make up (95%) of them, the army command used the Third Armored Division, which was based in Tikrit, and it had one brigade camped in the Musayyib district in Babil Governorate, which is the Sixth Armored Brigade, because the percentage of Sunnis in it (80-90%), and Al-Takarta constitutes the largest percentage in it, as he also participated with the Eighth Mechanized Brigade located in Ramadi to suppress the uprising (Kaddouri, 2006).

The government authorities issued orders to the army leadership to bring all the army units in a state of extreme alert, and the military columns charged with suppressing the uprising, led by Adnan Khairallah Talfah, arrived on February 7, 1977, and mobilized on the road leading to Karbala (Makiya, 2001), and were supported by two MiG warplanes that flew A low level to intimidate the visitors, but they were unable to perform any duty because one of them fell in Lake Al-Razzaza and the other fell in the Musayyab district. To this, one of the historians indicated that the position of the army personnel was honorable when he said: "This military force rejected the orders of the

regime and rebelled against it, even that the One of the senior officers in it climbed onto one of the tanks and stripped the regime, exposed it and declared its sympathy and support for the revolting masses, while some soldiers in their official uniforms were seen participating with the masses.

As a result of the army's stance towards the uprising, the Ba'ath authority sent a vehicle belonging to the security services behind every military tanker carrying those who were arrested, to prevent the drivers from helping the detainees escape. The authorities were also concerned about the cooperation of the military in Prison No. 1 located in Al-Rasheed Camp with the detainees, which This led to the imprisonment of a large number of them on charges of participating in the uprising (Coughlin, 2005), and on February 23, 1977, a special court was formed to try the defendants participating in the uprising. Eight of them were sentenced to death, and fifteen others to life imprisonment, including Mr. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Authors Group, 2011) despite the fact that no Notify him to come to court for fear of disturbances during his trial (Taqqosh, 2015).

It seems that the use of power by the army to suppress the uprising with all its cruelty stems from the secular ideology of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, which refuses to mix religion and politics, and party members have always been suspicious of the intentions of the clergy, regardless of their sectarian affiliation, even if their movements were purely religious.

Secondly. The struggle for power and the control of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party over the Iraqi military establishment 1977-1978

In addition, Saddam Hussein was a deceitful and violent person at the same time. His second step to control the political situation in Iraq was to weaken the position of President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in the Revolutionary Command Council, so he made the necessary arrangements by appointing ten new members loyal to him in the Council, to become loyal to him. Within the Council (14) members out of (21) members, which gave it a comfortable majority in it, to take any decision in line with its policy (Mustafa, 2015, p. 39-94).

Thus, in September 1977, the Council was able to exclude two senior Baath members suspected of loyalty to Saddam Hussein from the Council on the pretext of their sympathy for the (zero) uprising, namely, Minister of Health Izzat Mustafa (Mustafa, 2015, p. 39-94) and Minister of Industry Falih Hassan al-Jassem, and replaced them with two other members loyal to Saddam Hussein, Burhan al-Din Mustafa. Mohi Abdul-Hussein al-Mashhadani (Al-Douri, 2014, p. 313), and at the same time strengthened his grip on the military establishment, by handing over his loyal relatives to high positions in the military establishment. In October 1977, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr relinquished the position of Defense Minister, which he had held since July 1974, to Adnan. Khairallah Talfah (Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, op. cit., p. 207-208).

With the rise of Adnan Khairallah Tilfah to the position of Minister of Defense, the military institution became completely under Saddam Hussein's control, after his family

and clan members gradually occupied most of the sensitive military and security institutions. Barzan Al-Tikriti (Zenati, 2007, p. 422), his half-brother, was head of the General Intelligence Directorate (ibid.), And dominate as well He was responsible for a number of important security departments, as Saddam Hussein's close friend Saadoun Shakir (ibid.) was head of the National Security Office, and took over the task of communicating directly reports to him about opponents of him and the Baathist authority, while Watban, his other half-brother, assumed the position of Governor of Tikrit, and the third brother Sabawi He assumed the presidency of the Public Security Agency, and his uncle, Khairallah Talfah, the governor of Baghdad (Coughlin, 2005, p. 151).

In order to run the military institution according to his desire, he headed a special committee he formed to carry out the task of contracts on military equipment and supplies for the Iraqi army. It included Adnan Khairallah Talfah and Deputy Prime Minister Adnan Hussein al-Hamdani (Al-Douri, p.316), who played an important role in building the Iraqi arsenal of weapons during that period. On the other hand, the role of President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr has increasingly diminished, and his role has become much less than being a figurehead of the republic, so that the Iraqis began to refer to the Republican Palace as (the Unknown Soldier) to indicate his ineffectiveness, and the president began to face health problems as a result of psychological pressures (Coughlin, 2005, p. 153) on him, which made him A superficial figure in the Baathist authority, and he has no influence on the military establishment, and all those who work in his private office regularly report his news to the office of his deputy, Saddam Hussein, who became the central office for the administration of power and the military establishment (The Iraqi Gazette, 1977).

The arbitrary measures of the Ba'ath authority did not exclude any military who is on duty or out of service, and in order to control retired, expelled and resigned army officers, monitor their movements, and justify their arrest, the authority prevented them from carrying out any commercial activity, or working for Iraqi and foreign companies, not even being an officer An employer unless he obtains approvals exclusively from the Revolutionary Command Council, and Revolutionary Command Council Resolution No. (1213) on November 6, 1977 states that whoever violates this is subject to imprisonment for a period of no less than three years and not more than five years (A group of authors, p.388).

Saddam Hussein increased psychological pressure on the President of the Republic, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, to give up his position, by killing his son Muhammad in a car accident with his wife Nidal Abdul Karim al-Nada on March 26, 1978, as well as killing his son-in-law Mazhar al-Mutlaq, who were both opposed to the abuses of Saddam Hussein's relatives, and then His personal escort, as well as his secretary, Brigadier Hamid Al-Tikriti, was killed in two separate, mysterious incidents (Taqqosh, 2015, p. 335).

The Baath authority felt the importance of reducing the possibility of the army and security services having an opposing role, so it began to tighten the control of those

close to Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein over it. To get rid of military leaders suspected of their loyalty to it, in July 1978 he led a campaign to purge the army of these elements, and the result was the deportation of more than (450) officers, including the commander of the air force and a number of commanders of military divisions, and orders were also issued to execute (60) other officers.

The campaigns to purge the army coincided with the Baath authority's use of a new mechanism to control the military institution, to make it subservient to the regime by spreading the ideology of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party within its units. The important decisions within the joints of this institution are taken by the Baathists, in order to meet the goals and requirements of the party, and the authority has prohibited any gathering within the military institution for non-Baathists, to the extent that doubts were raised about any gathering by the military within their units to celebrate social events, and a number of members of the institution were recruited to transfer Periodic reports on any meeting of leaders and members of the army for fear of plotting against the authority.

Through the foregoing, it appears that the goal of empowering the Ba'athists within the military units is to paralyze the orders of the non-Baathist senior Iraqi army officers, and to prevent them from creating a collective identity for them away from the Ba'ath party.

In addition, the Ba'ath authority relied, in implementing its policy towards the military, on the political elite of low social status. , in return for obtaining special privileges, better than the privileges obtained by independent military personnel who do not belong to the Ba'ath Party (Coughlin, ,p.151-152).

Thus, the Baath authority was able to make all the military leaders in the military establishment loyal to it in general, and Saddam Hussein in particular, and most of them were from his family and those close to him, and the other army leaders were no longer able to coordinate among themselves to make any attempt to overthrow the authority of the Baath, and they were also exposed For the constant movement within the joints of the military institution, in a way that does not enable them to stabilize and establish their positions there, and to ensure that the authority places them in positions that enable it to monitor them (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008, p.109).

Third. Saddam Hussein's control of the Iraqi military establishment 1979

Disputes escalated between President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy, Saddam Hussein, following the presentation of the second on July 9, 1979, to Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr for signature, stipulating the execution of three hundred religious figures headed by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and when he refused to sign it, Saddam Hussein threatened him that he would meet the same fate if they He did not insist on the refusal, so he tried to obtain the approval of the Revolutionary Command Council for the execution, but he also clashed with their refusal, and asked some of them to be slow in this matter, while the other part requested the exception of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr from the execution (Al-Marashi and Salama, op. cit., p. 110.).

Saddam Hussein decided to assume the position of President of the Republic in any way, so he assigned his uncle Khairallah Tulfah with this task to persuade the president to give up his position. On the morning of July 16, 1979, he met with President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his son Haitham and in the presence of Defense Minister Adnan Khairallah at Khairallah Tulfah's house. He was presented with Saddam Hussein's proposal in this regard, but Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr did not agree, and an argument took place between bin Haitham and the Minister of Defense, which led to the latter being shot in the hand (Des Roches, 1999, p.33). However, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr chose to concede to Saddam Hussein in the end, apparently automatically, justifying this for health reasons that befell him, so it came as a voluntary waiver of all his responsibilities in the state and the party in favor of Saddam Hussein.

The military establishment entered a new stage when President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr relinquished his position on July 16, 1979, in favor of Saddam Hussein, as a result of pressure. To strengthen the military capacity of the Iraqi army, which was helped by the leniency of Western countries and companies with the Baathist authority

To benefit from it financially, due to its huge oil wealth, and the authority's direction to diversify its weapons and not rely on the Soviet Union only, which increased the budget of military spending on the purchase of Western weapons significantly, and in return the percentage of weapons purchases from the Soviet Union decreased (al-Mu'min, 2004, p.231).After Saddam Hussein was able to guarantee the loyalty of the military leaders in the military establishment, he was left with only the out-of-service military leaders, as well as the Baathist officers who participated with him in the 1968 coup, so he was worried that he would not be able to monitor them closely, so he sought to Getting rid of them, by various means and means, and implicating them in any conspiracy carried out against him, after five days of taking office, he claimed the discovery of a conspiracy to overthrow power carried out by a number of members of the party leadership, and a number of senior military leaders, with the support of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad(Hashem, p.425) and in coordination between a member of The leadership of the Iraqi country of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, Muhammad Ayesh al-Halbousi (Sassoon, 2012,p. 137) with a number of old party officers who participated with him in the coup of July 17, 1968, and the advisor at the Syrian Embassy in Baghdad, Wael al-Jaber, who was expelled after that, considering him persona non grata (Coughlin, p.155-156).

In light of the internal and external political conditions that Saddam Hussein reached, he had to establish his military authority in parallel with his political authority, in order to be able to stay at the top of the pyramid in Iraq for the longest possible period, so he portrayed his personality as a national military figure and a national military leader struggling against the conspiracies being hatched. On the people, after he granted himself the highest rank in the army, which is the rank of (majestic corner), he assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. His brutality, except for a few experienced leaders, by drawing close to him and declaring allegiance to him, then began to win the army's

officers and ranks at his side, by granting them new privileges. Any professional officer opposed to him in the military establishment announced the opening of the door to volunteer as an officer in the Iraqi army, and the most important condition he set for volunteering in the army was loyalty to the authority and the Baath Party.

One of the mechanisms that Saddam Hussein used to establish his military rule was to publish his pictures and erect statues of him in military uniform in public squares, in all cities of Iraq (Al-Zubaidi, p.554). And he pursued a policy of punishment and reward, according to The military's loyalty to him, without paying attention to the military laws, the promotions of army personnel were subject to this policy, and the promotions of army leaders became based on political loyalty to him in the first degree and to the Baath Party in the second degree and not on the competence of the officers.

According to this policy, a new campaign of arrests took place in the ranks of the military establishment at the end of 1979 on charges of conspiring to control the authority. 26 Communist officers were arrested, headed by the military human rights defender Salman Yusef Estefan (brahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, op. cit, p. 124), a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and they were subjected to torture in the Public Security Directorate to extract confessions. them, but as a result of the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and the communist bloc countries, the authority issued a pardon for them, and after their release from prison they took refuge in the mountainous areas in northern Iraq (David B. Des Roches, op. cit., p. 14).

It can be said that the political events and political developments in the Iraqi political arena enabled Saddam Hussein to gradually control the Iraqi military establishment. The political situation in Iraq in general and the military establishment in particular, so he was able to remove all his political opponents with the help of his relatives and those close to him who controlled the sensitive security and military positions, and then was able to rise to the pyramid of the military establishment, taking advantage of his political position as President of the Republic of Iraq to give himself the highest military rank in it, then He controlled it with his arbitrary measures, limiting the role of its leaders, executing them, or expelling them outside the institution.

CONCLUSIONS
The research reached the following results:

1. The Baath authority began to strengthen its grip on the Iraqi military institution after it managed in the first half of the seventies of the last century to get rid of the influential leaders in it, and worked to promote military figures close to it, and granted the second man in the Arab Socialist Baath Party the highest military rank in the country. The military establishment on January 6, 1976, represented by the figure of Saddam Hussein, to tighten control over the military establishment.
2. Since he was given the military rank, Saddam Hussein has imposed the influence of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party on the military institution in preparation for imposing his personal control over it, by placing the security services under his control, and exploiting the influence of those close to him to monitor the institution.

3. The military institution has become a tool of internal repression in the hands of the Baath authority, and the most prominent task it was assigned was to expel the Kurds from their place of residence in northern Iraq to southwestern Iraq.

4. Saddam Hussein began at the beginning of 1977 aspiring to impose his complete personal control over the military institution, taking advantage of the presence of his relatives there, led by Adnan Khairallah Talfah, who gradually assumed important positions in the party and the army. I began appointing him as a member of the party's regional leadership in January of 1977, and he was charged with the suppression of the Safar Intifada in February of the same year.

5. The conflict intensified in September 1977 over power and control of the Iraqi military establishment between the Baathist military and civilians, during which Saddam Hussein was able to liquidate his opponents in the party and the Revolutionary Command Council, executed a number of them, and appointed members loyal to him in their place. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was forced in October On the first of the same year, he ceded the position of Minister of Defense to Adnan Khairallah, in order to be able to fully tighten his control over the military establishment.

6. Saddam Hussein's measures to control the military establishment did not exclude the retired or expelled military personnel from engaging in any political or commercial activity, and he began to interpret the ideas of the Arab Socialist Baath Party on the military establishment, and he also increased his pressure on Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in 1978 to abdicate He left the position of President of the Republic until he was able to achieve this in July 1979, and granted himself the rank of majestic pillar, which is the only rank in the Iraqi military establishment.

7. At the end of 1979, Saddam Hussein became the first man in the military establishment after he assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and conducted a campaign of arrests for all his military opponents, even those who participated with him in the 1968 coup.

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