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### APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACTS OF SENATE OF PAKISTAN ON GENEVA ACCORD 1988

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This study inspects the influence exerted by Pakistan's Senate in shaping the Geneva Accord. The Accord was ratified in 1988, aimed with establishing stability and fostering peace in Afghanistan after a prolonged period of conflict. The Senate underwent to guarantee the enforcement of the Geneva Accord by highlighting the violation on several occasions. This study evaluates the role of Senate in determining the policies of government with reference to Geneva Accord. This study determines the role of Senate in formation of Pakistan's policy regarding Afghanistan and USSR with reference to Geneva Accord. This work enumerates how Pakistan helped to solve issues of Afghanistan and explains the role of Pakistan in Geneva Accord for the settlement between Afghanistan and USSR. The influence of Senate over Geneva Accord comes under the light. The study has been undertaken through a thorough analysis of Hansards by using qualitative, analytical and exploratory method. The analysis unfolds that the Senate had limited control over the Geneva Accord but tried to significantly impact Geneva Accord implementation. The House had not participated much in negotiation process due to several factors and could not become able to exert a significant influence as all decisions were taken by the executive of the country.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Afghanistan suffered from war for more than four decades, since the first anti-government revolts began in Kunar Province in October 1978 (Amstutz, 1986). Nur Muhammad Taraki, the leader of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan led a USSR backed government in Afghanistan that was much influenced by communist ideas and was not familiar with the stout nature of people of Afghanistan. After a year USSR invaded Afghanistan (Mehmud, 2013).

In March 1979, Herat faced the insurgence, which was suppressed by the government by use of power through army. It resulted in 5000 deaths including 100 Soviet Advisors that was unbearable for Soviet government (Coll, 2004). USSR decided to intervene in governmental structure of Afghanistan by replacing Tarki with Soviet backed Hafeez Ullah Amin (Tanner, 2002). Revolt blew out most part of the country in August, while in Kunar it was curbed by Soviet backed troops which were equipped with tanks and gunship helicopters resultantly many civilians were killed. This situation resulted to take final decision about Afghanistan for regime change. Therefore, on December 12, 1979 Kremlin leadership finalized to send their Red Army troops to step up the Communist Revolution in Afghanistan.

In December 1979, USSR made invasion in Afghanistan for two reasons. The first reason was to promote the communism in Afghanistan and to safeguard its investment that it made in Afghanistan since 1919. Secondly, USSR desired to eradicate the government of Hafizullah Amin due to its ties with US government (Raees, 1994). USSR tried to infuse its backed government to fulfil its ambitions. The presence of US and USSR in the Afghanistan at same time may cause another rivalry that tends toward another cold war. During that decade Afghanistan persisted as central point of the world politics and still its reverberations are present in the world.

Pakistan and Afghanistan wanted to solve Afghan crisis by dialogue. Kabul government wanted to stop intervention from Pakistan, while Pakistan wanted the exclusion of USSR from Afghanistan and a board-based government should be established there that would be able to do something for returning of Afghan refugees because Pakistan was hosting more than three million Afghan refugees. That was a burden over the economy of Pakistan which was creating problems for Pakistan.

### ***First Round of Geneva Talks***

For the settlement between Afghanistan and Pakistan Geneva Negotiation was started in June 1982. Which prohibited the neighboring country would not interfere in Afghanistan's internal matters. At that point Soviet Union objected the US interference in Afghanistan. From June 16-24 1982, the first round of the Geneva Talks was held. It was suggested that a content of a comprehensive settlement should be made. Non-interference, interrelationship, Withdraw of Afghan refugees on the basis of international guarantees were made in this content was made. UN Secretary General Cordovez gave the idea of guarantees by both Super powers. Yuri Andropov, new Soviet leader showed flexibility for solving Afghan issue after attending the funeral ceremony of Brezhnev the USSR president. In March 1983, Andropov met with UN Secretary General Cordovez and familiarized him with the narrative of USSR and explicated the problem of USSR during the war (Sattar, 2010).

### ***Second Round of Geneva Talks***

In 1983, Andropov felt that the solution of Afghan issue was only political settlement. At that point UN Secretary General Cordovez supported the former

King Zahir Shah for establishing the new government. The Afghan refugees who were living in different countries welcome the above idea. But this idea was rejected by the Mujahedeen. On UN side, Diego Cordovez and Pakistani officials gave a comprehensive solution between Mujahedeen and Kabul regime. It was assumed by UNO that the Afghan revenue system revolved on their economy. Afghan people were to make their own economic system and form their own government. It was assumed that there was no interior resistance in Afghanistan against Soviet troops. Any resistance would be taken place supported by outside. Gromyko rejected the suggestion and he named 'unrealistic phantasies' (Nagra, 2018). From 12-24 June, 1983 2<sup>nd</sup> round of Geneva Talks were held. In which it was decided the final settlement would be done when four elements had been agreed. Consultation of Afghan refugees and the endorsement of the international guarantors were included in the final dispensation.

After Cordovez, Gorbachev stepped in as President of USSR; however, the narrative was still unclear. He unrealistically posed that he was serious to solve the Afghanistan crisis to counter the international pressure. USSR and Afghanistan commonly alleged that the real problem of Afghanistan was foreign interference especially from USA through Pakistan (Nagra, 2018). These measures were for the postponement of negotiation and this was a time taking stunt to crush the Afghan resistance. In March 1984, Barbak Karmal, Soviet backed leader stated during the conversation with Harrison that Afghanistan would continue the negotiation with UN, until Pakistan would not recognize the Afghan government (Crew & Trazi, 2009).

Diego Cordovez introduced a single package as a basis for "indirect talks", with Kabul accepting the UN as 'honest broker' on a time when Pakistan left its demand of self-determination of Afghanistan (Bukhari, 2013). Alternate negotiation sessions were held by Afghanistan and Pakistan. In April 1984 session, which was introduced between 11-22 following points were discussed.

- i. United State and China affirmed the international guaranties for non-intervention and non-interference.
- ii. Afghan refugees would go to their regions their rights should be granted to them.
- iii. Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as possible in short time frame.

### ***Shuttle Diplomacy and Third Round of Geneva Talks***

In 1984 a period of shuttle diplomacy was started, however the death of USSR Leader Andropov in February 1984 caused a new turn as Konstantin Cherenkov, the successor of Andropov followed his forefather (Ali, 2017). Afghan crisis affected Iran also, but Iran refused to be the part of negotiation. It also did not participate in Geneva accord. However they desired that the government of Islamic fundamentalists should be framed in Afghanistan which would be opponent of USA and USSR. They promoted the Shia groups in Afghanistan. Third round was held during August 24-31, 1984. The format was changed from indirect to proximity talks. Agenda was also changed. Kabul government did

not agree by final agreement at being negotiated as a single agreement. Pakistan agreed and the four separate instruments, The Provisions concerning nonintervention and non-interference were given the form of a bilateral agreement.

United Nations, NAM and OIC passed several resolutions to mount the political pressure on USSR. The negotiations process was started in 1981 on the table of United Nations. But it could not flourish until Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. He changed the internal and external policies of Soviet Union and adopted a different foreign policy about Pakistan. According to his point of view Pakistan was interfering in Afghanistan. In his first meeting with Zia-ul-Haq at the funeral ceremony of Andropov, he posed hard attitude and threatened Zia-ul-Haq (Mahmood, 1992). It was the first time when USSR posed economic pressure on Pakistan (Rizvi, 1993). According to a USSR Media Agency (TASS), “aggressive actions of Pakistan would not allow the impartial relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union.” In June 1985, troops of Soviet Union changed its dilemma towards Pakistan that caused increasing attacks over Pakistani border. Moscow even officially declared Pakistan as a rival country in media talks and news (Nagra, 2018).

#### ***Discussing Geneva Talks in Senate of Pakistan (1985-1988)***

After revival of Senate of Pakistan, five sessions of talks about Geneva Accord were held from 1985-1988. In June 1985, the fourth round was held just after the shuttle visit of Cordovez to the area. Two days before negotiations, Yuli Alekeyev, Soviet Foreign Ministry’s head of the Middle Eastern Department and Oleg Sokolor, Soviet’s second-ranked officer in Washington met US Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy to discuss Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs but neither party changed their positions (Stevens, 1985).

On June 25, the round came to an end and Cordovez opined that deadlock prevailed since 1983 moved toward one significant step and document has been drafted that could serve as the foundation for a comprehensive settlement, if more powerful factors permit. He added that parties’ misinterpretation of what had been agreed upon during the round had caused the illusion of movement (Stevens, 1985). Soviet/Afghan side demanded the interference and international guarantees without determining the time when Soviet forces leave the Afghanistan. However, Pakistan was not agreed for settlement-related activities without fixation of time of Soviet pullout.

Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said in a press conference after talks that Pakistan was ready to talk to Kabul directly at an “appropriate time” and willing for discussion over settlements such as the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Daily *Jasarat* (1985) perceived that Pakistan's fundamental four-point stance had been abandoned as a result of what the foreign minister had perceived as progress in the recent negotiations.

A Senator of Pakistan presumed that with the span of time, this matter caused several harms to the integrity of Pakistan and the matter was not going well. On 7 July 1985, Maulana Kausar Niazi presented an adjournment motion to know

the conditions and consequences of Geneva agreement which was done between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He explained that the wars would not be beneficial for Pakistan. A large number of people had come in Pakistan for taking refuge and Pakistan hosted them. It made a huge burden not only on Pakistan but also its people. The peoples of both countries knew that the presence of USSR and USA were not affordable for the people of South Asia. So, they wanted both Super powers would leave the South Asia as soon as possible. After having agreement, the people wanted to know the real situation (Pakistan, 1985).

Zain Ahmad Noorani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs opposed the motion on technical grounds and explained that a motion should be concise and must carry fewer points for discussion. Secondly, the presenter did not talk on factual basis so he quoted the statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs to unfold the facts. The Minister quoted his statement that he did on 17 June 1985 that “these were complex issues and would have to be negotiate with care and patience. The Government was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for making further progress but expectations should not be focused on dramatic results (Pakistan, 1985).

He further quoted his own statement that was addressed in a function at Karachi on June 23, 1985. He said, “The Geneva talks now underway would certainly result in progress, however we should not expect anything to come out from these talks. They would certainly pave way for an ultimate solution (Pakistan, 1985). Furthermore, he clarified the stance of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Geneva talk and propounded that these talks would produce results in course of time. Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan ruled the motion out of order under rule 71(1) and stated that the Geneva talk’s 4<sup>th</sup> session was a continuous process which did not happen at once and Geneva 5 was still under process so it meant that the negotiation process was continued. He also told that Geneva Accord was a matter of foreign policy so it could be debated in Joint session of parliament or separately in Senate.

Maulana Kausar Niazi tried to talk on admissibility of motion while he was not able to do so as Chair already ruled about the matter. He asked the logic on which government was avoiding to debate about this issue. At that point, Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo said that this issue needed more attentions and he already described the matter in National Assembly. However, the government would set a day for discussion of this issue and we assure to conduct a joint sitting in upcoming session. The mover withdrew his motion and did not stress after the assurance by Prime Minister (Pakistan, 1985).

The next round of talks in Geneva was held during August 27-30 in 1985. In which it was decided that both Super Powers would provide the guarantee. In last round of Geneva Accord, the US was not agreed to give Guarantee. Kabul regime was agreed to give proper time frame for withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, Kabul government was insisted to direct talk so the negotiation was up, because Pakistan did not agree to recognize the Soviet back government (Rizvi, 1993).

On the eve of fortieth annual celebrations of UNGA in September 1985, Ronald Reagan, US President delivered a speech and presented three-point peace agenda. He gave the proposal for the restoration of regional issues. He also said that all ties about peace process in whole World should be held with the collaboration of USSR and U.S. He talked to promote the economy of the world countries and suggested that every state should play its role for increasing the economy of every member of the United Nation. US would give morally and economic support the freedom movement of Afghan Mujahedeen who were fighting for their independence. He mentioned especially Afghanistan, Angola Cambodia (UNGA, 2022). Sixth round Geneva was held in December 16-19, 1985, but remained inconclusive due to the deadlock cover the change in format (Bazai, 2008).

The issue was raised in the Senate of Pakistan by Molana Kausar Niazi through an adjournment motion on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1985 stating the whole scenario as interpreted in the newspaper (Pakistan, Senate debates, 1985). Government had not denied the news so the discussion on the said motion was held on February 2, 1986. He further told that the Journal wrote that America sent arms cost 4.7 million for Afghan Mujahedeen. But most part of the arms were not transfer to the Mujahedeen. He also said that Reagan government said that 20% arms were sold in Pakistan. On other hand the Director of Federation for American Afghan Action reported that 70% arms would be sold in Pakistan. He also pointed out that Pakistan told 2.7 million Afghan stayed in Pakistan. On other hand United Nation told 1.9 million (Pakistan, Senate debates, 1986).

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Noorani posed objection on adjournment motion due to two reasons. Firstly the journals published this news on fifth December and it was noticed on 2<sup>nd</sup> January, whereby its urgency lapsed by itself. Secondly, the Senator presented the adjournment motion on the basis of Newspaper and its reports so the adjournment motion could not be admitted as per ruling no. 59 of December 1974 of National Assembly.

In spite of opposing the adjournment motion he comprehensively threw light upon the said matter with three different aspects. He said first part stated about the division of the weapon, in 2<sup>nd</sup> part it discussed about the exact numbers of refugees and third part was related with the black marketing of food. Pakistani government did not allow anyone to interfere in its territory and the country would not be responsible for the supply of Arms in Afghanistan.

He added the statistics that according to Provincial Government Registration Authority of the NWFP and Baluchistan the number of registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan is 2.4 million. More than 0.5 million unregistered refugees were living in Pakistan. These were the numbers of according to the record of 1984. Now the population of Afghan refugees also has increased 2.7 million. These all facts and figures showed that 3.1 million refugees were living in Pakistan.

Third issue which was highlighted by Senator was mismanagement in food division. He also told that the donors of Afghan refugees did not donate required wheat and other principal item food basket in 1985, in this situation Pakistan

had to supply almost 25% of refugees needs from its own resources. Beside this Pakistan had to full fill their needs additionally. It might be said that the article which was published in, “Times” based on fake story.

At that point Maulana Kasur Niazi stated that it was commendable that at least the Foreign Office had denied these allegations. However, the ethnicity of American General, Babrak Carmel has leveled a number of allegations against Pakistan by its reference. The Journalists in USA work freely and American Government developed its strategies according to the opinions of their journalists. So, the government of Pakistan should connect with USA government for the clarifications. All the allegations, which were leveled in American Magazine, governments did not admit it correct. But in article, various authorities and institutions had made various contradictory allegations. At the end of this article, it was written that Pakistan did not admit such pipeline. There were no such things that Pakistan was acting as conduit or a pipeline and that makes the article unworthy (Pakistan, Senate debates, 1986).

The 7<sup>th</sup> round of negotiations were made in different sessions. Geneva VII (A) was held between 5 to 23 May 1986 and VII (B) held between 31 July and 8 August. Similarly, Geneva VII (C) and VII (D) occurred between 25 February-9 March and 7 to 10 September 1987 vice versa. During these sessions, the concerned countries finally moved positively towards an end, but could not become able to sort out all issue.

The last round Geneva VIII was held between 2 March and 8 April. After six years of indirect negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan an agreement was signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988, for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan under the following points.

1. Unconditional withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan.
2. International guarantees by the USA and USSR.
3. Non-interference and non-intervention in each other, of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
4. Return of Afghan. Refugees to their home.
5. The Accord also provided for the monitoring of the implementation of the agreement by the United Nation.

Geneva Accord was held on 15 May, 1988. It was signed by Mr. Zain Noorani the Pakistan Minister of state for foreign affairs and Mr. Abdul Wakil, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister and U. S secretary of Sates, signed the documents as guarantors (Nagra, 2018). However, USSR was not pleased on withdrawal of its troops and they thought that Pakistan had gone against their interests.

On 31 July 1988, Muhammad Tariq Chaudhary presented an adjournment motion that Soviet Union accused that Pakistan had violated the Geneva agreement. Russian President Mr. Gorbachev threatened Pakistan that a strong action would be taken against Pakistan. He described the actions of Afghan public against the Kabul Government as Pakistan’s intervention. Muhammad Tariq Chaudhary stated that during Geneva talks, Pakistan already clarified that

internal matters of Afghanistan, their forces, their Mujahedeen, and their government was out of the reach of Pakistan. Our country had not influenced Afghans but step taken by Government of Pakistan was admirable. It was purely heroic act to free Afghanistan from external Aggression. Pakistan had only so much involvement in this process that the poor and impoverished people of Afghanistan have migrated to land of Pakistan. Mujahedeen forced the superpower to kneel down and now Russia had to leave the Afghanistan. Resultantly, they put allegations and pressure on Pakistan for their face saving (Chaudhary, 1988).

Wasim Sajjad, Interior Minister opposed the motion and responded that the allegations raised in adjournment was incorrect. He said the Geneva agreement was adopted with true spirit and Pakistan had submitted answers that were objected in United Nations. Government arranged a site inspection of the entire border from Quetta to Chitral along-with the UN Military observer. The team inspected all kind of vehicles to inquire complaints about trans-shipments of arms. The observers visited so-called training camps and military depots and they described the condition of refugees to International Agencies such as the UNHCR and the ICRC etc. Geneva Accord had a specific procedure for the investigation of the complaints to regulate merits, otherwise, any party could impose allegation to others. All claims about violation of Geneva Accord against Pakistan were proved wrong. Pakistan registered several complaints to UNGOMAP and also provided list refugee camps. Pakistan also gave a list of those areas that were hit by the Afghanistan. Mr. Diego Vadovez, Personal Representative of the UN Secretary General on Afghanistan visited Pakistan from 3<sup>rd</sup> June to 5<sup>th</sup> July 1988. He expressed satisfaction on all steps taken by Pakistan (Sajjad, 1988). After assurance and explanation of Minister, the presenter had not pressed the motion.

In September 1988, Afghan Police Agency revealed that a hundred thousand Soviet armed forces in twelve provinces of Afghanistan were still present that was against the injunctions of Geneva Accord (Nawa-i-Waqt, 1988). Senator Tariq Chaudhry submitted an adjournment motion in this regard. He pointed out that Geneva agreement bounded USSR to withdraw half of the Russian forces Afghanistan by August 15, 1988 but still 100,000 Russian troops were present Afghanistan that was against the terms of Geneva Accord. Slowness or delay in the implementation of Geneva Agreement would directly affect Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (Chaudhary, Senate debates, 1988).

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan opposed the motion by saying that newspaper reported wrong facts and figures. The fact was that approximately fifty thousand Soviet troops out of hundred and three thousand had remained in Afghanistan. The remaining 50% of the Soviet troops would be withdrawn by 15<sup>th</sup> of February 1989, as per Geneva Agreement (Khan, 1988). Prof. Khurshid Ahmad inquired about conformity of figures of Soviet troops that was confirmed by Sahabzada Yaqub so the motion was not pressed.

Pakistan never turned down from this accord and always assured to not to intervene in sovereignty of Afghanistan. However, there were some characters present in political arena of Pakistan who had molded these talks for their



personal gains. In this perspective, Prof. Khurshid Ahmad introduced a privilege motion on 17 May 1989 when Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, MNA of ANP sent letters to the UN Secretary General and some heads of states and blamed that Pakistan had violated the Geneva Accord.

Prof. Khurshid stated that these letters was a reflection of Abdul Wali Kahn's prejudice against Pakistan. He had distorted the facts and raised baseless insinuations about Pakistan to restrain the country from straight point of view about Afghan policy. His action was against the integrity of Pakistan and he adopted anti-Pakistani agenda. During Geneva talks he tried to distort peace process and supported the Russian backed government (Ahmad, 1989).

From treasury benches, Dr. Sher Afghan, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs rejected the motion. About admissibility of privilege motion he referred the rules of Senate, Practice and Procedure of Parliament by M. N. Kaul, and Article 66 of the constitution. Mr. Basheer Ahmed, Senior leader of National Democratic Party also opposed the motion by saying that he read that letters and it were in interest of Pakistan. Khan Abdul Khan Wali had not gone against the interest of Pakistan and he also did not want to see chaos in Afghanistan.

Chairman Senate, Wasim Sajjad opined that both Houses represent the peoples and they believe that Parliament would work for the interest of the state and the public. Parliament had freedom to perform its functions independently so the House would analyze the background of these letters. Although, Mr. Abdul Wali Khan's letters were offensive in nature as presenter of motion said but he could not explained the cause of breach of privilege of the House. The letters neither created obstacle for members of the Upper House nor affected the functions of the Parliament that is why motion stood inadmissible (Pakistan, Senate debates, 1989).

## **CONCLUSION**

The immersion of Senate of Pakistan in the Geneva Accord can be deduced that the Senate possessed a limited control over the said Accord. The Senate of Pakistan tried to employ a powerful influence in implementations of the Geneva Accord. However, Senate could not play a crucial role in the negotiation process because during the first three years of negotiation, Senate was not present while during negotiations Senate did not hold any discussions over the said matter during February 1986 to October 1988. The Senate's direct participation in foreign policy and Accord was constrained as the democracy in the country was not at par. The Geneva Accord were primarily centered on diplomatic negotiations so the executive arm of the Pakistan's government played a predominant role in decision-making and the execution of the Accord. However, the House used played role in progressing the cause of inclusivity and communication among varied factions in Afghanistan and tried to facilitate stability and peace in the region.

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