



AN ARGUMENT FOR ISLAMIC ANTHROPOCENTRISM (From Taklifi Reasoning to Human Right Reasoning)

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses Islamic thought and how understanding of Islam is influenced by the paradigm used by each person. It discusses critically the two paradigms with focus on the following: the first is the reasoning of the theocentric Islamic paradigm, while the second is the reasoning within the anthropocentric Islamic paradigm. Taklif theory and rights (*haqq*) offered by Abdul Karim Soros and Yahya Muhammad's logical typology will be used as a tool of analysis. The research found that paradigms differences affect reasoning. Reasoning differences have implication on the purpose differences as it results in differences in understanding the Qur'an. The Theocentric Islamic paradigm uses reasoning, the anthropocentric Islamic paradigm uses human right as a basis of reasoning. The theocentric paradigm reads the Koran with the aim of finding the divine message commanded to humans while the anthropocentric paradigm reads the Qur'an with the aim of finding what God has given to humans, and the result is an anthropocentric style of Islam.

INTRODUCTION

Among Muslim intellectuals, some of them proposed the theocentric paradigm of Islam (Ismail 2012, 335–336, 2011, 181–84, 2003, 38), some others proposed the Theoantroposentris paradigm of Islam (Kuntowijoyo 2006; Wijaya 2014b, 262–97), and the rest proposed the anthropocentric paradigm of Islam (Wijaya 2014b, 211–23). The paradigms of Islam are based on the principles of the origin and the

purposes of the arrival of Islam in this world. The theocentric paradigm of Islam understands that Islam is departed from God and centered on God, whereas the theoantropocentric paradigm interprets Islam as departed from God and inviting humans toward God through the process of transcendence, while the anthropocentric paradigm views Islam as originated from God but for the benefit of man through the process of transformation (maqasyid al-syari'ah).

Those paradigms above affected the praxis of understanding of Islamic adherents in viewing the reality by providing different emphasis. The theocentric paradigm of Islam focuses on God, the theoantropocentric paradigm emphasizes God on behalf of Muslims, while the anthropocentric paradigm puts emphasis on humans regardless of religious barriers. Furthermore, the adherents of the first paradigm often use Islamic symbols such as the idea of Islamic law regulation (syariat); while the second paradigm adherents do not require such symbols, yet emphasize on substantive Islamic values, and the third paradigm adherents always employ the symbols of the human beings such as human right, religious freedom, religious tolerance, equality and so forth.

The three paradigms of Islam are parts of variation on understanding the religion, thus each paradigm should not blame one another and especially not to label others as infidels. The understanding and the spirit underlying the three paradigms are acceptable if they are based on the right understanding and spirit. Some people who do not have the ability to understand the right of Islam and appropriate spirit would actually consider Islam as a fertile land for their own benefits, with either good or bad intentions such as that which influence politics, economics, desire and wild emotions. The invested interest to manipulate the three paradigms is widely open, especially so in the manipulation of the theocentric paradigm. Aside from its positive purposes to put humans as the true servants of God and to avoid human conceit, the theocentric paradigm of Islam could also bring negative impact due to the changing direction of the paradigm from "teaching" to "ideology". This shift has restricted the doctrine of Islam while at the same time has made its adherents have exclusive and excessive idealism. The adherents are regarded as exclusive and excessive since they consider themselves legitimate to represent God. They feel that all their actions are deemed right. They feel obliged to defend God against others who are judged as not practicing God's teachings and that they are not in the same religious platform. In the name of defending God by echoing "Allahu Akbar", they commit acts of violence against others outside their group. This is common in the case of suicide bombers like the ones who carried out attacks in Paris France, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia. They were representing ISIS.

Fighting them with aggression will not be effective since they believe that their acts are a religious obligation known as jihad or a holy war, and that they will be rewarded with paradise in the hereafter. Also, it is hard to alter this reasoning for this theocentric paradigm has shifted from the understanding of Islam to a teaching of Islam as an ideology. What can be done now is to propose other paradigms that are philosophically favored towards humans. Both the theoantropocentric and

anthropocentric paradigms can offer themselves as alternatives. This article adopts Abdul Karim Soros' theory on taklif and rights and Yahya Muhammad's typology of reasoning, and discusses the reasoning employed by each of these paradigms.

METHODS

Both terms above are interrelated and the discussion on both is inseparable. When the theory of taklif is being discussed, the theory of rights will also be automatically discussed. There are many definitions and classifications on the concepts of taklif and rights; however, the terms defined by Abdulkarim Soros will be utilized. According to Soros (Soros 2009b, 205; Al-Qobanji 2009, 324), in Arabic, the term "al-haq" has five meanings including two true meanings and three i'tibari meanings. The two intrinsic meanings are the truth and reality, while the three i'tibari meanings include:

First, "al-haq al-lazim", which is the right which exists in itself and is completely unrelated to others. Thus, there would be no implication whether the right is being used or not and this would not affect other people. For example, someone has the right to travel. This right has nothing to do with anyone else. He or she has a freedom to choose whether he or she would go or not. Second is "al-haq al-muta'addi". In contrast to the first, this right is related to the rights of other people such as the rights of children to parents and vice versa; the right of the state to its citizens and the rights of its citizens to the state as well. Both sides are "demanding each other". Children claim their right to their parents and the parents demand their rights to their children, too. Third, "al-istihqaq", is a right arising due to something else such as an action. However, the actions are not directly connected with others. For example, those who do good deeds are entitled to the reward, likewise, the people who commit adultery deserve punishment.

According to Soros, the three forms of "al-haq i'tibari" are associated with three forms of "taklif". The first is "taklif al-lazim". "Taklif al-lazim" is a pair of "al-haq al-lazim". When someone uses their right to travel, as "al-haq al-lazim", others actually are not directly related with him. Other people should only respect and should not interfere with him. This respectful action is called "taklif al-lazim". Someone has the right of belief, and this actually does not relate with others. Other people should just respect it. This act of honor is called "taklif al-lazim". Second, "taklif al-muta'addi" is an act to meet the "al-haq al-muta'addi". When a father gives his children their rights, for example the right to receive an allowance, the children must meet their "taklif" obligations to the father such as an obligation to study hard. Third, "taklif al-istihqaq", is an act of giving something to people who express their "istihqaq" rights. When someone does a good deed, he or she deserves the praise of others, for example, from B. The praise is given not because of the person seeing the right of B. The praise is given since in himself A has done a good deed, and not because of his good deeds for B. B praises A only because A does a good deed. This is different from the second "taklif".

Departing from this theory, a question arises. Is adhering to a religion a divine taklif or a human right? Borrowing the theory proposed by Yahya Muhammad, this question presupposes the existence of taklifi reasoning and right reasoning in adhering to religion (Muhammad 1999b, 2008, 2010).

FINDINGS

Taklifi Reasoning in the Theocentric Paradigm of Islam

If we read the works of the earlier scholars on Islam, we find that they always begin their work with a discussion on divinity. The issue of the deity is regarded as the basics of religion (Ushuludin), whereas the issues on the universe and humans are included in the teaching of religious branches (furu'). Philosophical schools of thought, Sufism, kalam and fiqh always start the discussion from the issues of the divinity before discussing the issues of man and the universe. The discussion on Islam utilizing this descending logic such as starting from God towards human and the universe is called taklifi reasoning which is usually adopted by the adherents of the theocentric paradigm of Islam (Wijaya 2012, 211–23, 2013, 322–27). Yahya Muhammad noted two models of taklifi reasoning in the tradition of the anthropocentric paradigm of Islam, which are: first, wujud reasoning, second, mi'yari reasoning (Muhammad 2008, 2010).

Taklifi-Wujud Reasoning

Wujud reasoning is usually held by the philosophers and Sufis. The adherents of wujud reasoning begin their discussion on the issue of the divine being followed by its relationships with others; towards the true nature of religion and the way to understand it. In wujud reasoning, the explanation on religion starts from the outside framework of the religion, from wujud (existence) theory. The term wujud is stated in the discussion on religion, yet the concept used is taken from outside religious tradition which is philosophy. Philosophers' discussions on wujud is always accompanied by the discussion on mahiyah, however, they have different understanding of both.

The term wujud (existence) is usually explained through the opposite term 'adam (absence). By explaining through its opposite word, the explanation on it is considered as no longer needed. Even, due to its obvious meaning, it does not need to be redefined. If the definition is still required, for example, it begins from the term maujud and the antonym ma'dum. Maujud is something (an object) that exists, whereas ma'dum is something that does not exist or absent. Therefore, the word wujud is mentioned to distinguish it from absence (A. M. U. Al-Najjar 1996, 23). Meanwhile, the word mahiyah is normally associated with something that is maujud and the elements of its characteristics in the reality, for example, colors, and so on. Furthermore, mahiyah is associated with questions in Arabic pronounced "ma huwa". An answer that includes the truth of something with which it becomes itself and not the other. That is mahiyah. Hence, it can be argued that mahiyah is an essential element of something with which it becomes something different from

something else. For example, the characteristics of humans are animality and intelligence, and the two elements make a man and make him different from other creatures. Therefore, it is said that man is a thinking animal (A. M. U. Al-Najjar 1996, 25; Muhammad 2008, 18–19).

In addition to the differences regarding the two categories of wujud, the philosophers also differ in understanding the authenticity status of mahiyah and wujud, the question is, which one of the two should be prioritized. Suhrawardi puts mahiyah higher than wujud which was called asholat al-mahiyah, on the contrary Mulla Shadra prioritizes wujud to mahiyah which is called asholat al-wujud. Someone who holds an asholat al-mahiyah opinion considers wujud as having no true nature in the reality, while someone who holds asholat al-wujud opinion assumes mahiyah to be having no true nature in the reality (Muhammad 2008, 21; Wijaya 2014b). However, it is worth noting that even though they have different understanding in the authenticity of both, they have all adopted taklifi reasoning in understanding religion.

Taklifi-Mi'yari Reasoning

Mi'yari reasoning is used by the mutakallim and fuqaha. The adherents of mi'yari reasoning begin their study on the issue of divine actions. The question often asked is whether an act of God is a Mukallif motivated by illat or by a particular purpose or not? Or, the question commonly asked by the activists of maqasyid syari'ah is whether the acts of God contain maqasyid or not?

The models of questions are purposefully reported here because there is an epistemological relationship between the disciplines of kalam and fiqh, and the relationship can be seen from the maqasyid side, that is maqasyid mukallif as the object of the study of theology and maqasyid syari'ah into the study of fiqh. The relationship of both epistemologically takes two forms with theology in a position influencing fiqh: first, the study of fiqh is based on the propositions of theology, second, theology affects fiqh. The influence of theology for fiqh can be found from the use of the terms good and bad (al-hasan and al-qabihah) in fiqh which were originally key terms of theology (Muhammad 2011, 13–19).

In the tradition of theology which adopted taklifi mi'yari reasoning, the study on this issue always starts from maqasyid mukallif of four elements of taflif theory they commonly use, which are mukallif (God), mukallaf (human), taklif treatise (al-Qur'an) and taklifi results (teachings) (Muhammad 1999a). The relationship of the four elements is based on of the first two elements: mukallif and mukallaf, while the third and fourth elements are reflections of the relationship of both. In studying the connection of the first two elements, both are departed from the study of mukallif, whereas the study on mukallaf is based on the study of mukallif, and at once both are related to two categories of law: the rights and obligations; and the value of good and bad.

The classical thinkers of *mi'yari* reasoning have expressed their opinions about *maqasyid mukallif* in theology, and they are generally divided into three groups. First is the group which argues that the acts of God must have a purpose. *Mu'tazilite* and *Shiites* who hold this opinion contend that the human mind can recognize what is good and bad by itself without referring to revelation. This law of sense is applied to everyone, both humans and God. Humans must perform good deeds to get compliments and reward. On the contrary, they are prohibited to do evil deeds to avoid censure. Likewise, God has to do good deeds to receive the praise, and he must leave dastardly deeds aside to avoid disapprovals. Therefore, it means that God's acts have purposes or *illat*.

Second, in reaction to the rational opinion of *Mu'tazilite*, *Asy'ari* believes that the human mind cannot distinguish good and bad judgements since the two are not attached to the action itself. Judging an action as good or bad depends on *Sharia* law and not on the law of sense. The law is what has been considered good or bad by *sharia*. Therefore, a certain action that did not have any value before the revelation could have good or bad judgement after revelations. Hence, *Asy'ari* rejects the argument that "God is obliged to perform noble deeds, or God is prohibited to do evil deeds" because the revelation as the measurement of his judgment is His right as *Syari'*. This means that an act of God is not bound by any aim outside Him. The acts of God are beyond the law of causation.

Third, as a mediator of both ideas *al-Maturidi* deems that the *Mu'tazilite* opinion is right when they say that the act of God has a purpose or *illat*, but he rejects the *Mu'tazilite* argument that "God must" do it this way. *Ash'ari* is also right when he said that the act of God is not bound by the law of cause and effect, and that this law is only true in humans. *Al-Maturidi* accepts the view on the principle of good and bad, yet human intellect does not have the absolute authority to judge what is good and bad without being tied to a revelation. According to him, intelligence is given by God as a tool to distinguish what is good and bad after being told by the revelation. Many followers of *Ash'ari* prefer the *al-Maturidi* opinion on this issue (*Audah*, n.d., 142–48).

Yahya Muhammad utilizes a new method in elaborating the opinions regarding the issues described above using "principle of the right" and simplifies it into two categories: essential rights (*al-haq al-dzati*) and proprietary rights (*al-haq al-milkiyah*). Each category is held by two mainstream Islamic schools which enliven the journey of Islam: *Mu'tazilite-Shiite* and *Asy'ari-al-Maturidi* (*Muhammad* 2010, 17).

Al-haq al-dzati is a right which is not bound by anything and any condition outside it. A right on itself is a goodness that is rationally permitted and encouraged, not to be denied, so its performers deserve compliments. On the other hand, any act which is not allowed leads to vanity and the doers deserve reproach. This means that the value of an act in this perspective is attached to the action and not the performers, either God or human. As a result, both God and humans must be bound by the value

of the act. Since the right itself is a good deed, it was concluded that God must do mighty deeds.

Based on the explanation above, the principle of al-haq al-dzati presupposes the existence of legal consequence to others, that which is the obligation. Something that becomes a right for a certain party is an obligation to the other and vice versa. Something that becomes a right for God as mukallif is an obligation to humans as mukallaf. On the other hand, something that becomes a right for humans as mukallaf is an obligation for God as mukallif (Al-Jabiri 2007, 45). Like humans, God has not only the right but also an obligation, which is to do good deeds. The rights and obligations are measured in two value principles: good (hasan) and bad (qabih). Among the obligations of Mukallif which are bound by this principle is to do al-adl (Muhammad 2010, 26–32), al-lutf (Muhammad 2010, 32–33) and al-i'lam (Muhammad 2010, 37–38).

As opposed to the rights and obligations of mukallif, in the perspective of al-haq al-dzati, mukallaf also has rights and obligations. Mukallaf's obligations are: first, mukallaf needs to know the acts of mukallaf people; second, they have to know the characteristics and wisdom of mukallif; Third, they need to know the characteristics of taklif which are the rights of mukallaf especially those associated with the benefits and drawbacks. These three elements are interrelated to each other. The necessity to know the second element comes from the need to know the third element, while knowing the second element would not be complete without knowing the first (Muhammad 2010, 41).

On the contrary, in the perspective of al-haq al-milkiah, an act does not have any value in itself. The value depends on something outside it, which is the subject of the act labeled as the owner. The performer is the owner of his deeds (al-milkiah). According to common sense, every owner has the right to use his belonging, and at the same time, he has taklifi relationship with others, that is the obligation. However, this perspective is only labeled in humans, not God. The law which is applicable to humans cannot be applied to God, because God is the absolute owner of His acts and creatures. God has a freedom to use his rights without being bound by the law of the acts. God is not bound by the obligation to do good deeds, thus the acts of God always mean good, despite actions that seem to be negative which are interpreted using common sense (Muhammad 2010, 17).

Since the principle of al-haq al-milkiah rejects the application of the law of sense to judge the acts of God, it does not assume any obligation attached to God as mukallif. God as mukallif, whose character as the owner of absolute rights is also considered as having an absolute use of His rights without any reverse characteristics attached to Him as “obligation”; that which is the sole right of the mukallaf. On the contrary, human's position as mukallaf only has the obligation which is the right of God as mukallif, and there is no absolute rights attached to mukallaf (Muhammad 2010, 62). In other words, God only has the right, and His right is an obligation for mukallaf, otherwise mukallaf only has obligations, but

they do not have the rights. In this principle, then, God is not required to do justice because His deed itself is a justice (al-'adl), so God is not required to inform in advance about taklif to humans (al-i'lam) since someone who has not received information about Islam is not burdened on taklif, nor be asked for his responsibility by God (al-lutf).

Method in Understanding the Al-Qur'an

The difference in logic causes two groups of taklifi reasoning users to also differ in understanding of the essence of God, especially the ones related to His characteristics and revelation. Since Mu'tazilites prioritize the use of reasoning in understanding the acts of God (al-haq al-dzati), and also when they understand the issue of whether God has characteristics or not, in order to declare the oneness of God, Mu'tazilites reject the characteristics of God. When Al-Qur'an states that God has a characteristic of having knowledge, for example, they say that God knows something through His Essence, not by His characteristic of having knowledge (Muhammad 2010, 30–31). With this principle they are trying to remove God from anthropomorphism or equating God with man. On the other hand, Asharites who prioritise naqal in understanding the acts of God (al-haq al-milkiah) acknowledge the characteristics of God, and the characteristics that are believed to be qadim. They argue that God knows due to His knowledge, not His Essence. When they are asked about equating God with humans (if God is assumed to have the characteristics), they contend that God's attributes differ from that of humans. If it is stated that God has a hand, this group claims that God's hand is not the same as the human hand.

The implication of the attitude towards the issue whether God has characteristics or not is related to the character of God's revelation, whether revelation is a creation (makhluk) of God or God's kalam, or character. Mu'tazilite contends that revelation is God's creation so that it is included as hadis, whereas Asharite argues that revelation is kalam, an attribute of God so that it is qadim. Ibn Rushd takes a middle path saying that kalam nafsi of God is qadim, but His kalam lafzi is hadis. Their debate continues in revealing God's message in the Qur'an which is now in the form of Ottoman manuscripts (Wijaya 2011b, 2009). Mu'tazilite interpretes it rationally by giving example in Tafsir al-Kassaf by Zamakhshari and Qadi Abdul Jabbar's work Ushul al-Khamsah. Mu'tazilite successors openly accept the use of the new theory in understanding the Qur'an as expressed by Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid. On the contrary, the Asharite still interpret it traditionally, such as in the case of Jalaluddin Suyuti and al-Mahalli's work Tafsir Jalalain. Asharite Successors constantly choose exegesis as the only device to interpret al-Qur'an.

Human right Reasoning of the Anthropocentric Paradigm of Islam

Even though taklifi reasoning employs rights as a principle of thinking, the concept of the rights they propose departs from the descending logic since the right starts from God towards humans and the universe. Following this logic, they are called

as theocentric paradigm adherents. It is indeed true that Theocentric paradigm of Islam reasoning can make a man into a true servant of God, but at the same time, for the moment, this paradigm actually makes humans seem to want to take over the position of God since the adherents of this reasoning often use certain terms to commit acts of violence against others. In the name of defending God, they believe that it is legitimate and even obligatory to commit violence against others who are not in the same line of thinking with them. Humans as noble creatures of God have to be destroyed in order to maintain the glory of the human creator. How can true religious reasoning become meaningful for human existence without disclaiming the existence of God?

Human Right Reasoning

Religious reasoning should undergo change because the world today is different from the world of the past. The way humans think now is different from that of the past, especially in four aspects: the medium, goal, concept and worldview (Soros 2009c, 7–58). One significant element that undergoes alteration in the human reasoning is the idea of humans themselves. In the past human beings saw themselves as creatures that had to be qana'ah and became mukallaf, now humans see themselves as fighters and right owners, either for themselves or their environment. Thus, people now are thinking in terms of rights. People in the past used to think about what is commanded by our religion and also about our responsibility as religious beings. People now are thinking about their rights within the religion, and what is given by religion to them. With this way of thinking it can be concluded that for people in the past religion was understood as “taklif”, whereas to people now religion is understood as “the right”(Soros 2009c, 201–11). Therefore, adhering to a religion is a human right and that Islam can be considered an anthropocentric religion (Wijaya 2012, 211–23, 2014b, 322–27).

This anthropocentric paradigm reasoning is based on the principle that Islam departs from God, mandated to His prophets who were ordinary men, and is destined for mankind. That the prophet was an ordinary man is mentioned in some verses of the al Qu’ran showing the human dimension of the prophets, for example the verses discussing the human side of Noah (al-Mukminun:24), Hud (al-Mukminun:33), Moses, Aaron and Pharaoh (al-Mukminun:48), Isa (Jesus) (al-Isra’:95), and Muhammed(al-Kahfi:110). The affirmation of the human side of the prophet Mohammed is important since Arab society at that time believed that a prophet should exceed the limits of ordinary human beings. As a prophet, Muhammad must have had early potential which showed that he was different from ordinary people, including other prophets (Hanafi 2014, 602–17). This beyond human limit imaginary expectations also made most of Arab society reject Muhammad’s prophetic ways simply due to Muhammad’s status as a human being (al-Isra’:90-94; al-Anbiya’:7-8; al-Furqan: 7-8; (Darwazah, n.d., 17–18). He was

the same as other humans and could not induce harm or rewards on humans. He experienced what had been experienced by other humans and had basic needs as human being. He ate, drank, married, etc (al-A'raf: 188; al-Anbiya': 98; al-Ahzab: 52; al-Tahrim: 1; al-Duha: 6-8; al-Syarkhu:1-3).

The Al-Qur'an also shows the ordinary human limits of Muhammad such as in making humane mistakes (Al-Asymawi, n.d., 57–59). For example, the Prophet Mohammad was warned by God when he, in surly expression, turned his face from someone named Ibn Umm Maktum, something Surah Abasa revealed (Salim 2008, 251–56; Al-Asymawi, n.d., 55–58, 2013, 188–92). According to history, one day the Prophet hosted and talked to the leaders of Quraysh whom he hoped would convert to Islam. At the time, Ibn Umm Maktum, a blind friend who expected the Prophet p.b.u.h (peace be upon him) to recite to him the verses of the Qur'an Allah had revealed, was turned away. Allah revealed this surah as a warning on the attitude of the Prophet towards Ibn Umm Maktum. If the Arabs expected Muhammad to know the unseen thing, the Qur'an even asserts Muhammad's limitations. Muhammad was not an angel or other higher being who knew the unseen problems (al-An'am: 50).

Besides being mandated to human beings, the human dimension of Islam can also be seen from the maqasyid side of the religion, which according to Imam Syatibi (Syatibi 1997; 'Abdul Madjid Al-Najjar 2008; Audah 2011), refer to the human right he called the "ushul khamsah", which is preserving the freedom of adhering a religion, freedom of thought, the right to live, the rights of heredity and inheritance (Qordlawi 1997). In line with this, Soros further argues that the true religion at first is humane, and then people are required to adhere to the religion (Soros 2002, 106, 2009d, 15–51). Fazlur Rahman claimed that the al-Qu'ran as a fundamental source of Islam is a document for humanity. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid called the Al-Qu'ran as a humane phenomenon (Musthafawi 2009, 260–62). Even though the Qur'an talks about God in approximately 2500 words, the Qur'an is not a treatise on God and His attributes. Al-Qur'an is aimed at providing guidance for mankind (Abduh 2005, 56–59; 'Abbas 2007, 36–37), by discussing humans in their capacity as individuals and as members of society (Rahman 1980, 1; Rahmat 2006, 118–38).

Method in Understanding the Al-Qur'an

The sacred book is silent and does not speak, "Dzalika al-Qur'an, fa istanthiquhu wa lan yanthiqu, walakin ukhbirukum an'hu" (Thalib 2003, 200–201) but it has various meanings. The various meanings of the Qur'an are symbolized in different ways by the interpreters. Abdullah Darras illustrates the riches of "al-Qu'ran likes a diamond". Every corner emits different lights to those emanated from other angles. And, it is not impossible when we allow others to see it from different angles, then they would see more meanings compared to what we see" (Shihab 2000, XV).

The guidance sought by humans in the Al-Qur'an is also varied based on human expectations on the Qur'an as a fundamental source of Islam. Human expectations on the Qur'an depend on their life problems, that which encouraged them to find alternative solutions from within the Qur'an. Since humans face different problems in life and they undergo some changes according to the context of space and time, thus the type of messages and guidance in the Qur'an rely on human conditions and life's problems (Soros 2009a, 137–89), which they faced based on the space and time (Hanafi 1989, 103; Gent and Muhammad 2019). In order that the messages of God in the Qur'an can be found in accordance to the basic message and basic human needs, humane understanding towards religion is required (*qira'ah basyariyyah li al-Din*) (al-Syabistari 2009, 11,102-106; Wijaya 2009, 2011a). That is an understanding - by regarding the religion (al-Qur'an) in the context of human interest. The spirit starts from humans towards God, not the reverse, which is, from God to humans. This is the basic orientation of the epistemological anthropocentrism of Islam (al-Qur'an) (Wijaya 2014a, 2013).

The use of humane understanding into the study of religion, especially Islam, reveals a problem. There has been ingrained belief among Muslims that the exegesis often used by *mi'yari* reasoning users and *takwil* often used by *wujudi* reasoning users are sacred theories, for both came from God as it was stated in the Qur'an. Hermeneutics on the other hand, is considered as something profane since it came from outside of the Qur'an, especially from the Western tradition. Something profane could not be utilized to study the holy book, such as the Qur'an. The problem arises here. If *takwil* which has obtained support from the Qur'an can even be eliminated by theological interpretation (Wijaya 2009, 146–58), hermeneutics then would be more easily discounted (Harrison 2010).

Rather than taking out or leaving either of them, it should be wiser to combine the three. The combination of the three theories of text interpretations which are exegesis, *takwil*, and hermeneutics will be able to reveal the true message of the Qur'an which for a long time has been "unthought" of. Despite not being able to find the essential message which indeed belongs only to God and the Prophet Muhammad, at least, a combination of the three can find a comprehensive message that is still within the scope of the semantics of the Qur'an. The Message found by exegesis is "semi-objective", the message found by *takwil* is "mystical", and the message found hermeneutics is "praxis". A "semi-objective" message is as a binding on "the essential message" of the al-Qur'an, the "mystical" message is as a binder so that people would not go too far from the "message owner," and the "praxis" message is as the "message executor" on earth that increasingly changes without any control. "Semi-objective" and "semitic" messages have been widely circulated among Muslims through exegesis and mysticism. However, the "praxis" message is still in the process of forms and formulations of study. This is the importance of humanism epistemology (anthropocentrism) of Islam or the use of humane understanding such as hermeneutics in understanding the message of God in the Qur'an, and it indeed has to be accompanied by a critical selection on hermeneutics chosen (Wijaya 2009, 2011b).

CONCLUSION

From the explanation above, it can be understood that there is a difference in reasoning between the theocentric paradigm of Islam and the anthropocentric paradigm of Islam. The first paradigm uses taklifi reasoning, whereas the second paradigm utilizes human right reasoning. Also, in the understanding the Qur'an, the first paradigm understands the Qur'an as aiming at seeking the divine messages commanded to humans, while the second paradigm understands the Qur'an as being able to find what has been given by God to humans

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