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PAKISTAN'S POST 9/11 COERCIVE STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR NEUTRALIZING THE ISLAMIC INSURGENCY

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ABSTRACT

After September 11, 2001 attacks on world trade center and Pentagon, United States administration left no options for Pakistan except to choose War against terrorism as a US partner. Pakistan took U-turn on its Afghan policy and once again became ally of United States in Global War on Terrorism. Pakistan provided full logistic, military and intelligence support to US led allied forces to initiate Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. President Musharraf took chance to eradicate Islamic Extremism, Militancy and intolerance in the country as well. He made practical efforts to eradicate Extremism, Militancy and to prove his unstrained cooperation to United States in war on terrorism as a front line ally. In that regard he started crackdown against militants and Islamic extremist elements escalating their influence within Pakistan. In reaction to these steps militancy and terrorism erupted across the country and Government had to take coercive measures to curb Islamic militants in FATA, Swat and all over the country.

INTRODUCTION

During Afghan-Soviet war proliferation of madrassas was encouraged in Pakistan. Approximately 8000 registered Madāris and about 25,000 unregistered Madāris were functioning in Pakistan since then. (Murphy, 2009, 1 IX, no.2) The main

objective was to establish these Madāris to develop a generation of fighters who can serve American agenda against communism during that war. For this purpose genuine extreme methods were adopted through text books and curriculum designs which would spread extremism in this region (Ashraf, 2010). Academic curriculum had intolerance and it was well known to American administration particularly CIA intelligence officers. Ultimately the students graduated from these madāris were hardliner Islamists in their agendas.

After Pakistan became ally in the War against Terrorism, General Musharraf started crackdown against these Madāris considering them source of spreading extremism and militancy. Religious parties and madrassa students were raising the voice against Pakistan's new role in the war on terrorism and widely criticizing Musharraf policy. Some religious leaders were motivating madrassa students for jihad in Afghanistan against United States and allied forces. Sufi Mohammad took over ten thousand young madrasa students from KPK to join fight against US led coalition forces in Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2010). Primarily restrictions were imposed upon the Madāris in KPK and Baluchistan because US administration was pressurizing Pakistan to restraint all domestic sources of extremism. According to them, the madrassas established during Afghan-Soviet war were main source of spreading extremism, militancy and terrorism. United States Secretary of state Colin Powell said,

“Madrassa Programs that do nothing but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists” (Kronstadt, 2004).

General Musharraf started crackdown against hardline extremist Madāris and banned all their activities including seized their financial assets, banned their funding through all channels (Ali, 2003). He also announced National Educational Reforms policy (2001-2015) with the objective of bringing madrassa textbook design and curriculum into the mainstream of Pakistan's general education system through the inclusion of subjects such as Science, Social Studies and English in new syllabus (Kronstadt K. A., 2004).

General Musharraf activated State machinery against militant organizations operating in Pakistan. He banned many Islamic terrorist organizations in Pakistan. In January, 2002 General Musharraf banned five terrorist organizations including, Jaish-e-Mahammed (JeM), Sipāh-e-Sahāba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and Tehreek-e-Ja'faria Pakistan (TJP). Among these organizations US characterized Lashkir-e-Tayba and Jaish-e-Mahammed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations which had alliance with al-Qaeda and Taliban whereas others characterized as the domestic terrorist groups (Jabeen, Vol. 24, No.2, (July-December 2009)).

Many other militant groups whom were already banned in Pakistan due to involvement in terrorism and sectarian violence in different parts of country also came under the scrutiny. General Musharraf also started crackdown against these organizations considering involvement in spreading terrorism and militancy in a

country. As a result, Over 3,300 militants and terrorists were captured and detained by Pakistan law enforcement agencies from various parts of country in which most of them were released by courts due to insufficient evidence against them (Watson, 2002).

Pakistan's Changed Role as Coalition Partner in Afghanistan

U.S-led allied forces launched Operation Enduring freedom in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 with the aim to overthrow the Taliban regime and capture or kill al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. In this operation Pakistan assisted allied forces with every type of logistic support including Air bases, Navel ports and permission of blanket over flights to launch attack in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only provided logistic support but also provided useful intelligence and immigration data to allied forces. Pakistan cut off its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and stopped logistic support to Taliban. Although Pakistan provided logistic and intelligence support to allied forces but Pakistan's role was limited in this operation in terms of offensive operational activities (Woodward, 2002).

In March 2002 allied forces launched another offensive operation "Anaconda" in Paktia province of Afghanistan adjacent to FATA. During that operation Pakistani forces increased their strength in North and South Waziristan to stop militants crossing the border. Pakistani forces not only successfully countered militant movement in Pakistan during that operation but also targeted many foreign insurgents but NATO and Pakistani security forces failed to stop the movement of militants toward Pakistan (Naylor, 2005). Pakistani forces conducted several assault Operation at Kazha Punga in South Waziristan with the collaboration of FC, SSG commandos and regular troops against al-Qaeda in June 2002. In July, security forces also get breakthrough in Khyber and Kurram agency. First time security forces succeeded to enter the Tirah Valley in the Khyber Agency and Parachinar in Kurram Agency where they captured number of al-Qaeda operatives. Similarly, in august 2002 targeted operation against al-Qaeda operatives was also launched in Baluchistan province, in which security forces captured many al-Qaeda fighters. Some of them were handed over to Americans which remain temporarily in prisons in Kandahar, Bagram, and other locations and some remain in the custody of ISI (Jones, 2010).

Strategic Paradigm Shift by Islamic Insurgents

After preliminary crackdowns, these militant groups reorganized and regroup themselves to operate within Pakistan. Some domestic militant groups also had ties with al-Qaeda and other foreign extremist groups. United Nations listed Jaish-e-Mahammed (JeM) and Lashkir-e-Tayba (LeT) associated with al-Qaeda and Taliban. Now these militant groups spread all over Pakistan and started armed struggle against state in reaction of Pakistan's role in the war on terrorism and responses toward militancy on its soil. Most of these militants were involved in various kinds of violence, terrorism and criminal activities. Some of these groups

had ties with Taliban and al-Qaeda and they were fighting against US coalition forces in Afghanistan but now after crackdown in Pakistan they came back and started war against “internal enemies” (Hussain, 2007).

Terrorism became great challenge for Pakistan after it emerged as a reaction of Pakistan's role as a front line state in War against Terrorism. No other country in the world faced threat and terrorism as Pakistan faced after 9/11 for opposing extremism and standing with the world against militancy and terrorism. Before 9/11 many militant groups of mujahidin's (shaped during Soviet-Afghan war) were activated in Pakistan due to its strategic policy and support to Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Some of these groups were involved in violence and criminal activities particularly they were actively involved in sectarian violence in country that was not considered as a direct threat to State. Due to policy change and squelching against militancy and terrorism throughout the country, these militant groups now stretched their fight against the State to take revenge. They started armed struggle against the state and started like guerilla warfare against security forces.

Initially they targeted high profile officials to put pressure on Government to reframe their policies. They also started to mark soft targets like foreigners working in Pakistan and minorities. Most of the banned organizations also gained support from al-Qaeda and other international terrorist group which provided assistance to function against the State. This complex web of terrorist networks was activated against Pakistan and soon chain of terrorist activities was started across the country.

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	1781	533	3182	5496
2015	767	285	2098	3150
Total*	20704	6316	32142	59162


*Data till October 4, 2015

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (<http://www.satp.org>)

Coercive Responses towards Islamic Insurgency 2001-2015

After change in foreign policy, Pakistan's Administration decided to take actions against rapidly increasing militancy in FATA and adjacent areas. This orientation demands new strategy to face this challenge. For this regard Pakistan security forces were deployed with Afghan border to support US led war on terrorism in Afghanistan with the purpose to stop militant to cross the threshold into Pakistani territory. When Pak army reached in FATA, it faced strong resistance from different militant groups. Foreign and local militants had presence there in large number where they had training camps and safe hideouts. Some militant groups had strong hold in tribal areas where they not only forcefully controlled the local population but also involved in various kinds of violence, terrorism and criminal activities. When Pakistani Army entered in FATA militants perceived this development as an action against them. Pakistani forces were attacked several times in FATA.

Since then, Army was involved in ensuring internal security through military operations against militants. Several operations were launched against local and foreign insurgents and terrorists to reestablish writ of the government in tribal areas.



Data till October 7, 2015

Sources: Data is collected through South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pak Institute of Peace Studies Repots and Ministry of Interior Pakistan (National Crisis Management Cell) and Newspapers Reports.

Stick and Carrot Strategy for Counter Insurgency

Operation Al Mizan (2002-2006)

Al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued fatwa against Pakistan Army and called for the death of General Musharraf (Rashid, 2008). Several assassination attempts were made against General Musharraf in which he narrowly escaped. Investigation revealed that planners of assignation and other targeted missions were operating from Waziristan where al-Qaeda not only had presence but also had established network and command and control centers operating there (Pervez, 2006). In June 2002, al-Qaeda militant attacked Pakistani forces in Azam Warsak, near Wana in South Waziristan in which dozens of Pakistani soldiers were martyred (Jones, 2010).

United States was also pressurizing Pakistan to take action against militant in FATA. All these incidents forced Pakistan to commence Operation against militants. Initially Pakistani security forces started operation against foreign militants but some local groups had strong ties with al-Qaeda. Pakistan government politically pressurized the local tribes to point out who is harboring and facilitating foreign militants. In that regard several meetings of Shura (tribal parliament) were conducted in FATA. Pakistan conducted leading military operation Al Mizān (Justice) in 2002. This operation was combination of several small operations of security forces against different Islamic militant groups

operating in tribal areas. During operation Al Mizān Pakistan deployed 70,000 to 80,000 troops in FATA (Jones, 2010).

In the beginning, it was a small scale operation initiated with the focus to target only foreign militants in which only Frontier Corps (F.C) units participated. During that targeted raid six Uzbek militants were killed and most of them escaped from South to North Waziristan successfully (Khan, 2014). After that Security forces made a setup for full scale operation with the help of army aviation units to assist operations with artillery, transportation, and logistics units for backing forward-deployed units. Then Security forces began to infiltrate South Waziristan agency.

In October 2003, security forces conducted operation in village of Baghar in South Waziristan against foreign Islamic militants. In this operation 2500 soldiers participated. On January 8, 2004 similar kinds of operations were conducted in South Waziristan. During which militants ambush security forces from three sides and launched heavy attack with rockets on military check posts at Wana. Over the next several days militants fired rockets and short range missiles to army check posts in Wana and Shulama (Jones, 2010).

On March 2004, operation Kalusha was launched in South Waziristan to rescue Frontier Corps personnel in that area. This operation was concentrated 50 sq. km area near Wana. This area was in control of five different Islamic extremist groups led by Nek Mohammed who was supposed to be sheltering and harboring foreign militants and having connotations with the Afghan Taliban. In this operation Pakistan Army successfully eliminated foreign Islamic militants and captured the network of underground tunnels full of electronic system and ammunition and also traced the al-Qaeda command and control center. Although Army cleared the targeted area but this operation spread the battle from one corner to other corner of tribal belt. Local Islamic militant groups with coordination of foreigner militant started to attack other border check posts of Pakistani Army in guerilla warfare style. Pakistani security forces inflicted heavy losses in which 16 troops martyred, 14 officials took hostages and destroyed artillery setup, 23 military vehicles and other warfare setup (Yusafzai, 2004).

Whereas according to CRS Report for Congress, during this operation more than 46 Pakistani troops were killed and no high value al-Qaeda or Taliban fugitives killed or captured. Most of the terrorists escaped to Wana and Pakistani forces faced lethal resistance.

Pakistan claims that operation as victory but most of observers called that operation complete failure due to poor intelligence and planning (Kronstadt K. A., 2004). This operation further stretched to several months combat. Security forces employed 700 troops, but after two months fight roughly 7,000 regular troops and Frontier Corps were battling with the Islamic militants at several locations in southwest of Wana. According to Pakistan during this operation, Air force

participated with dozens of cobra helicopters and F-16 air jets. Number of local and foreign militants were killed and captured. Security forces destroyed al-Qaeda command and control center and also captured network of underground tunnels, military training camps and front line fortifications and barracks (Khan Z. A., 2014). Pakistani Security forces and Militants both claimed victories against each other however, the battle ended up on an oral deal.

Shaikai Agreement

Public pressure started to develop on government against Army action in South Waziristan. Operation Kulsha ended upon an unwritten deal between Pakistan Army and Pro-Taliban militant groups known as Shaikai agreement on 24 April 2004. Government arranged the Jirga with the assistance of political forces in which Islamist political party, JUI (coalition partners of Musharraf government) played a key role. Jirga was conducted at Shaikai in South Waziristan in which 50-members of tribal elders participated.

Pakistani Security forces demanded unconditional surrender of foreign militants and their local supporters. They were also asked to register foreign militants with authorities and Pakistani soil would not be used for cross border attacks. Pakistan's authorities also pressurized them to release hostages of Pro-Pakistani individuals. Militants also presented three counter conditions in front of Jirga (tribal meeting).

1. Pakistan Army should go back to their original position
2. They would not interfere in our internal matters
3. They also demanded to compensate 83 plus houses destroyed and release of 163 people arrested during operation (Jones, 2010).

On March 27 Jirga was conducted for final meeting at a Deobandi madrassa the Jamia Arabia Ahsan al 'uloom near Wana in which 18 members participated including Nek Mohammad Wazir, Haji Mohammad Sharif, The Corps Commander of Peshawar, Lt-Gen Safdar Hussain, JUI 'Ulamās and some tribal elders from Zalikhel tribe were present there.

Although both sides were agreed on main points but there were many problems with this deal.

First of all this agreement was based on verbal promises of which conditions were not written or signed.

Secondly, first time Jirga was held in madrassa, before that Jirga was held on public places which show the growing role of religious actors in that area.

Thirdly, both sides perceived that deal differently. Pakistani authorities believed problem of militancy can be tackled with political influence by using non-military

means as in the past so deal was considered victory. Tribal leadership offered their guns in Jirga to official as a symbolic gesture of peace but they were not ready to surrender themselves. Whereas militant understood as this deal as a tacit acceptance of their victory and they were perceived as powerful and legitimate as the Army. They had solid reasons to understand this deal as victory, because according to tribal tradition loser tribe or party comes to winner's territory to accept its victory and for stopping further conflict. As This deal was held in a madrasa in South Waziristan which was considered a headquarter of militants under the control of Naik Mohammad Wazir group so they perceived it as Pakistani authorities were accepting their defeat and recognizing them as greater force.

After the agreement militancy further augmented in that area. The deal not only provided militants a chance to consolidate upon themselves but also boost their confidence. Now they believed, they could challenge Pakistani forces that may be the reason they soon violated the peace deal. They were not ready to stop cross border violations, in fact, militancy further amplified in that area and no foreigner was registered to authorities. Tribal leader Naik Mohammad Wazir who was a central person in this deal was killed on June 18, 2004 in missile attack. Local suspected that missile come from other side of border or American drone killed him so after his death the deal entirely broke down (Rohde, 2004).

Military Action and Sraa Rogah Peace Deal

After the death of Naik Mohammad, Haji Omar became the new leader of the Wana. He also sheltered Uzbek, Chechen and other foreign militants and involved in various attacks on NATO force but his focus was more on targeting Pakistani security forces. Although militants were not following the conditions of peace deal and violating the agreement even then security forces remained on its position. Militants started to attack border security forces adjacent to Waziristan and their activities were increasing day by day. But one incident forced security forces to take action against increasing activities of militants. In an attack by Islamic militants, number of Pakistani security persons on border duty were ambushed and heartlessly killed at Sarwakai in July 2004 (Khan H. , December 2012). After five months, this operation was also ended with a deal known as Sara Rogh Agreement on February 2005. Sara Rogh Peace deal was between security forces and Pro-Taliban militants lead by Baitullah Maḥsūd. The deal consist of six points, all the points were to a certain extent same as previous deal with militants. JUI-F once again played a central role to conduct local jirgha and pressurized mashud tribe to do this peace deal. As a result, Baitullah Maḥsūd surrendered in Sara Rogh and agreed on several points including would not to attack on security forces and would not assist and shelter foreign militants on Maḥsūd area and if they violated the agreement would be punished according to tribal customs. After that agreement government provided amnesty to local militants and removed troops from Maḥsūd territory (Fair, 2010).

Military Action and Peace Agreements in North Waziristan – 2006

Before 2006, Security forces countered militancy in South Waziristan and their focus was mostly upon foreign militants. Military operations against foreigners pushed them to North Waziristan, where presence of government was limited that provided militants a chance to regroup and reorganize themselves. They not only established safe hideouts but also used territory for cross border attacks. In that year, Pakistani Security forces faced several attacks. This time militants adopted hit and run strategy. In March 2006, security forces targeted militant hide outs in North Waziristan. Security forces claimed that 45 people including 30 foreigners in which most of them were Chechens killed in an attack on border town of Danday Saidgi in North Waziristan (Khan J. , 2014).

When fight was ensuing in North Waziristan, administration in Islamabad was analyzing situation and it was felt that use of force in tribal areas was a counterproductive due to which local youth may lean toward militancy. Public opinion was also in favor that use of force is not a solution of problem. Local tribes were also desperate for return of peace in the area. As a result, finally both parties reached to a peace deal known as the North Waziristan Peace Agreement on 5 September 2006 at Miranshah (Waziristan accord signed , 2006).

This accord was highly criticized in western media and was considered as Pakistan is trying to safe its troops by exposing allied forces in Afghanistan for impairment. In Pakistan some parties and groups criticized this deal as Pakistani administration is indirectly acknowledging militants as a parallel force and authority in Waziristan.


Like many prior efforts militants also used this settlement to regroup themselves. After that deal, they increased their power, control and strength, not only in tribal areas but also influenced neighboring districts. Intense upsurge was witnessed in robberies, murders, kidnappings and other criminal activities which show that militants were more persuasive than before this agreement (Khan I. , 2006).

Establishment of TTP: Height of Islamic Insurgency

In autumn 2007, Baitullah Maḥsūd assimilated various local militant groups throughout Pakistan to form an organization. In December 2007 dozens of militant groups united under the umbrella of this organization named as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The main objective of this organization was to perform defensive (So called) Jihad against Pakistani Security forces and to fight against NATO and US led allied forces in Afghanistan. TTP rose as a reaction of Pakistan's actions against militant groups in FATA after 9/11. It was initially estimated that TTP consist of about 30,000 to 35000 militants. Although they referred to as "Taliban" but generally these groups of young militants basically

originated from Pakistan inspired by various indigenous tribal codes, tribal nationalism on the ideology of Afghan Taliban and united under TTP (Lian, 2010).

The formation and composition of TTP demonstrated the violence and militancy not only in FATA but also adjacent districts of KPK. TTP presence was observed in all seven agencies of FATA and also had influence on adjacent districts of KPK including Banu, D.I Khan, Laki Marvat, Deir, Bunir, Swat, and to Shangala was worrying sign for Pakistan.



Sources: Reports (Body Count : Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan, 2015), South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP, 2015)

Counter Insurgency Moves against TTP

Operation Zalzala

After the formation of TTP, Baitullah Maḥsūd took control of several parts of FATA. He not only brutally killed many tribal elders in Waziristan but also initiated the suicide bombing campaign in Pakistan with the cooperation of Pashtun and Punjabi extremist militant groups. Some foreigners and local intelligence sources concluded that TTP was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto (leader of Pakistan People party) during her election campaign and Baitullah Maḥsūd was the master mind of that murder (Warrick, 2008).

TTP was also involved in many attacks on Pakistani security forces in FATA. In January 2008 militants attacked the Sara Rogha fort in South Waziristan from four sides. In this attack several members of security forces were killed. According to different media reports about 200 militants attacked the fort from four sides with rockets and captured the fort in which number of troop were killed. Baitullah Maḥsūd took the responsibility of that attack. TTP also captured Splitoi, Ladha, and Sarawakai in South Waziristan and began striking a number of additional forts in their neighborhoods.

After the increasing activities of militants Pakistani security forces launched tri-star operation against militants. The operation Zalzala (Earthquake) was initiated in South Waziristan with the aim to clear the area under the control of Mashud network and to capture or kill leaders of TTP including Baitullah Maḥsūd and chief operator of suicide bombing Qari Hussain. In this operation security forces only targeted Bahauallah Maḥsūd network (Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives—Zalzala, 2008). In January 2008, Security forces dropped leaflets and pamphlets urging locals to vacate the area as government going to launch operation against militants. After that Army launched attack on several parts of South Waziristan on 24 January, 2008. During the battle between Islamic militants and security forces, heavy weapons were used against each other. Due to conflict in South Waziristan more than 20, 0000 residents were displaced who migrated to adjacent district of KPK. This battle continued for about six weeks in which several Taliban fighters were killed and arrested. Security forces also cleared the vast area of South Waziristan, however, security forces failed to kill or capture Baitullah Maḥsūd. Army also discovered the factory of suicide bombing and training camp where 09 to 12 years old children were turning to suicide bombers (Abbas, 2008).

Once again, this conflict also ended with peace deal or agreement. Conditions were similar to those as adopted in previous deals. Pakistani security forces started to withdraw from Maḥsūd tribe territory in May 2008. According to different sources after withdrawal of Pakistani forces TTP restored its position in South Waziristan (Mir, 2009). Security forces collectively punished the Maḥsūd tribe rendering to Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), tribal code and clauses of previous deal broken by them. Collective punishment was understood as tribe is collectively responsible for misdeeds of their persons. Security forces destroyed 4000 houses, number of Shops, Gas stations, Petrol pumps and other private property belongs to Maḥsūd tribe as a collective punishment (Abbas, 2008). This controversial collective punishment highly criticized in Pakistan which also developed hate and enmity in tribal people against Security forces.

Intrusion of Insurgency to SWAT and FATA

Operation Sher Dil

Security forces launched a military operation in Bajawr Agency on 6 September 2008. This operation was basically launched against Qari Zia Rahman group.

They were involved in various attacks on security forces in Bajawr. This group of militants attacked the Pro-Pakistani elders, political agents and National Lashkar who were performing security duty in that area. According to different reports more than 36 check posts were destroyed in that area. This militant group captured the Loe Sham in Bajuar agency. Political and economic control was lost by tribal elders and Lashkar (Lloyd, 2008).

The main objective of this operation was to target militant groups whom were operating against Pakistan and involved in attack on security forces. Other objectives were also included i.e. to clear the area, restore economic, political, and communication centers in Bajwar. During more than six months operation, Security forces discovered an interconnected tunnel system with the use of technology. Almost every house joined to a tunnel system in Loe Sham. Security forces also learnt that they were not fighting against ordinary rag tag militia, they were highly trained and equipped with latest weapons and their defense was also phenomenal. Security forces and intelligence sources revealed that all the weapons and militants were coming from Afghanistan. Although NATO, ISAF and U.S forces were present there but they were doing nothing to stop militant movement toward Pakistan.

Operation Rah-e- Haq

Due to military offensive in FATA militants spread to others part of country. Previous operations launched against militants ended up with deal. These Peace deals facilitated to establish temporary peace but also provided time to militants and provided them opportunity to reorganize. That may be one of the reasons that militancy spread to other parts of country.

Operation Rah-e-Haq was a military operation launched against a militant group known as Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in Mālākand division District Swat. This operation was conducted in three phases.

First phase was initiated on November 2007 when Army and local police launched search operation against militants in southern part of Swat valley but militant activities gradually started to increase in valley. TNSM militant group was infiltrated into cities of Swat. Within months, Islamic insurgents led by Sufi Mohammad spread in swat valley.

Second Phase of Operation Rah-e-Ḥaq was launched in July 2008 against increasing activities of militants. This operation was continued till end of the year with focus on northern side of valley. At that phase security forces were just stopping militants to enter in Swat valley. It seems that security forces were more than on defensive rather than on offensive mode.

In January 2009, security forces started third phase of this operation in reaction of attacks on Security forces and destroying of Schools in Swat. This operation was

also ended with peace deal in February 2009 known as Mālākand Accord (Fair, 2010).

Counter Insurgency Operations in Swat

After the Mālākand Accord, Government was convinced to accept demand of TNSM by institutionalized Islamic laws of justice in Mālākand division. But as usual in the shadow of this accord militants continued their activities in Swat valley under the leadership of Molvi Fazlullah. After two month, militants occupied major cities of Swat. They not only continued to attack security forces but also destroyed many police stations and government institutions including Government offices, schools, banks and other places and took entire control on large part of Swat. They robbed many Shops, Banks, NGOs offices and Gas stations in valley. They not only occupied Mingora city but also spread their influence on neighboring districts.

Now Taliban were just few kilometers away from Islamabad that was worrying signs for Pakistan. Pakistani security forces launched operation Rāh-e-Rāst in May, 2009 to clear the area of Swat with the aim to kill or capture the leadership of TNSM. It was a full scale operation launched against militants. On 30 May, after almost one month fight Army regains the control of Swat valley and successfully completed its all objectives.

Strategic Coercive Move in South Waziristan

Baitullah Maḥsūd and his TTP network increased terrorist activities in Pakistan. There were 2,148 terrorist attacked recorded during 2008 to 2009 in Pakistan. It seemed as every place and every corner of country was the target of TTP. After the escalation of violence across Pakistan, Security forces launched another military operation in South Waziristan against TTP network.

Operation Rah-e-Nijāt was started with the aim to destroy the network of TTP in South Waziristan and weaken the militant infrastructure, support base in FATA. COAS General Ashfaq Kayani explained that Operation Rah-e- Nijāt was only against foreign militants and cruel militant elements but not against Maḥsūd Tribe (Fair, 2010). Large numbers of militant were killed during that operation. Pakistani Forces destroyed the command and control center and base camp of TTP and cleared the area of Sararogha, Makin and Laddah in South Waziristan. Baitullah Maḥsūd was also killed in CIA drone attack on 5th July 2009 (Fair, 2010).

Due to effective approach and strategy, security forces not only destroyed the infrastructure, command and control center but also pushed them toward mountains in North Waziristan and some militants fled into neighboring provinces of Afghanistan. Although, this operation was relatively successful but it did not destroyed the ability of TTP to attack the State.

Paradigm Change in Military Operations

After the military operations Rāh-e-Haq and Rāh-e-Rāst in Swat valley and operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan, newly elected Government decided to give peace a chance to settle all the matters with negotiations. In January 2014 dialogue began between the representatives of Government and Militants, with the aim to resolve all the matters with peaceful process. But during the dialogue, militants also continued their terror campaign against the state. As Prime Minister explained in his speech at the National Assembly on 16 June 2014,

“At one hand we were doing dialogues and on other hand we were being frequently targeted. We were pursuing talks but our Air ports, Courts, Schools and places of worship were targeted. In spite of the sacrifices of our armed forces, we gave peace talk’s first precedence but our all efforts were gone in vain” (Tribune, 2014).

The Operation Zarb-e-‘Azb was finally launched on 15th June 2014 with the aim to completely eliminate Islamic militancy and terrorism from Pakistan. It was full scale military operation in North Waziristan Agency and in other areas of FATA close to Pakistan - Afghanistan border in which more than 30,000 Pakistani soldiers participated (Javaid, 2015). During that period, North Waziristan Agency became a hub for local and foreign militants. Militant groups were using North Waziristan Agency as a base camp to fight a war and launch terrorist activities in Pakistan. Terrorism not only disrupted National life but also instigated huge humanitarian loses within Pakistan. Pakistani authorities vacated the area before initiation of operation to save the people from mutilation. According to Express Tribune 929,859 people were registered as IDPs (Javaid, 2015).

The attack on Army Public School Peshawar on December 16, 2014 in which 132 innocent school children, 9 staff members were inhumanly killed by TTP militants shocked the whole of Nation (Javaid, 2015). It can be considered as “Pakistan’s 9/11”. After that attack National consensus was developed to deal with the terrorists with iron hand. Pakistan transmuted its terrorism policy by taking extra ordinary measures to curb and eradicate all kinds of Islamic militancy and terrorism.

Zarb-e-‘Azb successfully achieved its targets. According to DG ISPR 2763 terrorists killed, 837 hideouts destroyed in Zarb-e-‘Azb (Tribune, 2015). Security forces successfully cleared 90% area of North Waziristan Agency. The next phase of the operation is launched under the name of Operation Rad ul Fasād during the command of General Bajwa (Military Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 2015). This operation continues so far with the hope to eradicate terrorism and Islamic militancy from Pakistani society.

CONCLUSION

When Pakistan took U-turn on its Afghan policy and became front line state in war on terrorism. Pakistan played an active role to curb militancy and extremism from its territory. Security forces cracked down against militants and terrorist throughout the country. These militant groups stretched their fight against the State to take revenge. As a result they started armed struggle against the state and started guerilla warfare against security forces. They not only organized themselves against the security forces in FATA and adjacent areas but also spread terrorism throughout the country. Islamic Insurgency emerged as a great challenge for Pakistan. FATA became hub of local and foreign terrorists. Security forces conducted many military operations in FATA and adjacent areas including Operation Al Mizān, Operation Zalzalāh, Operation Sher Dil, Operation Rah-e-Ḥaq, Operation Rah-e-Rāst and Operation Rāh-e-Nijāt. All these operations were ended up on a peace deal. Although these Peace deals helped to establish temporary peace yet they also provided militants a chance to regroup and reorganized themselves. Soon they violated these peace deals and started terrorist activities in Pakistan. Operation Zārb 'Azb was finally started in July 2014, with the aim to completely eradicate militancy without any discrimination of good or bad militants and continues until the last terrorist has been eliminated. Operation Rad al Fasād continues so far with the hope to completely wipe out terrorism and militancy from Pakistan.

In nutshell, Pakistan being a front line state in war against terrorism faced more negative implications than positive. The security situation of Pakistan consistently remained critical and deteriorated the lives of people. Pakistan was free of the grabs of extremism, Islamic militancy and terrorism; incidents of violence were limited to specific acts of sectarian nature. However Afghan Jihad, militant culture, specific madrassa system, involvement of external hands, Strategic depth policy have negatively affected Pakistani society.

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