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THE LAW OF COMPULSORY CONSCRIPTION IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT, 1925-1935

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Abstract

The idea of establishing an Iraqi army was paid attention to at the Cairo Conference as the British High Commissioner Percy Cox put it forward. Cox foresaw the volunteer system as an acceptable concept consistent with his perspectives in forming army, guaranteeing Britain's military and political control. Accordingly, Iraq would constantly remain tied to the British military aid. After the formation of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, the successive Iraqi governments proceeded to apply the compulsory recruitment law. Indeed, this took a wide range of debates in the House of Representatives so as to consider defending the country as a national duty for the people of the Kingdom to carry out. However, this call was met with a strong rejection by many who were loyal to Britain; they indicated that this law would create a strong army, endangering the Britain's authority and privileges. The House of Representatives, ignoring such calls, recommended the implementation of this regulation which was voted on at the 13th session of the fourth period held on January 13, 1934. Then, the Royal Decree was issued on June 12,1935, implementing the Compulsory recruitment under the law No. 9 in 1934.

Keywords: Commissioner Percy, law, British, Ministry of Defense

Introduction

Most of the political elites in successive Iraqi governments were Iraqi officers who served in the Othman army. Its construction is complete, but the British government has stood in the way of the law and opposes it, fearing that the army will one day stand in the way of its interests and keep the army weak so that it does not carry out the mission of repelling internal and external threats. This prompted the House of Representatives to discuss without fear or fear the issue of conscription prepared by the Ministry of Defense, but the position of the members of the House of Representatives that was formed throughout the

life of Parliament was divided into two groups. About the list of compulsory conscription, until it was accepted and voted by Parliament and the government in 1934, and the Royal Decree was issued in 1935, despite all the difficulties and obstacles that Iraq witnessed during the research period.

Entrance in the establishment of the Iraqi army

In the late 1920's, the first interim Iraqi government was formed, headed by Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib (1). Jaafar al-Askari (2) was summoned as the first Iraqi officer to occupy the position of Minister of Defense, and he had a strong desire to establish a national army (3). He expressed his desire to the British High Commissioner, Percy Cox (4), who in turn suggested to the Interim Government in his book No. 9314 May 6-May 1921, the need to expedite the establishment of the Iraqi army (5), and to form a force not exceeding fifteen thousand soldiers sufficient for this purpose, and with an annual budget The amount of 15% of the state's public revenues, provided that this specialization increases until it reaches 25% annually, and that recruitment is limited to volunteering for a period of two years, after which the volunteer soldier is given freedom to work if he is recommended to return, and on the same day it was approved by the Council of Ministers (6). Based on the proposal of its representative in Baghdad, the British House of Commons decided unanimously on June 14, 1921, to approve the establishment of the Iraqi army (7), and on this occasion the Minister of Defense Jaafar Al-Askari issued a statement saying ((Praise be to God, the Ministry of Defense has been formed, and has appointed all the shops as officers for recruitment, for the sake of the damaged Iraqi National Army, which is the true document for preserving the entity of the country, and for the payment of aggressive emergencies. On the desired lost (8). In late June 1921, the registration of volunteers in the Iraqi army began as follows: First: - Any Iraqi citizen of cities or villages, whose ages range between 18-40 years old, is entitled to volunteer in the Iraqi army (9).

Second: - The volunteer is required to serve for a period of two years for the infantry and three years for the mounted classes (5), and upon the recommendation of the Minister of Defense, the Council of Ministers issued a decision stating that the (Iraqi) army will be organized, trained and supplied with clothes and equipment according to British principles 7.

The first Iraqi army regiment was formed in Baghdad in July 1921, under the name of the Imam Musa Al-Kadhim Regiment. It was suggested by Defense Minister Jaafar al-Askari (7), as it was based in the city of Kadhimiya in Khan al-Kabuli. Then he was transferred to Hilla to replace the British garrison, then the army formations began to expand, and to achieve this purpose, the second regiment was formed at the beginning of November 1921, and the

formations of the Iraqi army reached about 4000 soldiers, and the ministry's plan was to increase the number of the army to six thousand volunteers (7).

In order to provide the army with officers, the Iraqi Military College was established on the nineteenth of July 1921, and one hundred and fifty-six Iraqi officers were registered (7), Britain made sure that the batches of officers were from the sons of feudal lords and the sons of a prominent aristocracy traditionally known for their loyalty and association with them (10), and they were given salaries in the manner allowed by meager imports (7), in addition to the appointment of seventeen British officers in the Ministry of Defense who used to direct and educate Iraqi officers

Iraq was going through many challenges, especially with regard to the borders with its neighbors, and what increased the matter both, it was evident that Iraq's neighbors with Iran on the one hand and Turkey on the other hand required the Iraqi government to rely on its national army and implement the conscription system the best way to increase the efficiency of the army (5). After Faisal I was crowned king on the throne of Iraq, he showed his interest in the army because he believed that volunteering is the best way to build an armed army and the necessity to take one of the forms of compulsory service (11), and it cancels the British argument and their military presence in Iraq (12), and so we see him start his memo by saying (I started with the army because I see it as the backbone of forming the nation) (13)

During the reign of Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib's second government (September 12, 1921-September 30, 1922), the Wahhabis raided the position of Abu Jahr in the al-Muntafak Brigade. This incident spread discontent in Iraq, its repulsion was reflected in the discussions of the Council of Ministers held on March 27, 1922 (14), and when the opinions of the ministers were taken separately, Naji Al-Suwaidi, Minister of Justice, spoke that the interest of Iraq requires building a strong army equipped with modern weapons, in order to be able through them to repel external dangers and suppress Wahhabi movements, and demanded the government to strictly monitor the borders (7), and in the same session, the Minister of Health, Hanna Khayyat, criticized the government for not giving the true picture of this attack, calling for knowledge of the reasons that led to the outbreak of this attack (7), and when the ministry was subjected to a campaign of Criticism, the Minister of Defense tried to reduce the severity of criticism directed at the government, saying that Britain took on its responsibility to maintain internal security and defend the borders, until the time when the Iraqi National Army grows and becomes able to bear this responsibility (7).

Thus it seems clear that the Iraqi government, during the discussions of the cabinet session, felt the country's need for a strong and organized national army, to preserve the security of the nomadic and stable tribes, to prevent

them from invading and to preserve internal transportation routes, and its borders are unstable and threatened from all sides.

In line with the calls made by the ministers during the reign of the second president's government, the first ministry of Abd al-Mohsen al-Saadoun issued a decision on June 11, 1923. To increase the number of the army to six thousand, to increase the defense budget and to form new military forces (15), but it did not implement the mandatory conscription system (15) This is due to the most important reasons, the most important of which is that the Iraqis do not accept such a system if they believe that serving in the army is a service to Britain (15).

The British government was afraid that that army would one day stand in the way of its interests in Iraq. The representative of Iraq, the Commissioner in London, Jaafar al-Askari, wrote to King Faisal on June 23, 1923 (I met some heads of departments in the Ministry of War and Aviation, and convinced them that the Iraqi army must be supported, and I showed They have mistaken ideas of some Englishmen in Iraq and their fear that our army will split from them in the future) (15), and on this basis, the military agreement concluded on March 25, 1924 between the British government and the Iraqi government was signed, which Article (4) stipulated that (after 4 years) The Iraqi army will bear the responsibility for maintaining internal security and defending the security of Iraq from external aggressions, while Britain retains the right to inspect the army and the necessity to consult the High Commissioner in the distribution and movement of the army. The Iraqi army towards its interests, to develop the army's efficiency, but to make it always dependent on British competence and training. Compulsory conscription in the Constituent Assembly debates 1924.

The third session of the regular meeting of the Constituent Assembly held on March 31, 1924, which was devoted to discussing the Iraqi-British treaty and its annexes to the Council (17), for the purpose of approval, and when the discussions began, they created a wide scope for the issue of conscription to emerge and influence the discussions of the Constituent Assembly (18).

In view of this, Baghdad's deputy, Ahmad al-Dawood presented a proposal to apply the law of compulsory conscription to defend the homeland without the interference of a foreign authority. The treaty and its subsidiaries could not be conclusively concluded unless the necessary amendments are accepted in accordance with the provisions of the committee's report (18). As for the deputy of Hilla, Imran Alwan, he demanded the imposition of compulsory defense On the independence of Iraq (there is no independence without strength, so if you want independence then be prepared to defend your country, have you heard a nation from nations that gained its independence and gave it a pardon without demand. I ask the council to take the necessary

measures to defend the homeland to preserve its existence and ask the council to return the treaty to the government Adjustable (18).

And he referred to the same meaning, the deputy of Mosul, Asif Qasim Agha, that the government should issue the compulsory conscription law, because the military agreement does not guarantee Iraq external defense against its enemies (18), and during that the deputy of Kut, Hassan Shabout, said that Iraq collected (more than three) a rupee for a statue of Maud Should we not be able to collect enough money for our army to defend our country (18), and he continued his words that the terms of the treaty restrict the independence of Iraq, how can he arm himself and not have money (18).

In the same session, Diwaniyah's deputy, Abdul Wahid Sukkarqaa, said, "As for the country, it is dearer than our money, and we cannot tolerate or give up our rights in exchange for delusional things, and if we want to give up our rights, this is cowardice." For amendment and negotiations with Britain according to the report of the Commission (18).

On May 9, 1924, King Faisal called for an emergency session of the Council of Ministers, following the assaults that the Kirkuk Brigade was subjected to by the Revolutionaries on May 4, 1924 (7). On this matter, the meeting came out with a number of recommendations, which stated:

First: Pressuring the High Commissioner to implement the conscription system and to create local forces to replace the Libyan forces (19).

Second: Administrative transfers in the district, taking legal measures against the aggressors and maintaining security (13).

Third: Allocating thirty thousand rupees to compensate those affected (13). The measures that King Faisal took against that rebellion had an effect on winning the friendship of the Iraqi people (13).

At the same time, the twelfth session of the Constituent Assembly was held, chaired by Abdul Mohsen Al-Saadoun, and most of its members (20) were present, in order to know the measures taken by the government regarding these attacks. And Fawad Al-Daftary and Ahmad Al-Dawood (20).

At the beginning of his speech, the Prime Minister clarified that the government is radically interested in this issue and the circumstances of the massacre and its consequences, and he admitted that the incident took a racist and religious phase, and indirectly alluded to the responsibility of the British (20), and that he was one of those calling for building a strong army in order to defend Iraq and its independence. However, the British administration was standing in the way of this (20).

The proposal presented by the Prime Minister met with acceptance by some members of the Constituent Assembly and tried to enrich it with their proposals, including the proposal made by the Baghdad Vice President, Ahmad Al-Dawood, regarding the formation of an Iraqi army, saying: The political situation in Iraq and the dual governance prevent Iraqis from taking this step, and he expressed his readiness to join the army whenever Iraq is liberated from foreign power (20). Deputy Al-Muntafiq Abdul Mahdi Al-Muntafiqi praised the words of the Prime Minister, saying that a government cannot be independent unless It is based on an army, and an Iraqi who carries an iota of loyalty to this country cannot say that an Iraqi is in need of conscription (20).

The deputy of Al-Kut, Hassan Shabout, mentioned that he is among those who advocate the application of the compulsory conscription law, and according to his belief that no country can only recruit and the army, and he blamed some MPs for being lenient on this issue (20), and he made clear that dividing the country on the basis of military and civilian divisions might contradict Article 6 Ten of the Basic Law that considers Iraqis equal in their rights (20). The deputy of Al-Muntafik, Zamil Al-Manaa, said: "My gentlemen, you, and the people as a whole, welcome from the bottom of their heart this list, which cherishes the country and raises its desire to recruit our sons to preserve their homeland and their borders from the plague of the enemies I repeat and say that this useful service will be provided by our children and repel the enemies (20),

The deputy of Mosul, Diaa Younis, explained that (The compulsory conscription law is the symbol of independence and the country's fence, and it is its strength and the secret of greatness in it) (20). As for Baghdad's deputy, Yassin al-Hashemi, he demanded the application of the compulsory conscription law and considered it a first step towards independence, provided that you show its methods and forms on According to a special law (20)

The deputy of the Diwaniyah called Abd al-Wahid Sukkar: It is the duty of the nation to defend its country and its honor, and that this nation has in fact defended its right and fulfilled its duty (20). Baghdad deputy, Yusef Ghanima, referred to the same meaning of the necessity of a strong army capable of defending the country, for us to stop with our ally other than this position (18).

In the same session, the deputy of Al-Kut, Hassan Shabout, returned to speak about the repercussions of the incident, saying We suggest to the members of the esteemed government that they neglect and tolerate or be lenient As for those who are called revolutionaries, we ask the government to remove them from our country Independence can only be with money and men there is no state, no independence, and no attribution except with that, and we are ready to spend more money and men (18).

Representative Nuri al-Saeed (Minister of Defense) expressed his readiness to issue the compulsory conscription law, but at the same time he called the Council to look really into the matter, wondering (where are the aircraft and machine guns), which he considered one of the necessities of independence, and in that we demand the British to leave our country (18), and he supported Prime Minister Jaafar al-Askari expressed by the deputies and considered it fair to include an article in the Basic Law stipulating mandatory military service (18)

Despite all the efforts made by some of the Moidi, the idea of the compulsory conscription system, but this opinion was met with opposition by various social forces, considering that the issue of conscription is a right of the parliament and not the right of the Constituent Assembly (21).

Mandatory conscription in the House debates 1925--1935

When the second Saadounian cabinet took office on June 26, 1925 - November 21, 1926, (8), Al-Saadoun was able to persuade the Council of Ministers in its session held on March 21, 1926, to make the defense of Iraq a national duty for all the sons of the kingdom to rule it (8), so the Ministry of Defense began By forming a committee to 'legislate a law to replace the formula for compulsory conscription to replace volunteering, and to end the responsibility of the British government in the defense of Iraq (8).

In light of the Saadoun government's insistence on the necessity of compulsory conscription, the High Commissioner Henry Dobbs wrote on September 16, 1926, a telegram to the Ministry of Colonies that he doubted the Iraqi government's ability to implement the draft law on compulsory conscription, and that it was unable to pay defense costs despite conscription, and that it would It cannot guarantee internal security (22), and the British government took the opinion of its High Representative in Iraq, and informed the League of Nations about its lack of conviction in compulsory recruitment and it could not be achieved in Iraq (13), and to achieve this goal, it found the opportunity to provoke some of the representatives of tribal sheikhs, who crossed It is clear that the British government opposes the idea of applying the list of mandatory conscription, and that it will spend huge sums of money and use all the means it has to obstruct this law, and that Iraq is not in a position to resist the intrigues and strife that may arise from this obstruction (23).

For its part, the British government made it clear to al-Saadoun, after it invoked that "the tribes' opposition to compulsory conscription has made the mandatory indefinite conscription, "and that it provides assistance to the Iraqi government on the condition that it follows the advice of Britain (15), that aid came to dilute the draft Compulsory conscription on the understanding that it will achieve the same goals for the Iraqi government that it expects from

behind the law, namely providing means of defense and reducing costs (15). However, Al-Saadoun opposed those proposals and conditions presented by the British government as an alternative to the draft conscription (7).

However, Ja`far al-Askari's second ministry (November 21, 1926 - January 14, 1928) did not hesitate to raise the list of the compulsory conscription law to Parliament for the purpose of enacting it (9), but the continued opposition of the British government prevented a debate before Parliament (24) despite all The efforts made by some supporters of the idea of the compulsory conscription system, but the ministry was forced to withdraw it and postpone its implementation until another opportunity, hoping that an understanding would happen between the two governments (24).

It is clear from the foregoing that Jaafar al-Askari could not ignore the policy of the British government, and he believed that the Iraqi ministries were unable to discuss the list of compulsory conscription in Parliament because of the plan that the British government adopted towards that list.

On February 26, 1928, the first session of the regular meeting of 1928 was held, and the focus of its discussion revolved around the throne speech (24). The deputies looked forward to opportunities to express their views on the response to the throne speech, and in which the Baghdad deputy, Mahmoud Ramez, asked about the reasons for the absence of the throne speech from the list of the compulsory conscription law. (24), and he demanded the introduction of the issue of conscription and its promise ((One of the fundamental matters and a general issue that calls for true independence for the country)), and if the Throne speech does not mention these issues, it is a plot of the country (24).

Baghdad's deputy, Rashid Ali Al-Kilani criticized the throne speech, promising it a platform that does not represent the true will of the nation, and Al-Minhaj promised a break in the desires and hopes of the Iraqi nation in the formation of a strong army capable of protecting the country, especially since the government had promised that it would work to activate the issue of compulsory conscription and raise it to the Parliament Although more than a year has passed since that promise, no hope emerged from those promises, as indicated by the last speech of the Throne that we are about to discuss (24).

Nuri Said, Minister of Defense, spoke, explaining the reasons that make Iraq hesitate to adopt the principle of conscription by saying that (There is no one among Iraqis accepts to recruit the people of the country unless we verify that this service is for the country only) (24), otherwise This answer, which was mentioned by the Minister of Defense, did not convince the MPs, including the deputy of Baghdad, Rashid Ali al-Kilani, who repeated the words indicating that the mandatory conscription was intended to defend the

country and serve it at home and abroad, but if Nuri al-Saeed says that the intention of the conscription is not to serve the country We do not want conscription (24). As for the deputy of Baghdad, Mahmoud Ramez, who responded to what the Minister of Defense proposed, that he believed that the Minister of Defense was predestined before others that the conscription is due to Iraq, and that what the Minister of Defense spoke about was a new tone in Iraqi politics (24).

During the House of Representatives discussion of the budget of the Ministry of Defense on September 6, 1928, the deputies began to discuss the compulsory conscription, so the deputy of Baghdad, Yassin al-Hashemi, referred to the council, saying (The conscription law was not based on the opinions of the Iraqi military, but rather the British ally came with a military mission in 1925, which indicated that it is necessary. Following the method of compulsory conscription in order for Iraq to assume the responsibility of defending its borders and delegating to General Dele, who accepted his project to expand the army by the Iraqi government, but not more than a year had passed, and General Dele was forced to submit his resignation (8), and continued his words, saying that the application of conscription is The first guarantee for the existence of a strong modern army capable of protecting the entity and security of Iraq (8).

There is an opinion put forward by the deputy of Baghdad, Rashid Ali al-Kilani, that the problem of forming a strong army can be solved in two ways, either by creating a reserve army or by issuing the law on compulsory conscription (25), and he also explained that their historical responsibilities, which the people elected for them, are to fulfill the country's desires to obtain full independence, and that the way to obtain it is clear and that is to adopt the method of conscription (25).

This prompted Baghdad's deputy, Jaafar Abu al-Taman, to comment on the army's weakness, which has no power over the response of the Badia tribes, advising the government to take the responsibility of defending itself and form a strong army under its leaders, which will motivate people to volunteer and join its ranks (25). Jaafar Abu al-Taman weakened state measures against the invasions carried out by Ibn Saud on the one hand and the ambitions of Iran on the other hand, saying that Ibn Saud, when he saw the weakness, did not count our delegation's account, and he also criticized the government's delay in presenting the issue of compulsory recruitment to the Parliament (25).

The deputy of Baghdad, Yassin Al-Hashemi, returned to the conversation, explaining the roles that the conscription has gone through, indicating that Britain has evaded its promises to increase the army, and instead of fulfilling promises and exerting assistance, it placed obstacles and obstacles in front of the compulsory conscription law (25).

In the same session, the deputy of Anbar, Jamil Al-Rawi, directed a question to the Minister of Defense, Nuri Al-Saeed about the implementation of the provisions of the military agreement annexed to the Iraqi-British treaty (25), and asked about the fate of the military missions (26), and demanded the need to implement compulsory service after Iraq gets rid of the restrictions of the agreement (26).

Nuri al-Saeed responded to the questions of the representatives, that it is advisable to apply the compulsory conscription law, and that all of these problems are due to the joint rule, and if you want to be alone with responsibility, you must be alone with the ruling (25), and he stressed that (The Iraqi government has given the issue of Iraq taking responsibility for defense great attention and he indicated that the Ministry of Defense has been making every effort to raise the level of the army since 1922) (25), as for the fate of the military missions, he replied (that contacts are underway to decide this issue definitively) (25).

Prime Minister Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi presented the program of his first government (April 28, 1929-1929) to the House of Representatives, and he focused on discussing the list of the General Budget Law for the year 1929 Finance, the section on the Ministry of Defense (8). And it is necessary for Iraq, if you want to serve Iraq, what you have to do but bring us to the compulsory conscription law (27), and Baghdad's deputy, Yassin al-Hashemi, criticized the policy pursued by Britain, which stipulates that Iraq has only a few sufficient forces to maintain security, and the country should not have large forces It repels external dangers when needed (27).

The deputy of Al-Kut, Ali Mahmoud, demanded the ratification of the law, saying that Iraq must have an army in which to protect the country from external aggressions, and also stressed that there is no creativity and the high patriotism enjoyed by the people of the country will push them to soldiering in order to serve the country, and he concluded his words with his hope. The senior council must approve a list and give it a right of appreciation (27).

The deputy of Baghdad, Mawlid Mukhlis, referred to: Gentlemen, you know that after the nations multiplied and were formed, they needed the strength to defend themselves In our present role, no nation can live unless it has a guard and does not have an army to defend itself All the preachers and thinkers in the National Assembly and others expressed their desire for this law and said that there is no life for us except through recruitment (27).

The deputy of Mosul, Asif Qassem, spoke under the dome of this council, saying: I have stated in newspapers and newspapers about the importance of applying conscription. We know that governments do not exist except with the army and history, we understood what the value of armies is) (27) As for

the deputy of Kut, Hassan Shabout said (Everyone knows that the army is the wall of the state, and it is the one that preserves its prestige, and everyone knows as well that the reforms of this existing army will not be and will not be except in compulsory conscription) (27).

The deputy of Kirkuk, Suleiman Fattah, stated that we will not be able to obtain an army that reassures the nation's desires in all respects unless we replace the volunteer system with the compulsory conscription system, stressing the need to expand groups of different types of army to be able to fight to repel external excesses (27). The deputy of Al-Muntafak, Abdul-Mahdi Al-Muntafaki, criticized the British government's arming of the revolutionaries, saying (I know that the revolutionaries who entered the English service had stipulated that the English government should give each of them a rifle and enough cartridges when they leave, and this is a necessary condition when they enter the service, and in fact when they left, I gave them what I promised them in it) (27). Representative Muhammad Ali Fadel said, I can only support the deputies in their opinions. Then Sula directed to the Minister of Defense, is it possible for him to introduce the issue of conscription? I ask the minister to explain that (27). Defense Minister Nuri Al-Saeed replied: We can only subscribe to what was mentioned in my honorable representatives because I fully participate with their honorable persons on the matter (soon you will see the possible reforms) Running in the entire army ... I assure the council that the government is seeking to solve this issue, which is conscription and its system) (27). Despite the failure of successive Iraqi governments to issue the compulsory service law, the Ministry of Naji Al-Suwaidi (November 18, 1929-11 March 1930) decided to raise the compulsory conscription law to the House of Representatives, because it is the first guarantee to end the responsibility of the British government in the defense of Iraq (8) However, this law faced a wave of protests, and it was at the forefront of the Shiite and Kurdish protesters who were quick to announce their opposition to the law, and they took a negative stance when the ministry presented it to the parliament, so the ministry was forced to withdraw it and postpone its implementation to another opportunity (28) and this is what The deputy of Erbil, Ismail Al-Rawandzi, we, the Kurds, completely agree with our Shiite brothers that the law on compulsory conscription is inconsistent with our political situation, and we believe that the compulsory conscription law is not useful, and at the present time it causes many disadvantages, and therefore we recommend the government to abandon this idea for the time being (5). When Nuri al-Saeed took over the prime minister for the first time (March 23, 1930-19, October 1931), the idea of compulsory conscription took a clear retreat. For the first time, it was noticed that Britain had obtained a supportive position within the Iraqi government opposing conscription and favored the British position, which is the position of the prime minister who opposed expanding the army on The basis for compulsory conscription (7), although in 1929, when he was Minister of Defense, he insisted on the necessity of increasing the army forces, with the intention of preparing to assume responsibility when entering Iraq into the League of Nations (15). On March 30, 1932, a conference was held in the royal court attended by King Faisal I, Prime Minister Nuri Al-Saeed, Minister of Defense Jafar Al-Askari and the High Commissioner Cornolis (5). The king delivered his speech in which he stressed the importance of implementing the law on compulsory conscription, and the need to strengthen the army to confront and repel any external aggression. On Iraq and the suppression of the internal disturbances that occur, and at the same time the Prime Minister said that the interest of Iraq requires building a strong army equipped with modern weapons, then Jaafar Al Askari referred to the development of the army on the basis that the mandatory service law should be applied, but the British side protested the progress of the talks and considered their topic Not included in the agenda of the conference (29). At the behest of King Faisal I, NajiShawkat formed his ministry on (November 26, 1932-March 1933), and the ministry's program was to strengthen the army through conscription except for mandatory, because the government was unable to issue the compulsory conscription law (21). When Rashid Ali al-Kilani's first ministry was formed (March 20, 1933 - 9 September 1933), a list of its curriculum was submitted to Parliament on March 27, 1933 (30) and it included the compulsory conscription law (30), which was praised by Erbil's deputy, Jalal Baban, and said that personally, as an Iraqi, I welcome the ministry's step towards conscription It is mandatory, and that service in the army must be based on the loyalty of the people of the country, and that the increase in the budget of the Ministry of Defense is to prepare the requirements for this step in order to be ready to confront the emergency (31). As for the deputy of Hilla, Salman Al-Barrak, he expressed his support and welcome for this list, but called for speeding up Its implementation and work in line with the application of the compulsory service law (31). The deputy of Baghdad, Suleiman Fattah, pointed to the importance of compulsory recruitment, after linking the police issue to the army by saying that the national army can choose a good elite of the police from it to maintain security, and that the mandatory national service provides us with an army Great, able to fend off foreign invasions (31). At the beginning of November 1933, the opening ceremony of the parliament took place, and King Ghazi gave the throne speech, praising the army's mission in the first real confrontation that threatened the existence of the Iraqi state by the revolutionary insurgency, and its appearance as a professional army experienced in dealing with troubled situations (31) and emphasized the importance of developing and expanding the army. In proportion to the size of the Kingdom, to preserve its external borders and internal security (31), the deputies began to discuss the answer to the throne speech. The deputy of Al-Muntafak, Zamil Al-Manaa, participated in the discussion of the approach to

the Throne speech, as he recommended the use of force to eliminate the revolutionary rebels, saying that the group that seeks the government, the government has nothing but to eliminate it (31), and he referred to the same meaning of Baghdad's deputy, Yassin al-Hashemi, for not following Emotions in these matters that affect the independence of Iraq, and it was suggested that a secret session be held in order to determine the circumstances of the incident (31). Baghdad's deputy, Jamil Al-Madfai, objected, saying (There is no doubt that those who asked to hold the secret session were aiming to stand on the issue of the revolutionaries, and I think that the issue is not hidden from the House of Representatives or the people, and therefore I do not see the need to hold a secret session as requested) (31), and the viewpoint of the Baghdad MP was Hassan Al-Suhail said that the strife of the revolutionaries had alerted the Iraqis to the necessity of implementing the system of compulsory service and taking care of the army (31), and at the same time the deputy of al-Muntafak Muhammad Hassan Haider praised the ministry for taking the necessary measures to suppress this rebellion (31). While the deputy of Al-Muntafak, Abdul-Mahdi Al-Muntafaki, stated that these incidents have greatly harmed Iraq, whether it is harm to souls or money, and one of the government's duties is to eliminate strife and unrest in the country (31). As for Diwaniyah's deputy, Rahe Al-Attiyah, the duty of the army, as you know, is defense About the country from the external emergency and the army was found for this mission (31). The deputy of Baghdad, Jasim Amin, highlighted this issue, saying that the Iraqi army's need for weapons was urgent to enable it to defend the homeland against internal and external dangers, especially since the 1930 Iraqi-British treaty that restricted the independence of Iraq did not include Britain's commitment to supply the Iraqi army with weapons. However, it has authorized the purchase of these weapons from other countries, including the United States, which is at the forefront of global arms production (31). In light of the foregoing, Iraqis began to view the army as a symbol of independence and a tangible embodiment of national sovereignty, and from that moment on, serving in the army became one of the socially respectable professions that attracted young people of national and patriotic tendencies.

Under the first government of Jamil Al-Madfi (9-November 1933-12 February 1934), the list of the compulsory conscription law was submitted to the House of Representatives, in its session held on January 4, 1934, which was the first article of the tenth session (7).

The session began with the Prime Minister's speech to the members of the House of Representatives, saying: The list is in your hands. Future generations will record it for you with thanks and gratitude (31).

The president finished announcing the session's platform, until the voices and beatings on the tables were demanding to speak. Then the deputy of Baghdad, Ahmed Al-Daoud spoke praising the list, describing the independence of Iraq as an independence blurred, and the council's acceptance of this list goes away, because rights are taken and not given. In the army (31), as for the deputy of Hilla, Salman Al-Barrak, he said: I do not welcome this list (and I am completely flustered ... and from today I see the country climbing the ladder of life to elevation to honor to right defense I welcome it Because it will make the lions of Iraq in general trained in the use of modern weapons I welcome them, because all of us know that there is no entity for a state without an army and no life for the nation without a strong defense) (31).

Baghdad's deputy, Yassin Al-Hashemi, praised the efforts made to pass this list, and at the same time criticized the House of Representatives who described the national service as a blood tax, which is not a blood tax but an honor and pride, and said that if we had applied the basis of public service, it would have enriched us more than a lot. From the restrictions and treaties that we made while we were weak, as for this list, I say (to the respected MPs that national defense is not limited to people who reach the age of twenty because the principle of national defense begins with the formation of the state and has no end as long as the state is based on the principle of national defense and requires The nation has the right to recruit its sons and exploit all the power in its country (31).

In the same session, Deputy Al-Muntafiq, Abdul-Mahdi Al-Muntafaki, recommended the application of the law and asked the House of Representatives to ratify it (... ... we as deputies if we ask Iraq to accept soldiering because we have asked for a heresy or something new, but something that exists in its nature and with this reassurance. And this belief, if the rules of procedure were justified for us to set the list by voting one deal, I would have suggested putting it one deal by vote.

The deputy of Al-Muntafak, Zamel Al-Manaa, was enthusiastic about their opinions, as he demanded (..... from the Minister of Defense to attend cannons and rifles and not say that the budget is nothing in it ... I recommend that the defense budget be doubled and not go to the construction, roads and constructions that are It is useless) (31). Erbil's deputy, Jalal Baban, talked about conscription, indicating that the country needs a strong army in its number and promise, and that whoever does not meet the national service call is a traitor (31).

The deputy of Diwaniyah, Abdul Wahid Sukkar, referred to the same meaning, saying all the Brotherhood spoke about the list (and I support them because it is the duty of the nation to defend its country and its honor I have been informed that the government wants to exclude some Iraqi regions

from the text of this list These exceptions are what defames the reputation, so I ask the council not to agree to accept an exception for one region without another (32).

For his part, the deputy of Al-Kut commented on Mahmoud that it is my duty to say my word about the list of the compulsory conscription law, (which imposes a blood tax on Iraqis I was pessimistic about this tax two days ago, the mandate was, but the situation changed after Iraq entered the League of Nations, where it became a state It is an entity that is obligated to defend its dignity, and this bylaw obliges every Iraqi to join the military service (31).

Deputy Al-Amara Ibrahim Hammoud Al-Shaband, gentlemen, said that all Iraqis want this law, because it guarantees the independence and protection of its borders between countries, and Shabandar promised the army that applies conscription the best types of armies (31).

The deputy of Diyala, Hamed Al-Wadi, spoke: "My brothers, may I utter your name. My honorable colleagues, I have stood here hello to this list, the list of the National Defense Law ... I welcome it, because it will provide a good space for the participation of the nation's elements of all classes I proceed to the council, I hope that it approves the list as it came from the committee in its prepared form, and peace be upon you. (31) The deputy of Mosul, DiaaYunus, said that the compulsory conscription law is the symbol of independence and the country's fence, and that the army is the guardian of the homeland (31).

Nuri Al-Saeed, Minister of Defense, replied to the words of the House of Representatives, saying: "The list of mandatory conscription was submitted to your parliament after I left the cabinet ... Illiteracy the issue is not only the formation of an army, but the issue is the formation of a unified people (6).

On the other hand, this list was met with resistance and opposition, led by tribal sheikhs in an attempt to persuade the government to abstain from implementing this law, or to exclude their sons from performing military service (33). The deputy of the Diwaniyah, Abd al-Wahid, may have said by the representatives of tribal sheikhs to exempt their sons from conscription He said (... some Iraqi regions are excluded from this list, I don't know whether these areas are Iraqi or non-Iraqi, so if they are Iraqi then the defense must be upon everyone because the service is national, so I do not think that any of the people of the nation denounces service in his country and country) (31).

The deputy of Mosul, DiaaYunus, supported the words of his colleague, that the national service should prevail in all Iraqis equally and make the service public (34). As for the deputy of Al-Mutafak, Zamil Al-Manaa said (gentlemen, all the representatives want that no one is left ... and it agrees with Iraqis All of them, and there is no exception to any of them, and I ask the

Council not to prolong the talk about this useful law that the country welcomes the whole country.

After the discussions abounded, the deputy of Mosul, Salim Hassoun, said: "Everyone agreed on the list and we all welcomed it, so why is this prolongation? So I hope the council will suffice with the memorandum). Therefore, the council chairman requested that the statement be satisfied, and then the list was put to vote).

The efforts of the second ministry of Yassin Al-Hashemi (March 17, 1935-29, October 1936) bore fruit. For the issuance of the Compulsory Conscription Law on June 12, 1935, and it became effective after Royal Decree No. 237 was issued to implement the Compulsory Conscription Law No. 9 of 1934 (35).

In the second session of the extraordinary meeting of the House of Representatives, held on June 13, 1935, and upon discussion of the second article concerning the consideration of the report of the committee to edit the response to the throne speech, a number of deputies offered their thanks and gratitude to His Majesty the King and the government for presenting this list, so Salman Al-Barrak had a participation saying no I can thank His Majesty for issuing the royal will (and we must elders and elders, to be in the army when needed. If any pilgrim flies to Iraq, then our elders and elders must be in front of our youth to defend the homeland) (31).

In any case, the parliament's decision was accompanied by some incidents and clashes, especially in tribal circles, in Al-Muntafak and Al-Gharaf a number of tribal rebellions took place, carried out by Khayun Al-Ubaid and Sakban Al-Ali (36), and other tribal rebellions erupted in Al-Daghara district, carried out by the sheikh of Al-Ikraa tribes, Shaalan Al-Attiyah, demanding that their children be exempt from compulsory conscription (37), and there is no need for such a law, as the system of volunteerism that the previous governments adopted dispenses with the compulsory service system (38), and in this regard, Abd al-Abbas al-Farhoud, one of the tribal leaders, BaniZareej, was quoted as saying His men number three thousand and that he would rather go to Ibn Saud than send them for recruitment (28). After chaos ravaged the country, the government was finally able to eliminate these rebellions, and the opponents of this law declared their submission to the state after the government used force against them (39).

It is evident from the foregoing that most of the tribal representatives did not want to apply the compulsory conscription law. The British government portrayed these sheikhs and feudal lords who had relations with the British, that the law would create a strong army from the country over their tribal power and privileges, and that the compulsory conscription law would lead to

a shortage of agricultural and economic production. Because of the enrollment of young men working in the military service.

On June 20, 1935, the Directorate of Compulsory Conscription started its work in city centers by opening nineteen recruitment centers throughout the country as a first step to implement the law on compulsory conscription (5) and by implementing the law on compulsory conscription, Iraq would have completed a basic condition of independence.

Conclusion

After studying the role of parliamentarians in legislating the list of compulsory conscription inside the corridors of the parliament during the period of research 1925-1935, and the divergence of their different positions, we must pause through which we explain the most important conclusions reached by the researcher.

- The decision to establish the Iraqi army came from Britain, and it was not by an Iraqi decision or a royal will. Rather, the decision was issued by the Cairo conference.

There are two types of conscription, which is voluntary and compulsory: the voluntary one in which a person advances by his choice and desire in order to become a member of the army, while compulsory is the one in which a person is taken to training camps, whether he is willing or forced to do so.

There are two directions: - In forming the Iraqi army, the first trend: believes that the establishment of the army is a waste of time, money and efforts in a country lacking in sovereignty, and that mandatory conscription is unnecessary as long as Iraq is occupied by a foreign authority.

- The second trend: it considers expanding and developing the army and enacting the compulsory service law that involves all the people of the country in preserving the territorial integrity of the country, and this is a fundamental factor in forming a patriotic feeling, as well as reducing the army's expenditures and helping to provide a financial surplus through monetary allowance, and it can be used to meet the needs The army will thus overcome the financial crisis.

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1- Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib (1841-1927) is Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Sayyid Ali al-Kilani, whose lineage reaches to Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Jaili. He grew up in a religious environment with a mystical character and the captain of the Talibin Supervision in Baghdad, who presides over the interim Iraqi government. For more see: - Rajaa Hussein Hosni Al-Khattab, Abdul Rahman

- Al-Naqib, his life, political views and his relationship with his contemporaries, Baghdad Arab House for Printing, pp. 9-12.
- 2- Jaafar al-Askari, he is Jaafar bin Muhammad bin Mustafa al-Bahlwan, was born in Baghdad in 1885 and grew up there, originally from the Kurdish village of Askar in the Kirkuk district. He completed his primary education, Rashidiya military, then preparatory school, then traveled to Astana and graduated from the war education, then completed his studies in Berlin for more, see: Antonius George, The Arab Awakening, History of the Arab Nationalist Movement, translated by Nasir al-Din al-Assad, and Ihsan Abbas, 7th Edition, Beirut Beirut -1969, p. 311.
- 3- Philip Willardyland, Iraq: A Study in his Political Development, translated by Jaafar Khayyat, Beirut -1949, p. 225.
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