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GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN
EMPIRE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19th CENTURY IN
CENTRAL ASIA

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ABSTRACT

In this scientific article, the author examines such issues as Russian industry entered the capitalist path of development, how the importance of Central Asia as a sales market has grown many times. In addition, what a huge intermediary role Central Asia played in the transit of Russian goods to Afghanistan, Iran, India and China. The problems of conquering through the accession and development of new Central Asian markets of the second half of the 19th century became the primary task of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire. The development of new markets led to the gradual blurring of the borders between domestic and foreign markets, which, in turn, contributed to the pulling of many countries into the world market.

I. INTRODUCTION

Trade relations between Russia and the states of Central Asia date back to the time of Ivan Groznyy, and were of an irregular nature. But from the moment when Russian industry embarked on the capitalist path of development, the importance of Turkestan as a sales market has increased significantly. In addition, Turkestan played an intermediary role in the transit of Russian goods to Afghanistan, Iran, India and China.

For a long time, the Russian state did not pay sufficient attention to Asian customs policy. This was due to the fact that trade with the Asian states was of an exchange and caravan nature. There was no single

Asian tariff: for Astrakhan (from 1754) one tariff was in effect, for Orenburg and Troitsk (from 1777) - another.

Finally, on May 30, 1817, a new customs charter and tariff for Asian trade was approved. As indicated in the historical review of the Ministry of Finance, the charter of 1817 was based on "considerations of the great importance of bargaining with Asia for Russia: Russia in the west borders on countries more developed than we are industrially, and therefore only in the East our factories and plants can find a secured market for their works. The development of trade with Asia is important politically, as one of the measures for rapprochement with us. Therefore, the Asian Charter was drafted in such a way as to "encourage Asian trade in every possible way" (Kurbanov, 2020).

The government of the Russian Empire, showing an increasing interest in the Central Asian issue by the middle of the 19th century, strengthened the activities of Russian diplomats, began a wide study of the political and economic state of the khanates, caravan routes to Central Asia, etc.

By the end of the 30s of the 19th century, it marked a qualitatively new stage in Russia's policy towards Central Asia - the transition to the extension of borders, to control the steppe space of the Kyrgyz steppe (Kazakhstan) and Central Asia.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Review and Discussion

The main reason for the movement of borders to the south was the same striving for political stability in the steppe, in order to achieve the safety of life of the border population, as well as caravan trade with the Central Asian states. The key moment in solving this problem was the normalization of relations with the Khiva Khanate.

Back in the early 40s of the 18th century, a strong support base was created for the successful advance to Central Asia - the Orenburg line, i.e. a solid line of fortresses from about Samara (Kuibyshev) to Orenburg. To the east of it, the same Siberian line arose, going along the Irtysh from Ust-Kamenogorsk. The "defensive" (or rather, offensive) Siberian-Orenburg line stretched for almost 4,000 km. This was the beginning of the military advance of tsarism into Central Asia (Kastelskaya, 1980).

In Central Asia, by the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, the exact line of the state border was not established and was determined by the areas of nomadic movement of the native tribes who took Russian citizenship. The state border was guarded by regular units stationed by individual garrisons, mainly in fortresses. The latter together constituted a fortified line.

Where the line of military posts ended, there were Cossack posts located 25-50 versts from one another in the form of farms. Around them several trenches and trenches were torn off in case of repelling a surprise attack, which often happened (Kurbanov, 2020).

According to M.K. Rozhkova, the Central Asian market was important to Russia from the point of view of selling products of developing industries and providing this industry with cheap raw materials. Meanwhile, M.K. Rozhkova believed that the main motive for moving to Central Asia was not economic prerequisites, but the realities of colonial rivalry with England. This rivalry was the driving force behind Russia's policy towards Central Asia (Rozhkova, 1963).

In the second half of the 19th century, the importance of Central Asian policy in Russia increased markedly. At this time, political ones were added to the economic motives: the struggle with England for domination over the states of Central Asia and the Middle East. The 1860-1880 were characterized by the transition from peaceful, trade and diplomatic methods to military ones, which did not reduce the economic importance of this region for Russia.

The protection of clan Kazakh associations (Small and Middle Horde) in the 18th century did not lead to a positive result for Russia, which was associated with the peculiarities of the socio-economic structure of nomadic peoples. In the mid-60s of the 19th century, the plans of protection were supposed to be applied to the sedentary agricultural population of the Central Asian oases, which, as a rule, had centuries-old traditions of state administration: "... Kokand, then, at least, with Tashkent, making it clear to the inhabitants that their own interest forces them to be at peace with the Russians; but at the same time, by means of consuls or other diplomatic agents who, under favorable circumstances, can be commanded there or even installed, vigilantly monitor the state of affairs in the khanates in order to be able to timely take the necessary measures to suppress, at the very beginning, any plans that are contrary to our interests; in case of robbery or attacks, do not leave any hostile action without due punishment and retribution" (Serebryannikov, 1908).

The question of the conquest of Central Asian possessions or their complete "accession" to the Russian Empire is becoming a key issue in building a geopolitical system in Central Asia.

In the early 1860s, as is known, profound changes took place in Russia. The reforms were largely aimed at strengthening the Russian state, and this process was watched with concern by the European powers. The foreign policy situation prompted the country's military-political leadership to take retaliatory measures. Minister of Military D.A. Milyutin was busy looking for ways to weaken Russia's main enemy. One of them could be a military strike against the British possessions in India through the territory of Central Asia. The development of a detailed plan for the advancement to India is entrusted to M.G. Chernyaev. After reviewing Chernyaev's plan, the government considered it premature, but since then the idea of Central Asia as a base of operations in the event of a war with England has been firmly adopted by Russian politicians.

Another military reason for the beginning of Russia's active advance in Central Asia was the desire to establish a border in the south by

connecting the Orenburg and West Siberian lines of military posts. As noted by A.G. Serebrennikov: "When the Orenburg and Siberian lines were established in the first half of the last century to protect our southeastern borders from the raids of the Kirghiz kaisaks, the border authorities began to communicate with the peoples of Central Asia, adjacent to the Kirghiz steppes from the south. The main purpose of communication with them was the desire to secure the passage of our caravans through the lands occupied by the kaisaks and to alleviate the burden of the exorbitant duties to which the khans of the small possessions of Central Asia were subjected" (Serebrennikov, 1912).

The decision to connect the Orenburg and West Siberian border lines was made back in 1854, but the outbreak of the Crimean War prevented its implementation. Only in February 1863, at a meeting of the Special Committee, it was decided to start fulfilling this task. (Korneev, 1998). Imperial Russia, before embarking on a systematic advance to Central Asia, sent there "scientific", intelligence, and sometimes military expeditions. One of them, in 1839, directed against the Khiva Khanate, was headed by General V.A. Perovsky (Kastelskaya, 1980). There were no assumptions about the "accession" of this khanate to the Russian borders. The trip to Khiva itself was called a search in some official documents (Kuropatkin, 1899).

The Khiva campaign of 1839-1840 pursued the following strategic goals: 1) increasing the political prestige of Russia in the region of Central Asia; 2) the refusal of Khiva and Bukhara from the political reorientation to England, the disruption of British political expansion in Central Asia (Dubovitsky, 2010).

After the end of the Khiva campaign of 1839-1840, the Russian government tried to diplomatically consolidate the achieved successes. For this purpose, two embassies were sent to Khiva: under the leadership of Captain P. Nikiforov (1841) and Colonel G.I. Danilevsky (1842). The issues that these Russian embassies in Khiva tried to solve, as well as the military-political and administrative decisions made by the new Orenburg Governor-General V. Obruchev in relation to the territory of Central Asia, indicate the transition to a new state policy in the region (Dubovitsky, 2010).

In the instructions given to P. Nikiforov, a significant place was given to methods of establishing and streamlining Russian-Khiva trade relations.

In addition, in the instructions on behalf of the Orenburg Governor-General V.A. Perovsky on May 12, 1841, one can already notice a great concretization of the tasks of geopolitical influence, to which Tsarist Russia was striving in the space between the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea and the valley of the river. Syr Darya - the entire eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to the mouth of the Gyurgeni must certainly belong to Russia, since there at the beginning of the 18th century. Russian fortresses were built; moreover, the Turkmen lying close to it took the oath of office to Russia and, finally, because the Khivans, having no navy, cannot have claims to the sea, and the ownership of the

latter is certainly associated with the ownership of the coast (Serebrennikov, 1912).

Later, during negotiations with the khan, the width of the coastal strip, the possession of which was claimed by Russia, was determined at 15-20 versts. However, during the negotiations in Khiva, the Khan put forward demands to the Russian ambassador to transfer the territory to him along the Emba, Irgiz and Turgay rivers, i.e. about 50 degrees north latitude, which included most of the territory of residence of the Kirghiz of the Little Horde, adopted into Russian citizenship in 1732, and on the recognition of the border between the states by the Ural River (Terentyev, 1906).

To this P. Nikiforov reasonably remarked the following: "All Kyrgyz tribes are subjects of Russia, which I confirm to you through the Emperor's lips. The Russian state does not demand from you the Syr river, but gives you the left bank of it, if you accept other conditions, if the Emperor deigns to deem it necessary to occupy the right bank of the Syr, then they will occupy it without your consent" (Serebrennikov, 1912).

Thus, Russia determined rather not the line of the state border with the Khiva Khanate, but rather the sphere of political influence and administrative control of the nomadic peoples of the Kirghiz steppe.

Since the border issue was not resolved by embassy P. Nikiforov's, Lieutenant Colonel G.N. Danilevsky also received instructions to act according to the circumstances. In addition, the instruction allowed him to determine the border along the river. Syr Darya to the northern bank of the Aral Sea and the northern overhang (Chinka) of Ust-Urta. But during the negotiations this issue was never raised (Dubovitsky, 1984). At the conclusion of negotiations with the Khiva Khan, Nikiforov handed him a draft of a mandatory act, which was revised up to 20 times and finally, on December 27, 1842, was sealed by the khan's seal. Among others, the act included:

Art. 6) The duty on Russian goods should be collected once a year and in an amount not exceeding 5% of the actual price.

Art. 7) From goods belonging to Russian merchants and passing through the river. Cheese to Bukhara and other Asian possessions and back, do not take any duties.

Art. 8) Do not interfere with the caravan trade of Asian possessions with Russia, however, taking the established zakat from these caravans (Serebrennikov, 1912).

This act was awarded the Highest approval, which was confirmed by the inscription of the Vice-Chancellor on the act of June 30, 1843. The confirmation act was presented to the Khiva envoy Mukhamet-Emin.

Russian-Khiva relations after the adoption of the mandatory act of 1842; providing for the refusal of Khiva from hostile actions against Russia improved somewhat. For almost a quarter of a century, there have been no acute hostile conflicts. However, this fact should rather be attributed not to the results of negotiations between the political missions of P. Nikiforov and G.I. Danilevsky, and to the psychological

impact of the Khiva campaign of 1839-1840 and the policy of advancing the border, pursued by the Orenburg Governor-General V.A. Obruchev, who tried to practically ensure the protection of the borders declared in the negotiations with Khiva. To this decision V.A. Obruchev was also pushed by the incessant raids of Kenisary Kasymov since 1840 (Pavlov, 1910). This finally convinced Obruchev that neither the sultans, nor the flying detachments, nor meekness, nor cruelty, nor diplomacy, nor force, are able to subdue the Kirghiz. Therefore, he recognized it necessary to build two fortifications inside the steppe in 1845: one on the Turgai River, under the name of Orenburg, the other on the Irgiz River, called the Ural.

The forts were allowed duty-free barter. Founded by Count V.A. Perovsky, in the Kaidak Bay, the fortification Novo-Aleksandrovskoye, as not corresponding to its goal and extremely disastrous for the health of the garrison, Obruchev moved in 1846 to the Mangyshlak peninsula to Cape Tyup-Karagan, and named it Novo-Perovsky, and in 1857 it was renamed into Fort Alexandrovsky. Under him the fortified village of Nikolaevskaya was built (Pavlov, 1910).

To ensure the left flank of the Russian-Khiva border, in 1847 a decision was made to build a fortress on the Syrdarya river, in the Raim tract. This fortress was located 60 versts from the mouth of the Syr Darya and at the same time served as a naval base for a small military flotilla created in the same year on the Aral Sea. In 1848, intermediate forts of Karabutag were still built to connect the Ural fortification with the Orenburg line and Kosaral on the Aral Sea. The entire steppe was divided into 54 distances, which significantly influenced the ordering of management in this territory. Soon V.A. Obruchev took steps to colonize the lands around the newly erected fortresses by the forces of the Ural and Orenburg Cossack troops. In Raim, 25 families were relocated to the Orenburg fortification - 21, to the Ural - 13, to the Karabutag fort - 4 and to the Novo-Perov fortification - 15 (Terentyev, 1906).

All these measures led to positive, for the subjects of Russia, results - with the construction of forts on the way of the retreat of the guards, the raids on the line really stopped, and Khiva began to receive less Russian slaves.

But, despite the successes achieved, the Khiva Khanate remained a powerful destabilizing element for the Central Asian region, playing such a role until 1873, when a Russian protectorate was established over it.

To ensure the security of Russia, the Kokand Khanate proposed to occupy the Kokand fortress Ak-Mechet, which was carried out by the newly returned to the post of Orenburg Governor-General V.A. Perovsky.

The very fact of the seizure of the Kokand fortress Ak-Mechet is associated with the appearance on the political arena of Central Asia of a new active state element - the Kokand Khanate, which did not show hostile actions against Russia in the first half of the 19th century. Unlike

the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, the main directions of the state policy of Kokand during this period were its relations with the closest Central Asian neighbors: the Kara-Kyrgyz (Kyrgyz), the Bukhara possessions of the western part of the Fergana Valley and Ura-Tyube, as well as the territory of Kashgaria (Eastern Turkestan, annexed in 1756 by China and named Xinjiang (western territory) (Maksheev, 1890).

The Ak-Mechet fortress was built around 1817 on the left bank of the Syr Darya, but a year later it was moved to the right (Terentyev, 1906), and at the beginning of the 50s it was the main base for rest and shelter for groups of sheep and robbers who raided Kyrgyz citizens of Russia in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya.

On July 8, 1853, the assault on the Ak-Mechet fortress began. On July 28, the assault was over and the Ak-Mechet fortress passed into the hands of the Russians (Maksheev, 1890). The occupation of the Ak-Mechet fortress was important for strengthening the influence of the Russian government in Central Asia, and this was the first step towards the later conquests.

For the conquest of Ak-Mosque, Adjutant General V.A. Perovsky was honored to receive the Highest Rescrip, in which there was an instruction to rename the Ak-Mechet fortress to the Perovsky fort. All the ranks of the expeditionary detachment were not given an annual salary. In addition, it was awarded: 36 persons of the order and golden sabers, 67 - regular ranks and 14 - monetary awards. More distinguished lower ranks were given 50 insignia of a military order and 12 of the same insignia established for ranks of the Muslim confession (Maksheev, 1890).

On the right bank of the Syr Darya, near Kazaly, about 30 versts above the Aral fortification, which was destroyed by the order of Count Perovsky, a new fort No. 1 was erected; the garrison of the Aral fortification was transferred to it. Fort No. 2 was built in the Karmakchi tract, where Karaozek merges with Zhanadarya. Finally, the conquered fortress Kumysh-Kurgan, located on Kuandarya, was given the name "Fort No. 3"; but later it was left as unnecessary (Blaramberg, 1978).

To facilitate communications between the forts, the Aral State Flotilla was set up, for which the disassembled ships were transported on camels across the steppe (Belyavsky, 1884).

The so-called Syrdarya line arose, with the creation of which Russia completed the establishment of administrative power in the Kyrgyz steppe, and came close to the border of the Central Asian khanates.

Simultaneously with the advance of Russian troops to the south, from the north (from Semipalatinsk to Verny), on the approaches to Central Asia, a second line appeared - the Siberian (Ziyoev, 1998).

In 1847, the Kopal fortification was founded near the Semirechensky Ulug-Tau. During 1854-1860, the entire Trans-Ili region was occupied by the troops of the empire. At the very foot of the Tien Shan ridge, in 1854 near the village of Alma-Ata, the fortifications of Verny and Kastek were built, and in 1860 the fortifications of Pishpek and Tokmak were taken and destroyed. From Siberia, reconnaissance of the river

valley was carried out. Chu and fortifications of Auliet. From the side of Orenburg, in 1859, the Dzhulek fortification was built, in subsequent years, a reconnaissance of the river valley was carried out. Syr-Darya and Karatau mountains, and in 1863 the Kokand fortification of Yana Kurgan was taken (Romanovsky, 1868). (For more details see: *ibid.*, Appendix No. 1,2. P. 123-132).

Thus, the Syrdarya line, along with the Siberian line, became a springboard for Russia's further geopolitical expansion in Central Asia, which led to the emergence of a qualitatively new geopolitical situation in this part of Eurasia.

Improving the conditions of Russia's economic relations with Central Asia was part of an extensive program outlined at the beginning of the 19th century to strengthen the trading power of the Russian Empire, expand the sales of its industrial and agricultural products, and its role in transit trade.

The program for the development of economic ties between the Russian Empire and the countries of Central Asia was formulated and presented in November 1850 by P.I. Nebolsin, who was studying the issues of Russian trade with Central Asia.

In "Sketches of Russian Trade with the countries of Central Asia, Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokan: (from the Orenburg Line)" P.I. Nebolsin noted: "We send to Central Asia the goods that make up the first items, the most necessary needs of the entire population. It is from us that gold, silver, copper, cast iron, iron, various metal crafts, leather, paint, sugar, cloth, calico, all sorts of paper, and silk products are part of it ... Our products, metals, yuft, cloth and calico, Central Asia is hard to get at our prices from any other country (Kurbanov, 2019).

In December 1863, at last, it was decided to unite the Orenburg (in its Syrdarya part) and Siberian border lines located in a waterless, semi-desert area. As a result, food and sometimes fodder supplies to the troops were carried out through communications up to a thousand kilometers or more from the Southern Urals, Siberia and the Lower Volga region. Military and civilian specialists have repeatedly pointed out the need for the final determination of the southern part of the state border in Central Asia in fertile oases. In particular, this was indicated at a meeting of the command of the troops of the Orenburg and Siberian lines in Fort Perovsky on August 31, 1861. It was noted here that the occupation of fertile oases in the region of Tashkent, Turkestan and other Kokand cities creates the necessary conditions for the food supply of the Russian troops of the Syrdarya line located in semi-desert regions (Bushkov, Mazharov, Sobyenin, 2001).

More definitely, this geopolitical factor is indicated by M.A. Terentyev: "The closest acquaintance with the projected boundary indicated that the Karatau ridge, serving as a natural border, did not make things easier, however, since communication between the detachments and supplying them with supplies would be extremely difficult, and the northern slopes of the ridge, moreover, very poor in water. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to establish itself along the Arys (Arys) river

and occupy the Chimkent fortress, located at the junction of the routes from Kokand and our borders, and thus owning a junction of important trade routes leading from our borders to Bukhara, Kokand and Kuldja” (Terentyev, 1906).

In the second half of the 19th century, the interest of the Russian government in Central Asia increased. The reasons that determined the decisive turn of the Russian Empire towards expansion into Central Asia were: the defeat in the Crimean War, which deprived Russia of the Black Sea Fleet, and the ever-increasing confrontation with England, in particular, the increased penetration of British goods into the markets of Central Asia along with diplomatic intrigues (rendering military - political support for the spread of the power of Dost Muhammad Khan in the Amudarya river basin).

On October 16, 1857, Alexander II approved the report of A.M. Gorchakov on sending the Russian embassy to Khiva and Bukhara. On January 4, 1858, a meeting of the Special Committee was held, which basically agreed with the dispatch and spoke in favor of using all the possibilities for sailing along the Amu Darya in order to penetrate as far as possible (Khalfin, 1960).

At the suggestion of A.M. Gorchakov, a mission was sent to Khiva and Bukhara led by Colonel N.P. Ignatiev.

Together with the mission, two steamers were sent under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Butakov, who was assigned the task of passing from the Aral Sea to the Amu Darya and examining its mouth. However, Butakov's steamers were able to penetrate only to Kungrad, since their further movement was prohibited by the Khiva authorities (Zalesov, 1871).

The main task of Ignatiev's mission was to conclude an agreement with the Khiva Khan, according to which the Khan's government should not have taken any hostile actions against Russia, to allow Russian ships to sail freely along the Amu Darya, to allow the establishment of a Russian Trade Agency in Khiva, to establish constant duties on Russian goods no more than 2,5%, etc. Khiva Khan accepted the proposal on the need to develop trade and friendly relations, but the proposal to allow the free navigation of Russian ships along the Amu Darya was rejected, as it threatened the security of the khanate (Khalfin, 1956).

Some results were achieved by N.P. Ignatiev in Bukhara: The Bukhara Emir agreed to meet the basic requirements presented by Ignatiev, which consisted in reducing duties on Russian goods, creating a temporary trading agency in Bukhara and freeing Russian prisoners.

Thus, the government of the empire at that time carried out a comprehensive reconnaissance of the situation in Central Asia, sought to strengthen its position by diplomatic and economic means and at the same time was preparing a broad military-political offensive against the Uzbek khanates.

So, for example, in the work of D.I. Romanovsky "Notes on the Central Asian issue" indicates the military-political and fortification advantageousness of the construction of the Zailiyskiy fortification

Vernoe in the Almaty tract: , discussing the structure of our southeastern borders, in which both then governors-general took part - Orenburg, adjutant general count Perovsky and Siberian - infantry general Gasfert, came to a resolution on the connection of the Orenburg and Siberian lines” (Romanovsky, 1868).

The reasons that did not allow Russia to implement this plan then were pointed out by A.N. Kuropatkin. To organize further movement to the east at that time, in his opinion, Russia, firstly, does not have enough funds and military forces for active operations (because the Crimean War was going on, where Russia was defeated - Ch.K.); secondly, the tsarist administration pursued a very cautious policy of annexing the southern territories of Kazakhstan. Therefore, he believed that the leadership of the border detachments should have changed their tactics. They were assigned the task of "taking possession of one or another of the fortified points that served as a support for the Kokand gangs, destroy it and return back" (Kuropatkin, 1899).

D. Romanovsky wrote about the change in this wait-and-see policy and the transition to active military actions of the Russian authorities from the side of the fortification of Verny in the Trans-Ili region against Kokand and the capture of the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak and Pishpek by the detachment of Colonel Zimmerman and the battle won by the Russian troops Uzun-Agach. and A. Kuropatkin. As a military specialist, the last of the authors, analyzes in detail the course of the Uzun-Agach battle. Determining the tactics of fighting by the Russians, he wrote in his book "The Conquest of Turkmenistan": "Knowing that in the war with the Asians, the number of troops is not so much needed as the courage and surprise of an attack, knowing that, hiding behind the ramparts of Verny's fortification, he would give up for plunder enemy city and suburban villages, Lieutenant Colonel G.A. Kolpakovsky came out with insignificant troops to meet the enemy" (Kuropatkin, 1899).

They were unanimous in their assessment of the Uzun-Agach battle, which, according to the commander of the Alatav military district G.A. Kolpakovsky, the future military governor of the Semirechensk region, "saved our first settled settlements in the Trans-Ili region and everywhere assigned him to us (to the Russians - Ch.K.)." The intentions of the Russian government - to connect the Orenburg and West Siberian governorships with a line of fortifications in the Kazakh steppe - wrote L.F. Kostenko [25. P. 381]. But for this it was necessary to occupy the fortresses of Auliata, Suzak, Chulak-Kurgan and Turkestan.

In 1862, after the capture of the Merke fortress by General G.A. Kolpakovsky, Russia became a firm foot in Semirechye, and its influence spread to the Chinese borders.

In 1863, the highest order was to connect both lines, occupying Auliata, Chimkent and Turkestan, and to move the Russian border to the river. Arys (Kuropatkin, 1899).

The connection of the Orenburg line with the Siberian one was to take place on the territory that the Kokand Khanate considered its own, and therefore, out of necessity, the Russian government had to face the Kokand Khanate (Pavlov, 1910).

In 1863, a new stage in Russian politics began, characterized by the offensive of the tsarist troops and the conquest of the main points in Central Asia. As a result, in July 1864, Russian troops took Turkestan, in September of the same year - Chimkent, and in June 1865 the largest trade and handicraft-industrial city of Central Asia - Tashkent was taken by storm.

As the military historian M.A. Terentyev: "... Major General Chernyaev proposed to form from Tashkent a separate, independent from Kokand, possession, which was only under the protection of Russia. The government did not give permission to represent Major General Chernyaev on the occupation of Tashkent, but at the same time took care, as soon as possible, to present to General Chernyaev all the means for a strong defense of the entire space already occupied by us" (Terentyev, 1906).

Thus, Tashkent became a stronghold for Russia's conquests in Central Asia.

The difficult situation in geopolitical relations between Russia and the Central Asian states pushed it to revise its political course in the East. There was another no less significant factor that prompted the Russian authorities to do this, this is the incessant interference of England in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Persia, the Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand khanates.

The contours of a sharp turn in Russian policy from tolerance to exerting forceful pressure on the Central Asian states that found themselves in the zone of its "vital interests" were reflected in the circular of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.M. Gorchakov dated November 14, 1864 "Contemporary Politics" to Russian ambassadors abroad.

Circular A.M. Gorchakov, of course, gave openness to Russian Eastern policy. He clearly outlined its priority goals and objectives in this particular historical situation, which was far from unambiguous. The document was Russia's response to the destructive course of England in Central Asia, a reflection of the Anglo-Russian rivalry. Circular A.M. Gorchakov achieved his goal. The occupation of Tashkent in May 1865 by Russian troops after the connection of the Siberian and Syrdarya border lines and the formation of a new Turkestan region for the ruling circles of England came as a complete surprise (Niyazmatov, 2014).

Thus, reflecting the new priorities of Russian eastern policy, the circular of A.M. Gorchakov informed the ruling circles and leading political institutions, first of all, Western countries, as well as neighboring Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva about the beginning of large-scale political and military actions in Central Asia by Russia.

Therefore, we can agree with V.V. Dubovitsky in that: "... the definition of the southern border of Russia in Central Asia in the late 50s - early

60s of the XIX century was largely determined by landscape and geographical factors, which, in combination with a certain international political situation in Europe and events in zones bordering the Kokand and Khiva khanates, entailed the invasion of Russian troops into the territory of the agricultural oases of Central Asia. The landscape-geographical factor was, therefore, not the main reason, but the main trigger for the military policy of 1864-1865". (Dubovitsky, 2010).

The conquest of a huge area in Central Asia posed the problem of the administrative organization of the new territory to the Russian authorities. On August 6, 1865, the temporary Regulations on the management of the Turkestan region were approved (Decree No.42372, 1871).

The result of the administrative transformations was the emergence of a special system of military-people's administration, already tested during the conquest and "pacification" of the Caucasus. Its basic principles were legislatively formalized: 1) the indivisibility of administrative and military power and its concentration in one hand; 2) the belonging of all ranks of the people's military administration to the military department; 3) preservation of traditional institutions of self-government under the control of the Russian administration; 4) separation of the court from the administration (Abashin, Arapov, Bekmakhanova, 2008).

According to the interim regulation of 1865, the military governor exercised control over the indigenous population on the basis of the general rules established for governors and the instructions of the commander of the Orenburg district troops. The indigenous city administration was composed of elected local residents: 1) for nomads, these are the rulers, biys, and manaps; 2) for the sedentary - aksakals, rais, bazaar-bashi and kazi. The immediate chiefs of the entire "native" administration were the managers of the native population, who were subordinate to the chiefs of departments (Decree No.42372, 1871).

Thus, the management of the local population combined the desire of the authorities to subordinate the traditional institutions of self-government to the Russian administration, while preserving their certain independence.

After the conquest of Tashkent, the Russian authorities were concerned about the administrative and territorial delimitation of the new possessions of the empire. Governor-General of the Orenburg District N.A. Kryzhanovsky originally intended to proclaim an independent Tashkent Khanate under the protectorate of Russia. Later he proposed to create two regions (Turkestan and Tashkent) as part of the Orenburg region.

In order to develop a project for the administrative structure of Asian Russia, a special commission was created in May 1865, headed by F.K. Girs, which received the unofficial name Stepnaya. At the end of the work, the commissions were presented for discussion to a special committee made up of senior officials of the War Ministry. The committee chaired by Minister of War D.A. Milyutin decided on the

formation of an independent governor-general in the conquered Central Asian territories (Gears, 1884).

On July 11, 1867, the Russian government in Central Asia took an important political step - the organization of the Turkestan general-governorship (Decree No.44831, 1871). The first governor-general in Russian Turkestan was K.P. Kaufman, a close associate of Milyutin, who had experience in ruling the Northwest Territory and enjoyed the special favor and trust of the emperor. The new administrative entity included all the territories occupied since 1847 in the south of the Kyrgyz steppe (Kazakhstan) and in the northern part of the Kokand Khanate.

The new general-governorship was divided into two regions: Syrdarya, with the regional city of Tashkent, and Semirechensk, with the regional city of Verny. The first of them included seven counties, the second - five. The total territory of the Turkestan General Governorship was about 1.493 thousand square meters. versts, which made it one of the largest administrative entities of Russia at that time (Abdurakhimova, Rustamova, 1999).

In accordance with the recommendations of the Steppe Commission, the "Temporary Regulation on the Administration of the Semirechensk and Syrdarya Regions" was developed and put into effect.

In 1868, General K.P. Kaufman invited the Kokand Khan Khudoyar to sign an onerous treaty, promising him protection in case of popular indignation. The agreement contained five points: to grant Russian merchants the right to visit all the cities of the khanate; give them the right to arrange their caravanserais wherever they want; give them the right to have their own caravan-bashi in all cities of the khanate; equalize the duties of Russian and Muslim merchants; to provide Russian caravans with free passage to the possessions adjacent to Kokand (Abashin, Arapov, Bekmakhanova, 2008).

The Kokand Khan, having signed this treaty, became a vassal of Tsarist Russia. Having rendered harmless and neutralized, thus, the Kokand ruler, Kaufman moved to the Bukhara Khanate.

The Russian-Bukhara war of 1868 ended with the capture of Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan and adjacent areas and their transformation into the Zeravshan district of the Turkestan region. The occupation of the Zeravshan valley made the Bukhara Khanate completely dependent on the tsarist power in the water issue.

As a result, by the beginning of the seventies, a vast territory bounded by the left bank of the Syr Darya fell under the protectorate of Russia. Russian troops energetically began to equip the coastal line, creating a number of fortifications along it.

The Khiva Khan, in the neighborhood with whose possessions this creative work was going on, took a wait-and-see attitude at first. To the surprise of the warlike ruler, the Russians began to insistently offer peace. The agreement could well have taken place had the British advisers not intervened in the matter. And in terms of weaving intrigues, diplomats from the shores of the "foggy Albion" had strong skills. The

Khan yielded to pressure and completely refused to enter into any negotiations with representatives of the Russian command. The refusal was followed by steps that heated the situation to the limit.

But before embarking on the conquest of the Khiva Khanate, the Russian government took steps to ease tensions with Britain. After lengthy negotiations in 1873, a Russian-British agreement was concluded on the recognition of Afghanistan as a neutral zone and on the granting of Khiva to the "care" of Russia (Abashin, Arapov, Bekmakhanova, 2008). In February 1873, Russian troops began a campaign against the Khiva Khanate. In May 1873, the capital of the Khiva Khanate was surrounded and capitulated, in August the Khiva Khan signed a peace treaty and recognized vassal dependence on Russia (Abashin, Arapov, Bekmakhanova, 2008).

After the suppression of the uprising in Kokand (1875-1876) on February 19, 1876, Russia announced the "inclusion" of Kokand into the Turkestan General Government.

The total area of the territory of the Turkestan Territory is summed up by the following terms (Geyer, 1901):

Syrdarya region - 459,000 sq.

Fergana region:

excluding the Pamirs - 80.667 sq.

with the Pamirs - 140.667 sq.

Samarkand region - 60.597 sq.

Transcaspian region - 501.696 sq.

Semirechensk region - 328.966 sq.

Bukhara Khanate - 217.674 sq.

Khiva Khanate - 50,000 sq.

Total - 1.698.600 sq. verst.

The Bukhara and Khiva khanates, having greatly decreased in size, retained nominal independence, but the tsarist government interfered in their political and economic life.

Russia's political plans very well coincided with the interests of domestic commercial and industrial circles in relation to Asian states. Moreover, the need to solve foreign policy problems indirectly pushed the state authorities to develop foreign trade relations, seeing in them one of the reserves for strengthening Russia's positions in the world arena, within the country - its own positions.

The economic policy of the tsarist administration contributed to the destruction of the natural economy, the development of commodity-money relations. Part of the land from the feudal nobility was seized. Small plots that were previously leased were assigned to farmers on the basis of hereditary land use rights. This measure somewhat weakened the position of local feudal lords and increased tax revenues to the treasury.

Turning Central Asia into a source of raw materials, the tsarist administration began to stimulate the development of cotton growing

(Brodovsky, 1871). By the beginning of the 20th century, Central Asia had become the main supplier of cotton for the Russian industry.

An important factor in activating the policy of the tsarist government in this region was trade, since it was possible to obtain raw materials from Central Asia, and to sell industrial products there. It is no coincidence that it was the merchants who began to penetrate this region.

Trade with the East, occupying a relatively small place in the country's foreign trade turnover in the first half of the 19th century, played an important role for Russia. But the successes (especially in the textile industry), which were obvious, as well as the very active foreign policy of Russia in the eastern direction, in particular, towards Iran, prepared the interest of Russian trade circles in this region, created an opportunity for increasing the volume of trade interaction here. It is no coincidence that it was the subject of special attention in government and commercial and industrial circles.

The first two thirds of the 19th century were marked by a large economic lag between Russia and the capitalist powers of the West. In the first half of the 19th century, the exceptional importance of the Central Asian khanates for the sale of products of the Russian industry, especially the textile industry, was more and more clearly revealed. In addition, these khanates had extensive ties with neighboring Asian countries and could play a huge role in the development of Russian economic relations with states such as Persia, Afghanistan, Kashgar and even India. Tashkent had wide trade relations with Kashgar, ancient caravan routes to Afghanistan, India, Persia passed through the territory of the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate, trade along which did not stop, despite the robbery of the Turkmen tribes and the abuse of the rulers of these countries (Azadaev, 1959). In this sense, Central Asia represented a successful combination of an extensive sales market and a transit route to neighboring Asian states. Some Russian businessmen valued Central Asia much more as a transit route than as a sales market. For example, the well-known Moscow merchant V. Khludov wrote: "Central Asia, that is, Tashkent, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, in itself cannot serve as a serious market for the sale of our goods," emphasizing that it is important for trade with China (Rozhkova, 1963).

In the 60s of the XIX century, the problem of conquering and developing new markets for the developing industry became the priority task of the empire's foreign policy. The Central Asian issue was actively discussed in the periodicals, and most of the authors spoke in favor of a decisive offensive in Central Asia.

In 1862, the Minister of Finance received a petition signed by 15 large Moscow merchants to open a consulate in Bukhara to protect the interests of Russian merchants. Russian manufacturers were more and more interested in the Uzbek khanates as markets and raw materials. A large textile manufacturer A. Shipov pointed out the importance of the cotton industry in the economic life of Russia and the role of Central

Asia as a potential source of raw materials. He wrote that the Russian Empire "can use its efforts through skillful commercial or other relations to establish and improve the cultivation of cotton in Central Asia, because from this, consequences that are very important for the development of the productive forces of Russia should come".

The great importance of Central Asia as a sales market for Russian industrial products and as a raw material base for the cotton industry became clear not only for the country's trade and industrial circles, but also for many representatives of the highest government spheres.

A resolute supporter of the "Central Asian direction" of Russian foreign policy was General Staff officer I.F. Blaramberg, who wrote: "The future of Russia is not in Europe: it should turn its views to Asia. The brilliant development (especially in the last 30 years) and the constant increase from year to year in the number of domestic factories and manufactories that consume our own raw products require new sales routes, and since European markets are locked for Russian manufactured products by the rivalry of all states in this part of the world, then she involuntarily must turn to the vast countries of Asia for the sale of her works" (Blaramberg, 1978).

Great importance of Central Asia in the development of Russian trade and industry was attached by the prominent economist Yu.A. Gagemeister. In his book "A Look at the Industry and Trade of Russia", he noted the great economic prospects of the conquest of Central Asia, primarily from the point of view of cotton cultivation and the possibility of organizing Russian shipping up the Syrdarya to Tashkent and Kokand.

The demands of manufacturers and merchants became especially urgent due to the fact that Central Asian cotton, the import of which to Russia was increasing, during this period acquired enormous importance for Russian imports. This was caused by the civil war that began in the United States of 1861-1865 (Gubarevich-Radobylskiy, 1912).

From 1861 to 1863, the import of cotton fiber to Russia via the European border decreased by more than four times. At the same time, over these four years, the import of Central Asian cotton has increased more than fourfold. The enormous importance of Uzbek cotton for the Russian cotton industry has become quite obvious. The government became more and more imbued with the idea that the conquest of Central Asia is an urgent and urgent task of Russia's foreign policy (Gubarevich-Radobylskiy, 1912).

The process of economic development of Central Asia proceeded through contradictory clashes of interests, on the one hand, of the government and merchants, on the other, of different groups of merchants. These contradictions are natural, since they are characteristic of the transitional period in Russian history, the period from the 40s to the beginning of the 70s of the 19th century.

Economic interests in the East, although they occupied a significant place in the tsarist policy, were subordinated to the preparation of the

ground for inclusion in the Russian Empire and the subordination of the Central Asian khanates to the tsarist power.

The tsarist government in the period under review was not guided in its policy by the interests of the bourgeois development of the country, to which it made only concessions necessary to preserve its rule.

The reproach to the merchants was expressed by the correspondent of *Turkestanskiy Vedomosti* N. Bukharin. Describing the Turkestan department of the polytechnic exhibition in St. Petersburg and dwelling on the development of cotton growing in Turkestan, improving the quality of Central Asian cotton and, in connection with this, on the communication routes in Central Asia, he wrote: governments; wants to get profit, but spares the costs!" (*Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 1870).

P. Nebolsin defended opposing views: "Many are mistaken who believe that the expansion, improvement and prosperity of Russian trade in Central Asia depends on the arbitrariness, on the hunting of the Russian merchants alone" (Nebolsin, 1856).

Taking an active part in the development of the trade route between the Amu Darya and the Caspian Sea, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff A. Glukhovskoy, in his note on the significance of the Bukhara Khanate, wrote that for the development of Russian trade with Central Asia it is necessary to strive by all means to transfer this trade into the hands of the Russian merchants. "In our society there is a strong prejudice against the Russian merchant class, which is always accused of everything ... This criticism is not entirely fair ... before demanding anything from our merchants, it is necessary to ensure their life and property. Where a Russian citizen is threatened daily and every minute by a chopping block, a stake, a bug and a pit, there can be no proper trade" (Glukhovskoy, 1867).

N. Shavrov, who also took an active part in the discussion of the issue of trade in Central Asia, reproached the government for the fact that an extensive network of railways had been built in the direction of the Prussian border, and after 1862, when the Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod railway was built, there was no not a single fathom was built and paths from the central industrial districts of Russia in the direction of Asian markets. As a result of the government's policy in the railway business, Russian products not only encounter difficulties in marketing abroad, but are also pushed out of the domestic Russian market by foreign goods. "The domestic market is embarrassed by the poverty of the population and the competition of cheap foreign goods, ... our only Asian market behind the roads is almost inaccessible to us" (Shavrov, 1876).

The above data indicate that the government's trade policy in Central Asia did not satisfy the Russian bourgeoisie.

The dependence of trade on the state of communication routes necessitated the construction of railways in Central Asia.

The construction of the Transcaspian (1881-1886), and then the Orenburg-Tashkent railway subsequently played a huge role in the penetration of Russian capital deep into Central Asia, increased the

penetration of goods from the industrial regions of the empire, increased Russia's trade with other countries (Iran, Afghanistan, China), through the markets of Central Asia, was important for providing the region with food products, in particular bread (Aminov, Babakhodzhaev, 1966).

With the development of the textile industry in the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th century, the aspiration of Russian commercial and industrial circles, aimed at turning Central Asia into a raw material base, intensified.

Russian manufacturers and merchants in the 19th century had their offices in many cities of the Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand khanates. For example, the largest Vladimir and Ivanovo-Voznesensk manufacturers-tourists at the end of the 40s sold most of their products in the Turkestan markets. At their cotton factories, chintz of Asian designs were specially made, which successfully competed with English ones in the markets of Tashkent, Urgench, Bukhara, Samarkand, Andijan. Central Asian merchants (especially from Bukhara and Khiva) had loans from the largest textile manufacturers in Moscow, Ivanovo, Shuya. They were also the main suppliers of cheap Central Asian Chinese women, so popular among Russian peasants, which were sold at the Nizhny Novgorod fair, in almost all cities of the Volga region, Siberia, and even in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The benefits associated with Central Asian trade were quite obvious for the Russian bourgeoisie (Kastelskaya, 1980).

However, Central Asian raw materials did not satisfy all the needs of Russian industrial enterprises. The textile industry's demand for cotton was met only 50%. The monopolization of raw materials by the trusts of the advanced capitalist countries was very beneficial for industrialists. Therefore, the attention of Russian capital, naturally, is more and more riveted to the countries adjacent to Central Asia. Russia seeks to increase the import of raw materials from Northwest China (Xinjiang), Afghanistan and Northern Persia (Mannanov, 1964).

The development of more and more new markets has led to a gradual blurring of the boundaries between the domestic and foreign markets, which, in turn, has contributed to the pulling of many countries into the world market.

So the Russian Empire involved in the world market not only the Central Asian khanates, but also the neighboring states. However, the process of developing neighboring countries as sales markets was much slower than the development of their outskirts. This is due to the fact that Russia was in relatively more favorable conditions for the sale of manufactured goods in comparison with European countries.

The presence of territories underdeveloped by capital in European Russia somewhat smoothed out the contradictions between Russian and developing in Central Asia entrepreneurs. In addition, Central Asian traders were given access to the markets of all neighboring Asian countries. Acting as intermediaries in the trade of these countries with Russia, they contributed to the development by Russian capital of the

raw material wealth of Xinjiang, Afghanistan and North-East Persia. Central Asian merchants controlled both the export of Russian and local goods to neighboring countries, and the import of raw materials from these countries to Central Asia and Russia.

Economically, the Russian Empire was interested in developing trade with Xinjiang, Afghanistan and Persia, and therefore encouraged the activities of Central Asian traders. Despite the colonial essence of economic policy in Central Asia, the conditions mentioned contributed not only to the development of commercial capital here, but also to the emergence of industrial enterprises specialized in processing raw materials.

In order to establish a stronger commercial and industrial monopoly in the Central Asian markets, the ruling circles in 1892 prepared a draft reform, which provided for the inclusion of the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates into the unified Russian customs territory. The authors of the project substantiated the necessity of this decision by the following considerations: "As the internal and external improvement of the acquired properties was established, the domestic industry had the opportunity to acquire new and vast markets." It was further noted that "the huge area of the Turkestan Territory, which, in terms of soil and climatic properties, as well as the relative density of the native and newcomers, is the most favorable conditions for the development of many branches of the agricultural industry, served as a vast area for the trade exchange of local production materials for products of foreign manufacture".

It can be seen from the above document that, along with the concern for providing Russian industry with sales markets, the project set itself the task of providing industrial enterprises with Central Asian raw materials. However, as already noted, the Russian government highlighted the marketing of Russian goods.

On the territory of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand, handicrafts and domestic industry were ubiquitous, which was calculated not only to meet the needs of the family, but also partly for sale. According to the researcher of Russian trade with Central Asia P. Nebolsin, everyone makes "products for their use and parts for sale, out of the need to support the unenviable existence of their families" (Nebolsin, 1856).

Small craft workshops, along with domestic industrial production, were a typical form of industrial organization in Central Asia. Crafts and trade were often combined in the same hands, with the exception of trade, which was concentrated in the hands of merchants.

The Turkestan campaigns, as it were, completed the great mission of Russia, which at first stopped the expansion of nomads to Europe, and with the completion of colonization, finally pacified the eastern lands. In the light of these ideas, the entire course of the conquest of Asian states was highlighted, when the expressions "gangs", "congregations", "gangs", "insidious raids", "cowardly attacks" were used to describe the enemy, which are found in the memoirs of all the main participants in the campaigns - Chernyaev, Kaufman, Kolpakovsky and others.

An important step in the geopolitical design of the newly conquered territories was the organization of the defense space, namely the creation of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) (Decree No. 44844, 1871).

The Turkestan Military District consisted of the following constituent parts: from three regions: Syrdarya, Semirechensk and Fergana, from the temporary Zeravshan district, Kuldzhin region, conquered in 1871 and the Amu Darya department, acquired in 1873, the Syrdarya region was divided into 6 counties, Semirechenskaya into 5 counties, Fergana into 7 districts, Zeravshan district into three departments, Kuldzhinsky district into two sections and Amudarya department into departments. Therefore, there are 25 divisions in total. The district lies between 38° 35 and 48° 50 north latitude and between 28° 30 and 54° 25 east longitude from the Pulkovo meridian (Kostenko, 1880).

According to the description of L.F. Kostenko district belonged to the number of border Asian. The Turkestan district had an elongated figure extending from west to east. The greatest length from west to east in a straight line (along the 43rd parallel) was 1800 versts, and the width from north to south (along the 42th meridian) was 600 versts. The length along the post road from the northernmost point of the Syrdarya region to the northernmost point of the Semirechensk region is 2512 1/2 versts (Kostenko, 1880).

The total area of the District was 952,609 sq. versts, which is 1/20 of the space of the entire empire. In size, the Turkestan District surpassed all the first-class states of Europe. It was almost equal to Germany and Austria-Hungary combined.

All Orenburg regular troops located in the Turkestan region, as well as the troops of the Siberian military district, were also included in the composition of the district troops. The troops of the district also included the newly formed from the 9th and 10th regiments of the Siberian Cossack army, the Semirechye army, settled in Semirechye. In total, by the time TurkVO was organized, 16 infantry battalions, an artillery brigade, a sapper battalion and several hundred Ural, Orenburg and Siberian Cossack troops were concentrated on its territory (Maksheev, 1890).

In terms of military-strategic, these were very small forces, not comparable to the units of the British troops located on the territory of British India, but, nevertheless, considered by the British as a strategic threat to their richest colony.

The Russian conquest of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva caused a new surge of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia.

Another aggravation of Anglo-Russian relations occurred in 1885 (the Afghan crisis). The Russian army under the leadership of General A.V. Komarovs took possession of the Merv oasis and moved towards the Pyandjd. The British government demanded that the emir rebuff the Russian advance to the south. In 1885, there was a clash of Afghans with a Russian detachment, which ended in the defeat of the Afghans at

Kushka, Merv, Serakhs, and the Pamirs were taken by the Russians (Hopkirk, 2004).

After the famous battle at Kushka (March 18, 1885), negotiations began, as a result of which the border between the Russian Empire and Afghanistan was finally determined.

The change in the view of the Russian government on the significance of the Central Asian conquests dates back to this time. "Before, we considered the advancement to the south to be a matter of domestic policy and the task was to secure the steppe borders. Now our Central Asian policy has begun to acquire a great-power character. Previously, only hard rock pulled us inland. Now, the gaze of the Two-Headed Eagle turned southward, the bluish haze of the Pamirs, the snowy clouds of the Himalayan peaks and the valleys of Hindustan hidden behind them began to be guessed..." (Kersnovsky, 1993).

The western regions of the Pamirs (Shugnan, Rushan, Wakhan and Ishkashim*) became part of Bukhara as a result of the "Pamir demarcation" of 1895 between Russia and Great Britain. (*Ishkashim ethnically was an independent unit, and administratively was part of the Wakhan).

According to the agreement on the delimitation of the territory, located on the right side of the Panj (Shugnan, Rushan and the northern part of Wakhan), went to Bukhara, and on the left (Zapyanj Darvaz) to Afghanistan. The Russian and British governments pledged to use their influence on both emirs accordingly in order to achieve the implementation of the agreement (Iskandarov, 1958).

In the western regions of the Pamirs, Russian border detachments were left, but the management of these regions was transferred to the Bukhara administration.

The accession of Shugnan, Rushan and Wakhan to the emirate aroused sharp discontent among the indigenous population, which soon turned into hatred of the Bukhara officials, who mercilessly robbed the people. This hatred, intensified by religious strife (the inhabitants of Bukhara were mostly Sunnis, and the Western Pamirs were Ismailis), often led to clashes between residents and local authorities, which ultimately forced the head of the Pamir detachment to restrict the rights of the emir's administration.

III. CONCLUSION

The Russian government attached great importance to this region in view of its border position, and three years after its transition to the rule of the emir, the question of transferring the Western Pamirs to Russian control was raised. This, in particular, is given by the mission of Lieutenant Colonel Kuznetsov, who in December 1898 was specially sent by the Turkestan Governor General to Bukhara to negotiate the situation in the Western Pamirs. In the instruction to Kuznetsov it was indicated: "to find out the attitude of the Bukhara government to the issue of including Rushan, Shugnan and Wakhan within the borders of Russia." In the same order, it was noted that the officers of the Pamir

detachment of the Russian troops could be assigned the responsibility of managing these areas. At first, the emir did not even object to this (Iskandarov, 1958).

However, it turned out that he agreed to give the western regions of the Pamirs to the Russians only in exchange for some territory or other remuneration.

The desire of the tsarist government to annex Shugnan, Wakhan and Rushan was explained, first of all, by their important border position. The despotic control of the Bukhara administration, which aroused strong discontent among the masses, could not provide tsarism with a strong position in these regions.

The memorandum of the main headquarters of the Asian unit dated March 18, 1899 noted that “despite the promises made by the emir to free the population from all taxes by October 1, 1899, his officials tried to collect various taxes from this population, which constantly addressed all complaints to the chief of the Pamir detachment and to the chiefs of our posts”. Further, the main headquarters of the Asian part pointed to the strategic expediency of the transition of these regions to Russia and the creation of five volost administrations in them (Iskandarov, 1958).

The Pamir campaign ends the final conquest of Central Asia, in memory of which a medal was minted in 1896 for wearing on the Vladimir-Georgievskaya ribbon, on the front side of which are depicted the monograms of Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III, Nicholas II, and on the left, there is the inscription “For campaigns in Central Asia in 1853-1895”. This campaign is one of the most difficult campaigns that fell to the lot of the Pamir detachments, and not only the last (Tageev, 1902).

Thus, the geopolitical and economic interests of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century raised the policy of the tsarist government of Russia in relation to Central Asia to a qualitatively new level - the policy of the final conquest and “annexation” of Central Asia. The problem of conquering and developing new Central Asian markets in the second half of the 19th century became the priority task of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire.

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