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ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BUKHARA EMIRATE IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract:

The article the government of tsarist Russia and its officials in Turkestan gradually entered the economy of the Bukhara Emirate and gained full control over it. According to archival sources, the tsarist authorities in the Samarkand region achieved hegemony in the issue of water distribution in Zarafshan, made Bukhara region dependent on water supply, subjugated the emirate's economy and made the emirate economically dependent.

The Russian government pays great attention to the policy of occupying the internal markets of Russia and establishing its dominance in them. By the 70s and 90s of the 19th century, almost all industrial products necessary for the economic life of the emirate in the internal markets of Bukhara were imported from Russia.

Tsarist Russia managed to further strengthen the policy of economic dependence of the Bukhara Emirate in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. The Russian government began to look for new opportunities for the full dependence of the Bukhara economy on it and began to realize them.

Most importantly, the Russian bourgeoisie, which was directly interested in this policy, began to make new demands on the Russian government. As a result, the construction of railways and the formation of a flotilla in Central Asia, including in the Bukhara region, were achieved.

Key words: Militare, emirate, Buhara, economy, Zarafshan River, Russian, Qoqand, Khiva, Anglo-Russian, Amu Darya, Afghanistan, North India, Turkestan Railway, Railway Department.

Theoretical background:

In the coverage of the history of Russian-Bukharian relations in the second half of the XIX-early XX centuries, great importance was attached to the comprehensive and comprehensive use of various sources. It is in this direction that we have tried to pay serious attention in our research.

An important resource base for our research is a set of official documents stored in the collections of the Central State archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter- National State Archives RUz) and

archives of the CIS countries, including the Russian State military historical archive (hereinafter-RSMHA), located in Moscow. During the preparation of this research work, we have studied in detail the work plans of the 1st Foundation ("office of the Turkestan Governor-General"), the 3rd Foundation ("political Agency of Russia in Bukhara"), the 2nd Foundation ("diplomatic official at the Turkestan Governor-General"), the 18th Foundation ("administration of the Samarkand region") National State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Information on the establishment of the Russian consulate and the Russian political agency in Bukhara (Fund 400, List 1, File 878) from the collection of the General Staff of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (Fund 400), study of the construction of a railway between Bukhara and Amu Darya by the Russian government Into scientific circulation information on mutual correspondence and agreements has been introduced (Fund 400, List 24, File 879)

Methods

The article is published on the basis of generally accepted historical and sociological methods-historical, comparative-logical, analytical, sequence, objectivity.

Introduction

Influence of Russian capital on the economy of Bukhara and its consequences

From the military actions of Tsarist Russia in Central Asia, including the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara, he pursued not only political, military strategic goals, but also economic objectives.

It was not accidental that in the first draft agreements with the emirate of Bukhara, and then in May 1868, the bilateral peace treaty and the Friendship Agreement of 1873 put forward its economic demands[1]. After all, the Russian government has set a goal of getting into the economy of the Emirate of Bukhara and interfering with it as much as possible, securing it and, if necessary, fully developing it in its own interests.

Most importantly, it was expected that Bukhara's economy would become a region that would serve as a kind of base for the Russian military and a source of raw material for solving the English-Russian competition in the Middle East and providing new advances in the military-strategic field. This is why the Russian government has been gradually taking steps to influence Bukhara's economy and take control of it.

We know that after the battles in Kattakurgan and Zirabulak, the upper part of the Zarafshan River and its water basin, which is the main water source of the Bukhara Emirate, came under Russian treaty. This is the case since the 1970s, when the emirate of Bukhara began to cause enormous economic problems, especially in the development of agriculture.

As the upper part of the Zarafshan River is in the territory of Turkestan, the authorities of the Tsarist government in Samarkand began to use Bukhara

for economic dependence. Under various pretexts and excuses, they stopped supplying the population of the Emirate with almost no water. The residents of Bukhara are sometimes deprived of water in Zarafshan for months, and their arable land is drought-stricken. This, in turn, made the population more vulnerable.

By the 1990s, this situation finally escalated, causing great problems. As a result, there have been several negotiations between the two sides on the issue at the strict request of the Bukhara government.

After a long negotiation between the administrators of Russia and Bukhara on the rational and coordinated use of the Zarafshan River, an agreement was reached on May 27, 1894. From November 15 to March 10, residents of Samarkand region have access to the Emirate, except for potable water and some vital issues, and the remaining 40% to Bukhara [2].

Although such an agreement was signed between the two sides, the Russian authorities in Samarkand did not comply with it and explicitly linked Bukhara to this economic issue. In other words, they continued to subjugate themselves.

This is exactly what the Samarkandian government officials in the province of Bukhara have completely control of the economy of Bukhara. Farming in Bukhara is often in a difficult position due to water shortages. However, it is surprising that the Russian authorities in Petersburg are well aware that the Russian bourgeoisie is in dire need of Bukhara's cotton and understand that water supply needs to be resolved positively, and that is why their local administrators are right about this.

Since the end of the XIX century the Government of the Russian Federation gradually began to pay great attention to the policy of saturating the internal markets of the Bukhara Emirate and replenishing it with its own goods.

In the 1970s, all domestic markets in Bukhara were filled with Russian cotton products. Most importantly, at that time, these goods were not traded in the Tatar market as before, but Bukhara's domestic markets were now occupied by Russian-made traders [3].

In a short period of 70s - 90s of the XIX century practically all the industrial products, important for the economic life of Bukhara, including iron, copper, brass, tin, lumbering boilers, copper goods, paper, lead, paints, silk, candles, porcelain and many other household articles were imported from Tsarist Russia [4].

The Russian bourgeoisie, in various ways, began to suppress the Western Europeans, as well as the Afghans and Indians, their goods, which were their constant rivals in the markets of Bukhara.

In short, the Russian-Anglo-Russian rivalry that stepped up to gain economic domination in the domestic markets of the Bukhara economy led to their fiercest fighting, and the Russians, who started the struggle, gradually gained full advantage. They managed to gain full control of the internal

markets of Bukhara. By 1881, Russian and Russian goods had gained full hegemony in the markets of Bukhara, and had the exclusive monopoly power.

We can see the proof of this in the following words of Charikov [5], a senior Russian government official at the time. "Russian goods dominate the Emirate compared to other countries. It is gradually taking over foreign goods, gradually replacing them with successive methods. He managed to get other state goods to the Amu Darya and Hindikush [6].

The Tsarist Russian government and, above all, its administrators in Turkestan, almost completely intervened in the domestic and foreign economic affairs and life of the Bukhara Emirate, after gaining initial success in the emirate's markets. , after overstating its sales turnaround, it was trying to replicate it. Seeking new opportunities to strengthen these achievements. Most importantly, not only the Russian government, but also the Russian bourgeoisie benefited from these successes. For this reason, in the 1980s and '90s, the Russian bourgeoisie also introduced new requirements to the Russian government. As a result, railway construction and flotilla formation were achieved in Central Asia [7].

After the Caspian railroad was built and the ships were launched in the Amu Darya, Russian Tsar's trade turnover with Central Asia, including the Emirate of Bukhara, grew rapidly.

The total value of imported flour, sugar, waxes, tea, kerosene, paints, barley, porcelain and other goods from Russia to the Bukhara emirate in 1890 was 2 million 119,000 862 million dollars. 480,000 was 277pud [8].

In turn, the Chorus officials brought the best and most expensive goods from the Bukhara Emirate to their home country – Russia [9].

According to A. I. Remez, in 1880 - 1881 the Bukhara Emirate of Russia withdrew 4,000 pounds of cotton, 6 million 100 thousand pounds of citrus seeds, 4,000 pounds of cotton yarn and 0.8 thousand pounds of rags. These figures are only indicative of the molars taken to central Russia.

I. Remez did not add to this collection the molars that were transported to the cities of Siberia, Caspian region and Turkestan.

It should be admitted that most authors when considering their products from Bukhara have only considered the value of goods exported to Russia [10]. For some reason they tried to ignore the fact that the general governorship of Trukistan, which was under Russian control, did not include the collection of molars that were transported to Siberia and the Caspian region. Although the governorship of Turkestan was recognized as an integral part of Tsarist Russia, the country was governed by Russian laws at that time. These are the issues that require a more serious approach. All goods exported from the Bukharan emirate to the Turkestan governor-general are to be regarded as supplies to Tsarist Russia. After all, it is possible to accurately reflect the plundering policy of the Tsarist Russia based on accurate figures.

According to the archives, many goods were exported from Bukhara to the cities of Turkestan, especially to the Caspian region. For example, during the 1890-1891 years, a large amount of bags, green tea, indigo, and dried

fruits were seized from the Emirate of Bukhara to Turkestan and the Caspian region [11].

In the center of Tsarist Russia these years, the export of cotton, wool, dark leather, and silk from the emirate increased significantly. At the same time, special attention was paid to dried fruits, melons and watermelons [12].

In 1890, the Bukhara Emirate provided about 1 million dollars to Russia. 841 178 poodles were seized [13].

Despite the fact that the Russian government imported its goods into the territory of the Bukhara emirate and almost completely alienated foreign goods from the Bukhara markets, during the period 1890-1895 foreign countries, especially England, attempted to enter the economy of Bukhara again. And, frankly, he has achieved some successes. This puts the Russian government and its bourgeois representatives at a great risk. As a result, the Russian government took urgent measures to prevent this. Several official meetings were held in St. Petersburg on this issue. At one of these meetings, Russian authorities approved Bukhara to be incorporated into the Russian Customs Union, and in 1895 the issue was unilaterally resolved without the participation of the Bukhara Emirate [14].

Thus, from January 1, 1895, Bukhara was included into the single customs territory of Russia [15].

It is known from history that until the invasion of Tsarist Russia and its interference in the internal affairs of the Bukhara emirate, it was not until the 50s of the XIX century that the paper money was not in circulation in the emirate of Bukhara. Coins in the emirate have always been in circulation. This was the case in the 1970s and '90s. The coins of Bukhara are usually made of gold, silver and copper [16]. One Bukhara gold was worth about 4 rubles at the time, the Russian currency. The silver coin was 15-20 kopecks.

In some cases, the value of a coin has been rising and falling many times over the course of one day. This had a significant effect on the value of Russian credit money. That is why Russian businessmen and traders have repeatedly appealed to the Russian government to prevent this. In the archives it is noted that in 1890-1891 such appeals were very frequent. They asked the Russian government to release the Bukhara coin from the domestic markets of Bukhara and introduce the Russian ruble in its place [17].

Beginning in 1891, the Russian government negotiated with the Bukhara government on this issue, and continued until 1900. Eventually the Emir of Bukhara, unable to withstand the harsh pressures of the Russian government, had to accept their offer in 1900. Thus, on April 6, 1900, the Bukhara government undertook no coinage. The Russian government, on the other hand, has pledged to buy all the coins still in circulation in the Bukhara economy - 15 kopecks per coin. Thus, the Bukhara coins in circulation were to be completely removed from circulation. On April 16, 1900, this decision was approved by the Russian tsar.

In 1901-1903, the Russian government purchased 24mln coins, which were in 1902, as previously agreed with the emperor in St. Petersburg [18].

In this way, the Russian government was able to exert its influence on money, which is one of the highest symbols and most important indicators of the economy of Bukhara - one of the highest symbols of the state - its economic life. . As a result, in Bukhara the monetary reform was carried out under severe pressure and pressure from the Russian government. The Bukhara coin, which had been in circulation for hundreds of years, was removed from circulation. The Bukhara money system was practically liquidated. After the monetary reform in Bukhara, large amounts of Russian credit, Russian gold and silver coins were brought in and traded on the domestic markets of Bukhara.

The Russian bourgeoisie and the Russian merchants, in the first place, took into account the interests of the Russian government, and under strict pressure and pressure, the monetary reform of the Tsarist Russia in the Emirate of Bukhara was fully colonial in nature. The main goal of this reform is to fully control the economy of Bukhara, its internal markets and the whole economic system of the emirate, and to allow it to be run voluntarily. and, further, to strengthen the hegemony of Russian industrial goods and Russian bourgeoisie in the markets of Bukhara. Conducting monetary reform in Bukhara is an example of the practical implementation of the idea of economic dependence of the Emirate on Russia. In this way, Russia managed to inflict a huge political and legal blow on the independence of the Bukhara Emirate.

Main parts:

Importance of railroad construction in the economy of the Emirate of Bukhara

After the conquest of large territories of the Central Asian khanates, the Tsarist Russia completely regained its dominion there, and since the last quarter of the nineteenth century began to focus on strengthening its position.

Particularly important is the policy of Russia in the construction of railways in Central Asia. The policy of the Russian government in the construction of railways in the Central Asian region was one of the most important of his efforts to strengthen his position in Turkestan.

The issue of railway construction in Turkestan was first of all on the agenda in terms of political, military strategic and economic issues.

The Tsarist government, in various ways, was also interested in strengthening its position in the East, in addition to strengthening its dominance over the people of Turkestan, the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate. With the help of these tools, the British (the English - ours, R.X.) began to try to prevent Central Asian invasion.

As we know, the accession of the Qoqand khan to full-fledged Russia and the partial subjugation of the Bukhara and Khiva khanates have further intensified the Anglo-Russian relations, especially in the Middle East.

The dispute did not stop even after Britain and Russia signed a treaty. Both the British and the Russians have been working hard to expand their positions and influence in Central Asia.

The rivalry between England and Russia intensified and intensified by the late 1970s.

In 1878-1880 the British broke the treaty and agreements with the Russians and launched the Second War in Afghanistan. This led to the intensification of the Anglo-Russian competition.

The Russian government also took immediate action against this. He paid great attention to further strengthening his position in Turkestan. In this case, the importance of the railway connecting Turkestan and Russia became clear to the Russian government.

The need to build a railway between Russia and Turkestan was, first and foremost, political and military strategic. At the same time, the construction of this railway required a number of economic reasons. The Russian bourgeoisie considers Turkestan an extremely important commodity and a major domestic market for the sale of its goods. This is exactly what the Russian bourgeoisie, as a supporter of railroad construction, began to demand from the Russian government in the 1980s [19]. It was a long time coming from the caravan routes to transport and transport goods, and it was a huge expense.

For example, the caravan from Orenburg to Tashkent would take 90-100 days. From Tashkent to Orenburg, the caravan would last at least 3 months, and the caravan from Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod would have to travel 5-6 months. In addition, 9-12 rubles were spent on each camel. Each camel could carry 16 pounds of cargo [20]. From the economic point of view, the cost per luggage was 56-57 kopecks. By the 1980s, the supply of goods by caravan roads was, firstly, costly, and secondly, in terms of speed, and thirdly, the demands of the Russian bourgeoisie, and, fourthly, of the Russian military's demand and, finally, of the fifth. was abandoned.

It is these mistakes, such as the high cost of the commodity, and the impact it has made on the need for a fast rail.

Thus, the entry of railways into Central Asia was driven primarily by political, military strategic and, finally, economic reasons.

Railroad construction in Central Asia was raised several times even before the conquest of these territories. In particular, during the period of 1850-1860 in Russia, the project of railroad construction was raised in Central Asia. But at the time, she remained pretty.

The construction of the railway in Central Asia was of the utmost interest to the Russian authorities in Turkestan, so they repeatedly asked the Russian government to resolve the issue positively.

In 1873, Governor-General of Turkestan General von Kaufman wrote in writing to the Tsar's government to ask for a railroad to Central Asia [21]. In his letter, Kaufman makes it clear that the main reason for his appeal to this issue is the intensification of English Russian competition.

In particular, General Kaufman said that the construction of the railway was primarily aimed at preventing and diminishing the interest of the British in Central Asia, as well as to prevent any possible action taken by them in Central Asia. recognizes that this is a very important issue. In 1880, General

Kaufman sent a telegram to the military minister, stating that the urgency of the matter was paramount in military strategic terms, and wrote: I ask that you directly intervene to accelerate the Central Asian Railway Project and strongly urge it to be implemented. It should be noted that the construction of this railroad will not only ensure the economic development of the country (although it is the main cause of the railway), making it one of the most efficient manufacturing centers of the empire. The military-political importance of railroad construction is very important. If this railroad is not implemented, we could lose the good and strong support we have in this region and the strong Asian influence.” [22].

This well-founded proposal by General Kaufman was properly understood and supported by the military ministry. It was the basis for the Government to put forward its proposals on this issue.

It is worth noting that, in 1873, a special commission was set up in St. Petersburg under the Ministry of Railways to review and discuss railway construction projects [23].

This special commission has been widely presented by Russian engineers and foreign nationals on railway construction projects linking Central Asia with Russia. Only from 1865 to 1880 more than 40 projects of this kind were proposed. Most of the projects were presented in the 1970s of the 19th century [24].

Eventually, the Tsarist Russian government had to support and start the railway construction in Central Asia. Initially, it was planned to build a railway from Orenburg to Tashkent.

Tensions between the English-Russian border on Afghanistan and Central Asia have forced the temporary suspension of the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad and the Russian government's main focus on the construction of the Caspian region.

On February 11-12, 1880, a special council under the leadership of the military minister was convened to discuss the issue of the Caspian Sea and the construction of the railway there, and a decision was made to begin the construction of the railway [25].

The first stage of the Caspian railway construction (217 Worst road from Mikhailovsk arm to Red Arvat) was built and commissioned in a very short period of 8 months [26]. The construction of this railroad will enable the Government of Russia to address not only its large-scale economic problems, but also the construction of large railroads, which will further strengthen its military and strategic position in Central Asia. It made him confident.

On April 18-22, 1886, the Committee of Ministers discussed the construction of a new railway line of the Caspian Sea and decided to continue it to Samarkand, and on that basis the construction of the railway was started. year ended [27]. The new railway is called the Caspian Military Railway.

In this way, Central Asia opened the way for railroad construction, and in the following years, the Russian government began to develop it rapidly and start new networks.

By the beginning of the 20th century the Government of Tsarist Russia faced the issue of linking the South-West and South-Eastern regions of the Bukhara emirate with the Central Asian Railroad, from the economic and political point of view. Yes. This road was supposed to connect Russia with Bukhara or Samarkand through Termiz, the southernmost part of the Emirate.

It should be noted that Central Asia's main railway crosses the Zarafshan River, mainly from the northern part of the Bukhara Emirate. The south-western and southeastern parts of the Emirate were not far from the railroad.

The southern part of the Bukhara Emirate was a region of rich natural resources. There were numerous trees, gold, tin, sulfur, oil, iron, coal, marble, lapis lazuli, ruby. In the territory of these wealthy cities were the cities of Karshi, Kitab, Yakkabog, Chirakchi, Guzar, Sherabad, Sari'o (Sariosi), Shartuz, Korogh, Gissar, Dushanbe.

The passage of railways through these areas will allow the Russian bourgeoisie to absorb and invest valuable resources in the first place, on the other hand, will allow the Russian government to gain full access to the Bukhara markets, and thirdly. The construction of railways in the area would give the Russians greater access to trade with the outside world, opening up new opportunities for faster access to Afghanistan and India. Last but not least, the newly constructed Bukhara Railway is of political and military strategic importance for Russia, and it is inevitable that it will achieve its own success in the English Russian competition. It was precisely these aspects that the Russian government supported the construction [28].

Construction of a new railway from Kagan to Karshi through Termiz was planned across the Afghan border. This is precisely because it was supposed to have a profound effect on Russian-Afghan and Anglo-Russian relations and would further strengthen Russia's position in the Middle East [29].

On March 13, 1904, the Committee for Railroad Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan conducted a technical survey on the directions of Bukhara-Karshi-Kalif-Termiz and Samarkand-Karshi (557 Wests) and Karshi-Sherabad-Termiz (total 269Wyst). decided to carry out the work [30].

In March 1904, the Ministry of Defense requested the commander of the Turkestan military forces to agree with the Emir of Bukhara on the authorization and protection of the road investigators [31].

The Russian government will also begin to see the railroad because of its interest in the economy of Bukhara and, secondly, because of its military strategic importance. One of the main objectives of the railway construction was to connect the Turkestan and Afghanistan border.

On April 19, 1904, in a letter to the governor general of Turkestan, the technical department of the Railway Administration of the Ministry of Communications announced that the work on the construction of the railway had begun: "The adviser of the college for studying the Karshi-Kalif, Karshi-Guzar and Sherabad roads, plans to start collecting materials for connecting

the Central Asian Railroad with Bukhara and Samarkand with the city of Termiz on the Amu Darya River., Goliembiovsky was appointed as a communications engineer. " [32].

By the spring of 1904 the technical survey of the Bukhara railway was completed. Then the governor-general of Turkestan appealed to the military ministry to include the construction of the Bukhara Railway in 1906 [33].

However, as a result of the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, the construction of this railway was delayed.

Several projects have been prepared for the construction of the Bukhara railway.

In 1910, negotiations between the Tsarist government and Emir Abdulahad on the construction of a railway in Bukhara were held.

The governor of the Turkestan governor's office submitted a report to the governor general of Turkestan, which proposed to build a railway from Kagan to Karshi through Termiz. This issue has been repeatedly discussed by the military and foreign ministries, and has caused some controversy [34].

The Turkestan General Governor's Office proposes the idea of building a Bukhara-Karshi road in the first phase of the construction of the Bukhara Railway, involving private entrepreneurs [35].

Officials of the Tsarist government are considering the construction of a narrow-track railway, considering that the construction of the Karshi-Kagan railway can be delayed with private capital, and this package of documents is needed to study the project. the captain hands over to Schul [36]. But the background tells Schulz that a study of the project would not benefit from the construction of a simple narrow-line railroad, and that a narrow-track rail would not be strategically fit. In turn, the government of Bukhara has also objected to the construction of the narrow-track railway.

At the end of April, 1910, a meeting of the Committee of Ministers was held to discuss the importance of the Kagan-Termiz highway, but no further funding for the project. is displayed as [37].

In 1907, the English-Russian Agreement on Central Asia was signed between King Edward VII of England and the Tsarist government. However, after King Edward's death, Georg V's rise to the throne prompted the Tsarist government to once again build a railroad to reinforce Bukhara's border [38].

It was reported in the foreign press about Georg V, and it was alleged that Britain was supporting its colonies. Therefore, the Tsarist government will endeavor to complete the construction of the railway as soon as possible, taking into account the possibility of the Anglo-Afghan conflict. In a secret letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated January 30, 1910, the military minister stated: "According to the Turkestan Front operational plan, the need for this railway will arise. It connects our Central Asian railway with the Bukhara-Afghan border. It is difficult to locate troops and military goods on the Kabul route (Termiz-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul), where this railroad operation is supposed to take place [39].

On Nov. 25, 1910, the "Novoye Vremya" newspaper published in Tehran described the advantage of the railway construction as described by Novatsky. In particular, it states: "By rail, the goods of Termez may be delivered not only to the north of Afghanistan, but also from its internal areas. This is because of the ancient route that connects Kabul with Central Asia. It is true that we currently have very low customs turnover with Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, as the railroad passes through Termiz, natural goods will grow each year and we will also have access to markets in northern Afghanistan." [40].

The Termiz railroad is not only strategically important but also economically feasible, it connects the Amu Darya with Afghanistan and North India. By this rail, our products are well-selling in the Anglo-Indian region, and even today our products are more expensive than the British, and the road is initially costly, but it will certainly enhance our civil and military position in Central Asia. will bring. Secondly, sooner or later the rust emir roads will be the first stage of the connection with the Anglo-Indian road. Through this link, Russia controls the transit route, which is the only one in the world that connects Western Europe with South Asia. At the same time, the Russian industry is booming so that Russia will be able to sell its goods to the British colonies at a lower price [41].

Gubarevich Radobilsky, in his essay "Bukhara and Turkestan Economics", commented on the construction of the Termez railway, including the following: In this regard, the defense of our territories in Central Asia should be inextricably linked to the Russian defense. Through our military and economic training here, the solution to the problem of Central Asia's development can be justified by the 100 million spent on Turkestan. In general, to succeed in Central Asia, we must be prepared not only for defense but also for attack.

This road is also important for Bukhara's economy. Mineral resources in the southeastern part of the country are developed and sold. There are fertile areas here, and to a lesser extent wheat, rice and cotton are sown. When railroad construction is carried out, the crop will be expanded. This railroad will play a major role in the rapid development of military operations and the rapid accumulation of large troops. Only the Kagan-Termez railway can meet the requirements of our policy towards Afghanistan and England." [42].

As a result of all the above information and reports and discussions with the government of Bukhara, the Kagan-Termez railway line was agreed upon. This decision was considered and approved in April 1910 by the Committee of Ministers of Russia headed by Stolipin [43].

In the spring of 1912, information on the Bukhara Railway Project and its complete protocol was prepared and submitted for discussion by Kovalensky. This presentation provides an overview of the Turkestan Railway, which was built between 1880 and 1912, and the trends in their development, in the economic, political and cultural life that is expected to be associated with the construction of Central Asia and Turkestan railroads.

Important information was given about possible changes and construction of secondary roads in the country. This book contains important information about the Emirate of Bukhara, including its rich natural resources, especially the mountain and southern regions of Bukhara, the state of the emirate's other branches of agriculture, the emirate industry and its status, ethnicity and important information about the composition of it.

Most importantly, this presentation will provide comprehensive and comprehensive information on the locations of railways, their exact numbers, their route, and their length, and their use. data were provided.

Kovalensky also provided specific figures on what kind of railroad goods to be built, the revenue and the total cost of the railway to be built.

According to Kovalensky's estimates, the construction of the railway is estimated at 26 million 534 thousand 467 rubles.

In April 1912, the Department of Railways contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked them to express their views on the Kovalensky project. As a result, both ministries emphasized the importance and importance of railroad construction in Bukhara, but because Bukhoro was an independent state, it was a concession to build the railroad, taking into account the construction of the railway directly in its territory. the right to authorize the emir of Bukhara [44].

On May 5, 1912, the headquarters asked the Ministry of Railways to discuss the Kovalensky project in 1912.

The emir of Bukhara supported the construction of this Bukhara railway on June 8, 1912, and allowed Kovalensky to allocate 600 acres of land for the construction of the railway [45].

The ambassador of the Bukhara embassy in a letter to the Russian Empire Political Agent wrote: "Given the extreme importance of this railroad, the high-ranking Emir of Bukhara has decided to hand over concessions to Russian citizen Alexander Nikolayevich Kovalensky for the construction of this railway." He gave a damn [46].

The projects for the construction of the Bukhara highway by Kovalensky and others were studied on September 18 and 25, 1912. The Commission unanimously supported the construction of the Bukhara railway under the Kovalensky project.

On May 28, 1913, the Committee of Ministers, the Ministry of Railway Construction and the Ministry of Finance discussed this issue in detail and allowed the engineer Kovalensky to set up a special society for the construction and operation of the Bukhara Railway.

As it was mentioned above, after the construction of the Bukhara railway in 1913, a lot of organizational work was carried out on its implementation.

In October 1913, the director of the Bukhara Railway Company, M. Slutsky, visited Bukhara. He was responsible for all the preparatory work. First and foremost, he had to solve the labor force problem. From October 1913 to April 1914, M. Slutskiy held negotiations with the government of

Bukhara on the mutual agreement on the issue of land works. It had its own reasons. The people of Bukhara at that time banned their citizens from traveling to neighboring countries and other cities. That is why he had to negotiate with the Bukhara government and personally with the Emir.

By the middle of April 1914, the first 400 residents of Bukhara, who were carrying out soil work, had arrived at the construction site. The lowest wages paid to local workers who went on earthworks [47]. Their wages were so low that even those who were involved in any other railway construction at that time could not afford that. The very low wages, in turn, have an impact on the efficiency of work. On the other hand, their attitude towards them has also been affected.

The first 400 locals recruited from Karshi were dissatisfied with the "benevolence" against them, and the Russian engineers were reluctant to work as expected. 28 days after they were recruited, the Bukhara government was forced to retire on May 8, 1914, and they were replaced by labor from other areas.

By the end of May 1914, the number of Bukhara workers had reached 1,000 (1,000). Most of the workers were sent to work from the Qarategin area. Most of these workers were forcibly evicted. They were not provided with any conditions. They are even expected to reach their place of work. The workers had to work hard to get their meals on their way to work. The workers, who arrived at the construction site, openly stated to the management of the Railway Department that they were reluctant and weighed. As a result, despite all the efforts of engineer I.E. Tanner, all 800 workers left their jobs [48].

This has shown to railroad executives that as much as they want, that is, inexpensive labor, the railroad's intentions to carry out earthworks are not met.

At the height of construction, the Buhari government demanded that each worker, for April, May, and June, 1914, pay 50 kopecks for each railway worker, not 0.75 kopecks. After long controversies, railway workers had to pay 20 rubles for ruble workers and 1 ruble for workers in Bukhara.

These circumstances have led railroad managers to address the challenge of seeking skilled, new workforce. As a result, railroad executives were forced to search for workforce in Russia, Baku and even Iran and take urgent measures to attract them.

In particular, there was a great deal of hope for the Iranian workers to be involved in the construction of the Bukhara railroad, but these efforts were in vain. In the meantime, it was planned to attract 2,000 workers from Iran and a contract was signed. But in 1914, only 226 Iranians came to Bukhara. By August 1914, there were 116 of them [49].

Railway executives sought to recruit more than 400 people from the Turkmen. Later, the railway managers sent their agents to the Caucasus and Siberia to the central regions of Russia. Despite all these efforts, the shortage of manpower in the construction of the railway was still a problem.

After failing to find a way out of the situation, the railway construction managers approached the prison department and asked them to allow the prison staff to work on the Bukhara railroad.

This action did not bring any positive results. Railway managers then asked other railroad construction managers to help them with their workforce.

It was after these appeals that the number of workers in the construction of the Bukhara Railroad increased slightly. By the end of October 1914, there had been a slight increase in the number of workers.

By February 1915, the number of workers on the Bukhara railroad was declining. Many Russian workers also returned to Russia.

The political agent of the Russian Empire in Bukhara and the governor-general of Turkestan paid great attention to the use of foreign military captives as a new source of labor for the construction of the Bukhara Railway.

Thanks to the prisoners of war, Bukhara managed to increase the number of railway workers to 6,000 [50].

The Ministry of Railway Construction has tasked the leaders of the Bukhara Railroad Railroad to finish the railway one year ahead of schedule, in mid-July 1916. The main reason for this was that the Tsarist Russia began to defeat one another on the front lines of the First World War. Also, the economic situation and the life in the country were increasingly difficult during the war. For this reason, the rapid construction of the Bukhara Railway was expected to pave the way for some problems, especially in the supply of raw materials and the stabilization of Russian industrial production.

By July 1916 the work on the construction of the Bukhara railway began. The number of railway workers employed there increased to 7,000 [51].

On April 20, 1914, preparatory work for the construction of the Bukhara Railroad was started. On June 16, 1914, construction began. The Bukhoro Railroad was completed and commissioned exactly one year before the construction was completed in June 1916.

The total length of the road was 572 Wests. 150 of them crossed the Afghan border. Although the road was constructed for the benefit of the Tsarist government, it was of great importance to the government of Bukhara [52].

Conclusion

The tsarist government of Russia sent troops to Central Asia, including the Bukhara Emirate not only political, military, but also military actions. Strategic goals. But in the sphere of economic interestssays he also pursued a goal. The four governments of Russia and their administrators in Turkestan are Gradually, the Bukhara Emirate entered the economy and overtook it. completely excluded. Four people in Samarkand region, dagithe authorities are discussing the issue of water distribution in Zarafshonhas entered. Bukhara region depends on water supply. hereand Bukhara Emiratetook the first step towards economic transformation. Russian Government Capturing Russian domestic markets and establishing dominance

over them. He focused on implementing the system. 70-90s of the XIX century Bukhara's internal markets are also needed for the economic life of the emirate.

It is necessary and important to import almost all high-quality products from Russia. European and European goods are ousted from the internal market of Bukhara. Carus began, and by 1880 Russians and Russians in two markets in Bukhara. Goods to the lake of complete hegemony. has a sole monopoly. Tsarist Russia 1 Policy of economic subordination of Bukhara Emirate XIX. By the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, it managed to gain strength. The Russian government is going to take over the economy of Bukhara. Parallel capabilities began to diminish, and they were put into practice. It is the Russians who are directly interested in this policy. The bourgeoisie has put forward new demands on the Russian government. As a result, iron ore in Central Asia, including Bukhara. The construction of the road led to the formation of a flotilla.

Russian businessmen and traders are under intense pressure, Russian government since 1891, Bukhara. Amiridin internal market of Bukhara. Strong demand for abandoning monetary and financial reform. done. Emir of Bukhara, unable to withstand pressure from the Russian government. On April 6, 1900, he was forced to carry out financial reforms.

The governments of the four countries considered the Bukhara Emirate an economic entity and complete military-political, strategic and economic situation in this area. strengthen the construction of railways

The position of the Russian government on the territory of the Bukhara Emirate to further strengthen and develop the internal markets of Bukhara. Russian who valued his country as an important market for his goods. building a railway against the demands of the bourgeoisie and in 1916 it was commissioned.

This is the most important result expected from the construction of the Bukhara railway. First of all, from a military-strategic point of view, Bukhara railway to the southwest and southeast of the emirate along the Central Asian highway and Bukhara along this road connect the city of Termez, located in the southernmost part of the emirate was intended. On the other hand, the emirate has natural resources.

The construction of a railway in the southern part of the country was for the Russian bourgeoisie. Acquire and exchange the priceless wealth of these territories

big profits and development of foreign trade relations, the novelty enters the markets of Afghanistan and India in a short time it was meant to open up possibilities.

And, finally, the most important thing is the construction of railways in the emirate of Russia. It acquired a third political, as well as military-strategic importance for the Anglo-Russian. This is the basis for a serious victory of the Russian government in the competition served.

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