

## PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt / Egyptology

### THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED FOR VIOLATING THE RULES OF REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION IN MALANG REGENCY INDONESIA

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**Suko Wiyono, Nuruddin Hady, Desinta Dwi Rapita, Wahyu Hindiawati, Tikka Dessy Harsanti, Rika Novitasari, Eko Pujiati, Shofiyatul Azmi. The Sanctions Imposed For Violating The Rules Of Regional Head Election In Malang Regency Indonesia--Palarch's Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt/Egyptology 17(4), 871-882. ISSN 1567-214x**

**Keywords: Sanctions, Violations, General Election Of Regional Head (Gerh)**

#### **ABSTRACT**

#### **BACKGROUND**

There are various frauds, deviations, and violations during the implementation of General Election of Regional Head (GERH). Those include various modes of money politics campaigns outside the predetermined zoning, the act of destroying, obstructing and disturbing campaigns of other candidate pairs, the act of destroying campaign tools of other candidate pairs, campaigns in educational center, and black campaigns.

#### **OBJECTIVES**

This study aims at studying and analyzing various violations occurred during the process of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency as well as the implementation of sanctions for the violations committed.

#### **METHOD**

This study uses normative legal research. The approach used in this study is an approach that combines a normative legal approach and an empirical legal approach.

#### **RESULT**

There are various kinds of violations during The General Election of Regional Head (GERH). In fact, there are 39 violations and most of them occurred at campaign stage which include

various modes of money politics, campaigns outside the predetermined zoning, the act of destroying, obstructing, and disturbing campaigns of other candidate pairs, the act of destroying campaign tools of other candidate pairs, campaigns in educational center, and black campaigns. Unfortunately, most reports regarding the violations cannot be followed up due to insufficient evidences, especially for cases that fall under criminal qualifications of General Election of Regional Head (GERH). As a result, Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) cannot apply sanctions for the occurring violations.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) is not able to play an optimal role as an election supervisory institution which is expected to be able to oversee the democratic process so that it runs well, by following up on the slightest violations that occur during the General Election of Regional Head (GERH) process, especially when both candidates and the campaign team did money politics violations with various modes of operation. In fact, the violation done can invalidate the elected regional head candidate pair.

## INTRODUCTION

The General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Indonesia is a direct mandate of the 1998 reform movement. Nowadays, General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is held directly. This direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) has been going on since 2005, which is based on the provisions of Law no. 32 of 2004 based on the provisions of Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution which stipulates that the Governor, Regent and Mayor respectively as heads of provincial, regency and municipal government are elected democratically. With this system, it is believed that the realization of people's sovereignty in the government system can be realized as a whole, considering that the democratic system is a direct command mandated by the 1945 Constitution.

In 2015, there were 272 regions that held General Election of Regional Head (GERH) simultaneously throughout Indonesia. The emergence of attention to the democratic transition in the region according to Brian C Smith (1998) departs from a belief that democracy in the regions is a prerequisite for the emergence of democracy at the national level. The implementation of direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is one of the indicators of the progress of democracy in Indonesia, especially local democracy. Therefore, direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is a process of strengthening and deepening democracy and an effort to realize good and effective governance (Zuhro, 2011).

Further implementation of democracy practice as revealed by Reuschmeyer (1992) is an effort to overcome the weaknesses of substantive democratic practices, especially in responding to the demands of local communities. Fung and Olin-Wright (2003) reveal that further implementation of democracy is needed to fulfill the central idea of political democracy which includes: providing facilities for the public to be involved in politics, encouraging political consensus through dialogue, realizing public policies that can create economic effectiveness and a healthy society. and providing protection so that citizens can also make use of the country's wealth. In addition, direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is expected to produce regional heads

who have higher accountability to the people (Marijan, 2010). According to Tutik (2006: 13), direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is basically a national political process towards a more democratic life (people's sovereignty), transparency, and responsibility. In addition, the direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH) indicates a change in local democracy, which is not just a vertical distribution of power among levels of government.

In relation to democratization in the regional scope, the quality of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) implementation greatly determines the quality of democracy in certain region; therefore, democracy that results from an unhealthy General Election of Regional Head (GERH) implementation pattern is an unhealthy democracy, and vice versa, a healthy General Election of Regional Head (GERH) process will result in healthy and good quality democracy which later becomes a means of achieving the goals of nation and state life which is explicitly stated in Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Paragraph IV. To be able to hold a healthy General Election of Regional Head (GERH), there are several prerequisites that must be fulfilled, including the availability of clear and fair rules for all participants, an independent and non-discriminatory organizer, consistent implementation of rules, and fair sanctions to all parties ( Yulianto, 2008).

However, in the implementation of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) so far, it turns out that there are still many frauds, manipulations, deviations, and violations. According to Mochtar (2012) violations in General Election of Regional Head (GERH) can be committed by organizers, regional head candidates or their success team. In General Election of Regional Head (GERH), money politics is one of the most frequent type of violations committed by General Election of Regional Head (GERH) participants, one of which is done by vote buying that is by giving money or other items to influence voters. Ironically, almost all candidate pairs practice this vote buying. They just use different kinds of methods but the goal is the same that is to influence voters to vote for them. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all General Election of Regional Head (GERH) held in this country always end in dispute.

According to Fahmal (2011), there are seven kinds of violations that often occur in General Election of Regional Head (GERH) namely manipulation of administrative requirements for nominations, money politics, politicization of the bureaucracy, negligence of election officials, manipulation of votes in several places, threats and intimidation, as well as the mentality of election organizers. Various kinds of violations have the potential to be committed by anyone, including election organizers, election participants, certain officials, monitoring groups or the voting community. In fact, various kinds of products of laws and regulations have been produced to provide a basis and guidelines and even guarantee that elections are carried out directly, publicly, freely, secretly, honestly and fairly.

In order to create a free, fair and competitive General Election of Regional Head (GERH) and in order to prevent violations in its implementation, a supervision is needed to ensure that General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is actually carried out based on the principles of direct, general, free,

secret, honest and fair and in accordance to the prevailing laws and regulations and the implementation of sanctions against election violations must be carried out so that the problem of election violations does not continue repeatedly and creates chaos in society as election participants. Several studies have shown that sanctions differ among political elites across regime types (Allen 2008; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Mayor 2012;).

Democratic sanctions have become an important tool for leaders to achieve democratization, namely the improvement of civil liberties and political rights (Soest and Wahman 2015). Democratic leaders are more vulnerable to sanctions because as more citizens feel the pain of sanctions, the more democratic elites face public pressure (Major 2012). Soest and Wahman (2015) found that there is a positive correlation between democratic sanctions and an increase in the level of democracy in authoritarian countries. Different results shown by Park (2018) showing that sanctions worsen election performance and result in autocratic leaders rather than democratic leaders. Sanctions can mobilize and strengthen opposition groups during election periods by generating anti-regime movements among the community and by offering signals of implicit or explicit support for the international community for regime change.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Local democracy*

The discussion regarding the effort in understanding local democracy cannot be separated from decentralization policies. Considering this policy is the starting point for the creation of local democracy. Some scientists even believe that the real goal of decentralization is none other than fostering local democracy (Brian C Smith. 1998). Further implementation of democracy as revealed by Reuschmeyer (1992) is an effort to overcome the weaknesses of substantive democratic practices, especially in responding to the demands of local communities. Further implementation of democracy according to Fung and Olin-Wright (2003) is also needed to fulfill the central idea of political democracy which includes several important things, such as providing facilities to the community so that they are involved in politics: encouraging political consensus through dialogue, realizing public policies that can create economic effectiveness and a healthy society, and providing protection so that citizens can also make use of the country's wealth.

The emergence of attention to the transition to democracy in the region according to Brian C Smith (1998) comes from a belief that democracy in the regions is a prerequisite for the emergence of democracy at the national level. This assumption believes that when there is an improvement in the quality of democracy in the region, it can automatically be interpreted as an improvement in the quality of democracy at the national level. Regional government, as stated by Diamond (1999), has an important role in accelerating the vitality of democracy. Diamond provides a number of reasons that local government can help develop democratic values and skills among its citizens. Local government can also increase accountability and accountability

to various interests that exist in the region. Additionally, local governments can provide additional channels and access to historically marginalized groups. When this is fulfilled, there is a tendency for a better level of democratic representation. In the end, local governments can encourage the realization of checks and balances in power. Hayden (1992) in "Governance and Politics in Africa" also sees General Election of Regional Head (GERH) as an arena for creating local good governance. The creation of a good local government order then is said to have three dimensions of governance, namely the actor dimension, structure, and empirical dimension.

### *Democracy sanction*

The effectiveness of sanctions has been a problem for some time in academic research and has been debated extensively in the last two decades (Hufbauer, et al. 2007; Portela 2008). In general, the effectiveness of sanctions has been discussed in the context of the impact of sanctions and the success of sanctions. There are not only methodological challenges in measuring the effectiveness of sanctions, but also some debate about the exact definition and criteria for measuring effectiveness (Elliot 1998; Pape 1998). A common reason for highly negative ratings of sanction effectiveness is to limit the measurement of sanctions to one objective while other secondary or even tertiary objectives are often overlooked. The effectiveness of sanctions must be understood as the degree of success of certain sanctions measures for specific political objectives. Sanctions are effective if they "encourage concessions or significant movement in target policy positions" (Brooks 2002).

Democratic sanctions have become an important tool for leaders to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences the norms of democracy and international human rights and not to tolerate drastic deviations from these principles. More than 50% of all sanctions aimed at autocratic regimes recorded in the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions are explicitly aimed at realizing democratization, namely the enhancement of civil liberties and political rights (Soest and Wahman 2015). When regimes violate international democratic norms, Western countries make strategic decisions that involve the potential costs of issuing sanctions and are expected to achieve concessions from the target rather than issues related to security (Donno, 2013). Grebe (2010) revealed that there are clear indications that sanctions have been successfully implemented in some cases by isolating regime members, prohibiting regime members from traveling abroad, and freezing the assets of some officials. There is also some evidence that in some cases sanctions led to changes in the behavior of some regime members who saw financial businesses as being threatened by sanctions.

### **RESEARCH METHOD**

This research uses normative legal research. Marzuki (2005) argues that in essence of legal research is a process to find legal rules, legal principles, and legal doctrine in order to answer legal issues at hand. The approach used in this research is an approach that combines a normative legal approach and an empirical legal approach. The normative legal approach or the normative juridical approach is used to analyze various laws and regulations related to

Election of Regional Head (ERH), regulation and implementation of sanctions against violations on Election of Regional Head (ERH) in Malang Regency.

## FINDINGS

### *The violations on the election of regional head (ERH)*

The Election of Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head in Malang Regency was held on December 5 2015 which took place safely and peacefully, bringing candidate pair number 1 Rendra Kresna and Sanusi as the winners. This is officially stipulated based on the Decree of General Election Commission (KPU) of Malang Regency, Number: 528 / KPs / KPU-Kab-014.329781 / 2015, concerning the Stipulation of the Recapitulation of Vote Count Results and the Election Results of Malang Regent and Deputy Regent in 2015. The results of the votes were as follows:

**Table 1.** Determination of the Recapitulation of Vote Count Result

| No. | The name of candidate pair    | Number of votes |
|-----|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1.  | Rendra Kresna- Sanusi         | 605.817         |
| 2.  | Dewanti Rumpoko-Masrifah Hadi | 521.928         |
| 3.  | Nurcholis – Muhammad Mufidz   | 45.723          |

Even though the Election of Regional Head took place safely and peacefully, it does not mean that there is no violations in its implementation. This is strengthened by the incidents showing that one of the losing candidate pairs, namely candidate pair number 2 Dewanti Rumpoko and Masrifah Hadi filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court although in the end the lawsuit was rejected by the Constitutional Court. Regarding the violations that occurred during the Election of Regional Head (ERH), it was found that based on data from the Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) of Malang Regency, there were 39 violations occurred during General Election of Regional Head (GERH). Those violations are divided into 3 categories namely administrative violations, criminal violations, and code of ethics violations.

The administrative violations that occur during the process of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) are: (1) campaigns outside the predetermined zoning; (2) campaigns without a campaign notification letter; and (3) the existence of multiple voters found on the Permanent Voters List (PVL) in 33 districts. Meanwhile, the forms of criminal violations are: (1) promising free recreation to prospective voters; (2) damaging, obstructing and disrupting the campaigns of other pairs of candidates; (3) destroying the campaign tools of candidate pairs; (4) doing campaigns at educational places / Islamic boarding schools; (5) doing a black campaign; (6) involving foreigners in campaign and having immodestly outfit; (7) doing money politics; (8) distributing goods, in the form of sarongs, headscarves and school uniforms; and (9) making use of voting rights more than once. Last, the code of ethics violation is related to the negligence of General Election Commission (KPU) of Malang Regency regarding the phenomenon of one of candidate pair who

print the banners for the with a picture and written background of Batu Mayor. Consequently, Malang Regency Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) commanded to have the banners removed from 390 villages in Malang Regency. The above reality shows that the General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is still tinged with various frauds.

In a crime study according to Piers Beirne da James Messerschmidt (1995), as quoted again by Eddy O.S Hiariej (2012: 179), election crime can also be included into corruption. Two of the nine types of corruption directly related to elections are election fraud and corrupt campaign practice. Election fraud is corruption that is directly related to general election fraud. Included in this election fraud are voter registration which is deliberately carried out inaccurately, fraud in vote counting and paying a certain amount of money or giving goods or promises to elect a certain candidate in the election.

Meanwhile, the corrupt campaign practice is a campaign practice using state facilities and state funds by candidates who are currently holding state power. In the context of General Election of Regional Head (GERH), the problems faced by direct General Election of Regional Head (GERH), according to Sartono Sahlan, et al (2012: 74-75) are quite complex and various. The longest debate lies in the large costs required to hold a direct post-conflict local election, besides the issue of conflict and dispute being a common spectacle in several elections of regional head. This is in line with the opinion from Mahfud MD (2012: 9-12) who says that General Election of Regional Head (GERH) will immediately shift from a moment of a democratic party to a political phenomenon which is always colored by problems. According to Mahfud MD, there are at least 7 (seven) problems in the implementation of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) which are (1) post-conflict local elections become an arena for unhealthy power rivalry; (2) post-conflict local elections encourage the emergence of moral pragmatism, both candidates for regional head, post-conflict local election organizers, and the community; (3) General Election of Regional Head (GERH) perpetuates the oligarchy of power while giving birth to people who are addicted to power; (4) General Election of Regional Head (GERH) raises budget problems; (5) General Election of Regional Head (GERH) triggers bureaucratic politicization; (6) General Election of Regional Head (GERH) is prone to conflicts between political relations that involve the masses; and (7) uniformity in General Election of Regional Head (GERH) procedures as now tends to ignore the character of indigenous peoples who still exist.

### ***The implementation of sanctions regarding violations on election of regional head***

General Election of Regional Head (GERH) which is run without a free and independent supervisory mechanism will only result in meaningless democratic party because it will be filled with various frauds. In such a situation, General Election of Regional Head (GERH) gave birth to various problems which Mahfud MD (2012: 9) said would injure democracy. Therefore, General Election of Regional Head (GERH) regulations position supervisors of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) as an institution

that oversees the occurrence of fraudulent practices as well as various forms of violations that occur at every stage of the General Election of Regional Head (GERH).

In the context of the General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency, of the 39 violations that have been previously described, in general it can be qualified into 5 (five) follow-up statuses, namely: First, the report on the alleged violation that cannot be followed up by Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) because it is considered not to violate administrative provisions, code of ethics, and criminal acts. Second, reports of violations that cannot be followed up due to insufficient evidences. Third, reports of violations that cannot be followed up because the report lasts more than seven days as regulated in Article 134 paragraph (4) of Law no. 8 of 2015. Fourth, Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) recommends reports of violations that fall into the category of administrative violations, to be reported to General Election Commission (KPU) of Malang Regency for follow-up. Fifth, there are reports of violations that cannot be followed up due to non-criminal elements that are not regulated in Law Number 8 of 2015. Based on the above classification, none of the violations of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency have been resolved in the realm of post-conflict local election courts. This is not only due to the weak supervision carried out by Election Supervisory Committee (ESC), but also due to the weak evidences of fraud owned by Election Supervisory Committee (ESC). We always encounter this reality in every General Election of Regional Head (GERH) event, where a very small percentage of violations are followed up by Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) the prosecution process at the prosecutor's office until the court decides. In fact, in the case of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency, none of the violation cases were followed up in the prosecution process at the Attorney General's Office until it is decided by the court.

In this regard, Ramlan Surbakti, et al (2011: 25-26) argued that there are at least four problems with election law enforcement namely: (1) whether there is a common perception between election supervisors on the one hand and law enforcers (police-prosecutors). -judge) on the other; (2) is there any use of "discretion" in resolving election crimes; (3) how is the readiness of election supervisors and law enforcers in facing various pressures; and (4) is there consistency in the enforcement of election law. The similarity in perception between election supervisors on the one hand and law enforcers on the other hand is an important condition that determines the fate of cases that are forwarded by Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) to the criminal justice system. The assertiveness of Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) who bring findings of election criminal acts to the police will be meaningless if the police do not agree with the Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) especially regarding which actions fulfill the elements of an election criminal act. Arif Wibowo (2012: 115) considers that the problem of handling crimes in General Election of Regional Head (GERH) both from the legal substance, structure and culture of law enforcement officials, causes many post-conflict local election criminal violations which are not handled properly. The implication of not fulfilling the sense of justice in the community related to law

enforcement on criminal violations at General Election of Regional Head then forces them to lead the case to the Constitutional Court. Moreover, these violations that are categorized as structured, systematic, and massive can have implications for the cancellation of the elected candidate pair, because it seriously injures the proceeding of an honest and fair General Election of Regional Head (GERH) even though the Constitutional Court's decision is from the aspect of legal certainty and the principle of expediency that can endanger the democratic process. A similar view was also expressed by Mahfud MD (2012: 12-14) concerning the issue in assessing the legal problems of the General Election. He mentions that there are at least 4 problems regarding this issue which are: (1) the legal rules and regulations of the General Election which still have many gaps of weakness when they are derived into operational regulations made by General Election Commission (KPU); (2) the legal issues related to Administrative court decisions which are usually proposed is connected to the determination of a pair of candidates; (3) things related to the criminal act of General Election of Regional Head (GERH); and (4) it is related to high quantity of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) result disputes proposed to the Constitutional Court.

Departing from the aforementioned conditions, the application of sanctions regarding the violation of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency is certainly very ineffective because only administrative violations are followed up. However, the sanctions imposed by General Election Commission (KPU) of Malang regency are not so significant. Meanwhile, there was not any single criminal violations like: (1) promising free recreation to prospective voters; (2) damaging, obstructing and disrupting the campaigns of other pairs of candidates; (3) doing black campaign; and (4) committing money politics with its various operation modes are not proceeded to the Attorney General's Office, or even it is proceeded up to court. This condition certainly raises a big question mark regarding the quality of our local democracy, in the framework of realizing substantive justice if the election supervisory institution is unable to resolve various fraud problems that occur during the General Election, especially when money politics occurs as it may result into the cancellation of the elected regional head candidate pair. This is confirmed in the provisions of Article 73 paragraph (1) of Law no. 1 of 2015 which states: "Candidates and / or campaign teams are prohibited from promising and / or giving money or other materials to influence voters". Meanwhile, Article 73 paragraph (2) states: "Candidates who are proven to have committed violations as referred to in paragraph (1) based on a court decision that has legal force are still subject to sanctions for cancellation as candidates by the Provincial General Election Commission (KPU) and General Election Commission (KPU) and subject to criminal sanctions in accordance to laws and regulations". This formulation confirms that candidates or campaign teams who promise and / or provide money or other materials to influence voters or what we usually know as money politics, will be subject to cancellation sanctions as candidates, but of course the process is after going through a court decision that has legal force. That means these violations must go through a process at the Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) , which is then followed up in the prosecution process at the Attorney General's Office until the court decides. Therefore, in the context of

law enforcement on General Election of Regional Head (GERH), the position of Election Supervisory Committee (ESC) is strategic in an effort to maintain and guard a quality of General Election of Regional Head (GERH), without being tainted by fraud and violations that can reduce the quality of democracy.

### CONCLUSION

The General Election of Regional Head (GERH) in Malang Regency has taken place safely and peacefully and run in accordance to the stages of the General Election of Regional Head (GERH) which are regulated by existing laws and regulations. There were 39 forms of violations that occurred during the General Election of Regional Head (GERH), and most of them occurred at the campaign stage marked by various modes of money politics, campaigns outside the predetermined zoning, the act of destroying, obstructing, and disturbing campaigns of other candidate pairs, and the act of destroying campaign tools of other candidate pairs. Unfortunately most reports of violations cannot be followed up due to insufficient evidences, especially cases that qualify for the criminal election of the General Election of Regional Head (GERH). Thus, ESC (Election Supervisory Committee) cannot apply sanctions for violations committed. In this context, it can be judged that ESC (Election Supervisory Committee) is not able to play an optimal role as an election supervisory institution which is expected to be able to oversee the democratic process so that it runs well. It can be done by following up on the slightest violations committed during the implementation of General Election of Regional Head (GERH) process, especially when there are violations concerning money politics with various modes of operation. This money politics acts are carried out by the Candidate and the campaign team regardless the fact that such violation can threaten someone opportunity to be elected as regional head candidate pair.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research is supported by the Faculty of Social Science, State University of Malang, Faculty of Law, Wisnuwardhana University and Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Wisnuwardhana University Malang-Indonesia.

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