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Disbanding the Iraqi Armed Forces in 2003 and the Suppression of Former Iraq Military Officers

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Abstract : The Iraqi armed had been disintegrated during the operation of invading Iraq by the United States in 2003. The problem of this study is to discover and analyze the reasons and the objectives behind the disbanding of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the aftermath of the Iraq-War 2003. The effects of such disbanding on the security of Iraq which had been left with no professional and experienced military institution. This study finds that the Iraqi Armed Forces had been disbanded not by any order, but by the war itself and because the desertion of the soldiers and commanders from the battlefields. The lack of effective armed forces has affected the security, politics and the state building of Iraq. Several armed groups had played roles in the ethno-sectarian disputes which weakened the internal and external politics of Iraq.

Introduction

The Iraqi armed forces, which had been established in the sixth of January 1921, had been disbanded in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies, in an order issued by Paul Bremer the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003. As military forces, the Iraqi armed forces should take the responsibility in protecting the borders of Iraq, provide the peace and security, and political and societal stability. The Iraqi armed forces were actively involved in the political and security life from external wars to internal involvements. Therefore, the disbanding of the Iraqi

armed forces had created a gap in the Iraqi security as well as the social and political aspects. (Hashim, 2003 & Al-Hamdani, 2011).

1.1 The Iraqi Armed Forces and the political dominance and manipulation 1921-2003

Armed forces are the most important institution that matters to a state's survival, in other words, security within a state cannot be stabilized without the support of its armed forces. This does not mean that the armed forces' backing is sufficient for securing the state, but at least, they represent the key institution that should play its designated roles. The major roles of armed forces are to defend the state against any external attack, to contribute in building nations in peace times, and to represent the whole nation. To be prepared for this purpose, the army should be trained and equipped in peacetime to achieve the maintenance and the survival of a state (Barany 2011).

Armed forces are considered as a cornerstone of a state security and one of the most important strategic instrument. With no armed forces, there is no state, due to their extreme importance in the security of the state from any potential external threat in addition to the services provided to the society in peacetime. John Wiley defines Armed forces as part of military forces that made up of persons who are specially trained to serve their state in war and peace times (Wiley, 2010). Armed forces are the main instrument of the state in the wartime that play its role on the ground. Eventually, the stronger, bigger, and higher technologic army a state has, the more strategic choices available to that state. The armed forces are generally divided to three main kinds : land force, air force, and sea force (navy). (Kassimeris, & Buckley, 2010), (Jordan, Kiras, Lansdale, Speller, Tuck, & Walton, 2008).

The Iraqi modern Armed forces are officially rooted back to 1921, a year after the Iraqi revolution against the British occupation in 1020. The Iraqi army was established to be under the flag of the Kingdom of Iraq during the period of the British mandate (Hashim, 2003). After the independence of Iraq in 1932, the Iraqi Armed forces' nature, structure, size, and mission were determined by the United Kingdom which declared its responsibility for training the Iraqi Army (Al-Marashi, 2007). The aim of London was to establish a strong security system in Iraq to protect the new Iraqi monarchy regime as an ally to the Great Britain in the region, relying on a number of commanders called Sharifists who were very loyal to the United Kingdom (Al-Hamdani, 2011).

The Iraqi civil-military relations had been unbalanced since the establishment of the Iraqi armed forces in 6th of January 1921 until the overthrow of the Saddam Hussain's regime in 9th of April 2003. Waving from the control or the intervention of the military over the civilian governments since the establishment until 1968, to the civilian intervention over the military in the way that affected the professionalism of the armed forces through leading the armed forces by non-professional leaders just for their loyalty to Saddam Hussain. Another aspect of the unbalanced civil-military relations in Iraq was the variety of ideologies that took place in the military orientations (Hashim, 2003).

The officers of the Iraqi armed forces were generally divided to three major ideologies : the pan-Arab nationalist that sought to unify twenty one Arab countries, the Iraq-first current, and the Kurdish Minority which threatened the domination of the pan-Arab nationalists over the country. The pan-Arab nationalist officers and political rebels were inspired by the liberation of Arab

states from the Ottoman Empire, and the rise of the idea of "Arabness" which means to unify all Arab nations to be a single united nation. Such Idea had influenced the majority of the officers who belonged to the Sunni Arabs who are ethno-sectarian minority. They sought to develop the underdeveloped country with drawing the new-born Iraq closer to the Arab west ,considering the fact that Iraq is the eastern gate of the Arab states (Hashim, 2003).

The Iraq-first current was the orientation influenced a group of officers who had been Arab nationalists as well as the pan-Arab nationalists. However, unlike the pan-Arab nationalists who wanted directly to be united with the rest of the Arab nations as the main and first step of the development, the Iraq-firsters' orientation was to start with building Iraqi nation first, developing Iraq as a modern country and then Iraq can be involved in developing the other Arab states. They were led by the "Sharifian" officers who supported the monarchy. They were inspired by Turkish Kemal Ataturk, and Iranian Reza Pahlavi who moderated their nations. This difference had created other differences between the two orientations to be later a serious conflict (Hashim, 2003).

The third group of officers, who were mainly Kurdish minority, threatened the potential domination of the pan-Arab nationalists over Iraq, which was threatening the Kurdish identity of the people who live in the north of Iraq. Such orientation is existed until present days, and contributed in the Iraqi internal crises. They tended to get closer to the Iraq-first ideology, at least they have common Idea that put Iraq first before other counties, and this can protect Iraq from the Arab nationalism wave. (Hashim, 2003).

The Iraqi military officers were involved in the political movements and political changings in the Arab world. In Iraq, the Ba'athist officers with an alliance with the Nasirist officers overthrew the Iraqi president, as they declared, the dictator Abdul Karim Qasim and ended him, as they also called autocratic regime in the 8th of February 1963. At the end he was shot at the same day. Two officer groups, mainly the Ba'athist officers, and the Nasirist officers who are inspired by the Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasir, led the military coup. With this coalition, the overthrow of the president Abdul Karim Qasim had not taken long time or effort. The coalition of the Ba'athist and Nasirist military officers was effective enough to overthrow Qasim who was killed at the same day, to make the Nasirist Abdul Salam Arif as a president of Iraq (Sorby, 2013).

The last successful episode of the coup d'états' series in Iraq was the coup d'état of 1968 by the Ba'ath Party led by Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakir and Saddam Husain. The Ba'ath party's policy, after dominating the country specially when Saddam Hussain ruled the state, was to remove the potential opponents officers through a series of executions, or replacing them with unprofessional people who were just loyal to Saddam Hussain. He reorganized the Army after removing the untrusted officers from the Army (Al-Marashi, 2007).

In 1979, when Saddam overthrew Ahmed Hasan Al-Bakir and became the President of Iraq, he was not an officer in the Army. He declared himself as Mushir (Field Marshal), the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. He became an absolute ruler of Iraq including its military, with an ambition to be the leader of the Arab world. Such ambition had led him to wage an external bloody war against Iran in 1980 lasted eight years, and to invade Kuwait just two years after that in 1990. During that period, Saddam Hussain had issued

death penalties against many officers under the pretext of non-implementation of his orders (Al-Marashi, 2007).

To liberate Kuwait, the United States led collation to defeat and retreat the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Iraqi armed forces were destroyed and disintegrated. The ceasefire agreement was signed in 28ᵗʰ of February 1991. A day following the ceasefire, one of the gigantic portraits of the President Saddam in Basra was shot by a shell fired by a T-72 tank gunner, returning home after the Iraq Army was defeated in Kuwait. The revolt in Basra was led at first by Mohammed Iibrahim Wali, an army officer who gathered a force of military vehicles to attack the government buildings then he was followed by most of the civilians. (Lesch, 1996).

The Republican Guard that was established by the loyalists to Saddam Hussain started to use the helicopters as gunships to put down the uprisings. The Ba'athists did not hesitate to respond to the uprisings with crushing force, within less than three weeks, tens of thousands had been killed and more had fled the country. With no outside protection for the civilians, the Republican Guard were firing everyone opposing them whether rebels or civilians by shooting the opposing areas. Finally and shortly, Saddam Hussain announced the regaining of control over the country (Dawisha, 2009).

Saddam Hussain could live to remain in power for the longest era in Iraqi contemporary history even though he had been targeted by numerous assassination and coup attempts. During the Iraq-Iran war, Ayatollah Khomeini called the Iraqi military to "liberate Iraq" from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussain. During the Operation of Desert Storm in February 1991, the President of the United States George H.W. Bush fomented Iraqi armed forces and Iraqi people to take the power from Saddam as the only way to stop the bloodshed. Another attempt was when the opposition organization "the Iraqi National Accord" Amman-based declared that there were a large number of disgruntled officers waiting the zero moment to overthrow Saddam Hussain (Hashim, 2003).

All the attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussain had failed because of his strong control over the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi civil-military relations in Saddam Hussain's era was not well-understood by either the United States, regional countries or Iraqi opposition. Saddam Hussain's security system was considered as formidable and multi-layered. The only reason of the failure of all coup attempts was the "hawk-like vigilance" of Saddam, his family, and his party's regime and the efficiency of the security forces including the intelligence. The country was controlled by Saddam and his family who made his power the strongest and longest in the contemporary history of Iraq (Hashim, 2003).

Since he came to power in 1980, Saddam Hussain's policy was to build a strong Iraq to be regional and Arab key nation. This policy was made primarily through maximizing the Iraqi armed forces' size and power. Saddam throne used to be surrounded by his family members, his brother in law Adnan Khairallah, the minister of Defense 1977-1989, his cousin ,Ali Hassan Al-Majeed, the minister of Defense 1991-1995, Director of the Intelligence Service 1995-2003, and other security offices. Saddam's brothers Sabaawi Al-Tikriti, Head of the Directorate of General Security 1991-1996, and Director of the Intelligence

Service 1989-1995, and Watban al-Tikriti, Interior Minister 1991-1995. His son in law Hussein Kamel Minister of Military Industries 1987-1995, and Kamel's brother and Saddam Hussein's son in law as well, Saddam Kamel was the Head of Republican Guard for a time. Saddam's sons Qusay was the Director of the Iraqi Special Security Organization 1992-1997, and the Supervisor of Iraqi Republican Guard and had the authority on other Iraqi military unites, and the oldest son of Saddam, Uday was the head of "Fedayeen Saddam" Saddam's Men of Sacrifice (McMillan, 2003).

During Saddam's rule, Iraqi armed forces were not used for only external wars, Saddam's regime was associated with internal use of the Iraqi armed forces. Al-Anfal campaign led by Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan Al-Majeed in the north of Iraq against Kurdish people from 1987 to 1989, in a systematic slaughter. Over 50,000 of the civilians were killed, which was considered as an ethnic cleansing. A sectarian cleansing was done by the armed forces under the leadership of Saddam and his family members against the Shia in the south of Iraq during the 1990s caused the death or forced displacement of about 200,000 of the Arab Shia (McMillan, 2003).

1.2 Problem Statement
The Iraqi armed forces had been defeated, and the President Bush announced on May 1, 2003, that the combat operations had ended. The United States had declared occupation of Iraq. Then, the United States disbanded what was left of the Iraqi armed forces which had been established in 1921. This was one of the first actions that had been done by Civilian Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to reconstruct it from the beginning (Yoo, 2003. Jones, 2007).

The disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces was a terrible error, hundreds of thousands Iraqis including three hundred and eighty five thousands from the Iraqi army had been laid off to be suddenly unemployed and left unpaid and humiliated. This is one of the main factors of emerging the insurgency led by high trained officers of the former Iraqi armed forces whom their services had been ended in the Iraqi armed forces under the pretext of their loyalties to Saddam Hussain. They were replaced with unprofessional and unexperienced officers selected from the opposing parties that then led the country (Davis, 2005., Pfiffner, 2010).
The problem is that this study aims to address is to discover and analyze the reasons and the objectives behind the disbanding of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the aftermath of the Iraq-War 2003. The effects of such disbanding on the security of Iraq which had been left with no professional and experienced military institution.

1.3 Research Questions
This study addresses three main research questions listed below:
1. Why the United States disbanded the Iraqi Armed Forces in the post-war 2003?
2. What are the reasons behind disbanding the Iraqi armed forces?
3. What is the impact of the disbanding of the Iraqi army on the security of Iraq?

1.4 Research Objectives
Having identified the relevant research problems, the general aim of this study is to examine the reasons behind the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and its impacts on the security, politics, and the society of Iraq.
The specific objectives of this study are as follow:
1. To identify the reasons behind the disbanding of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the post-Iraq war in 2003.
2. To analyze the impacts of the disbanding of the Iraqi Army on the security of Iraq.

1.5 Significance of the Study
This study bridges the existing gap in the literature with regards the reasons led the United States to disband the Iraqi armed forces, and the impacts of such disbanding on the security and the whole political life in Iraq, and the challenges that face the process of the rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces.

1.6 Scope of the Study
This study focuses mainly on discovering and analyzing the reasons of disbanding the Iraqi armed forces in 2003 and its impacts on the Iraq security.

1.7 The Iraqi Armed Forces and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003
Although Iraqi Armed forces had been degraded by the sanctions imposed by U.N and the United States, it was still a significant figure of size. With over 650,000 full-time active duty personnel, with extra 100,000 were reservists who had been called up, equipped by 2,600 main battle tanks, 3,700 armoured vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery. Although Iraqi air force had 300 combat aircraft, it was no chance to have any successful combat against modern aircrafts such as U.S air force. It had a ground based air defense system, with about 900 missile launchers, and over 3000 anti-aircraft gun system with small navy (Garden, 2003).

About thirteen years after sanctions were imposed on Iraq, the United States had controlled Iraq on April 9, 2003. Claiming that Iraq possessed WMDs, and that Saddam Hussain supported global terrorist groups mainly Al-Qaeda. The first immediate objective, as the White House stated, was to remove Saddam Hussain and his Ba'ath Party from power, then to rebuild Iraq's economy and develop democracy. Saddam Hussain was easily toppled in only three weeks of fighting, the United States announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom in May 2003 (Dale, 2008).

2.1 The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Overthrowing Saddam Hussein's Regime
The invasion of Iraq , by the United States and its allies, which took place in the 19th of March 2003, was called by the invaders "Iraqi Freedom Operation". Although Saddam Hussein was accused of possessing Weapons of Massive Destruction, any step against him and his regime was unthinkable until the 11th of September 2001 attacks. Saddam Hussein was strongly accused of funding and supporting terrorism groups, especially al-Qaeda that claimed its responsibility for the 11th September attacks in 2001. After years of sanctioning Iraq and limiting and containing its power since 1991, the United States decided

to invade Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his dictator regime, and replace it with democracy .

The coalition led by the United States achieved a decisive victory in no more than three weeks to invade the center of Baghdad in the 9th of April 2003. The United States had created a strong coalition, with a sufficient infrastructure in the region of Persian Gulf following the Gulf War in 1991. Such buildup, in additional to the Iraqi armed forces situation since after the defeat in 1991, left Saddam Hussein with no way to contemplate any military action outside Iraq, or even defend his own regime. The war of 2003 on Iraq has been a turning point in the strategic studies field. It was, after the Gulf War of 1991, the case study of decisive wars. The Iraqi armed forces had lost most of its military equipment, and the military officers had escaped from their positions. The Iraqi armed forces had completely defeated and disbanded (Perry, Darilek, Rohn, & Sollinger, 2015).

2.2 Disbanding the Iraqi Armed Forces

In the name of the United States administration in Iraq, Paul Bremer, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, had decided, (within order two- Dissolution of Entities) to disband the Iraqi armed forces in May 2003. Such decision came simultaneously with the decision of laying off the military officers. Moreover, Bremer issued a resolution of De-Ba'athification which was disbanding of Ba'ath Party, which affected the military officers who were accused of being members of Ba'ath Party. Such decisions had left the officers of Iraqi armed forces with no financial support, as well as scared of the new regime of the Coalition provisional Authority led by the United States and the new Iraqi government (Sharp, 2005).

Most experts, journalist, political analysts, political officers, and military officers as well as civilians strongly believe that disbanding the Iraqi armed forces in the 2003 war and the aftermath had been the biggest mistake ever. Such disbanding had played a significant role in the process of building the new Iraq. After it had been realized as one of the biggest mistakes in the contemporary history of Iraq, all the participants in the new political life of Iraq after 2003 weather the United States administration, or the new Iraqi rulers who had been opponents of Saddam regime, had claimed that it had not been their mistake. According to the interviews with Iraqi former military officers, this study discovers the real factor that disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, as an introduction to discover the main reasons behind disbanding the Iraqi armed forces.

The estimated number of armed forces personnel that laid off by the Coalition Provisional Authority was about 500,000 officers and soldiers. As officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority claimed, the number of armed forces officers which was affected by the layoffs is believed to be over 400,000. Others announced that may be as high as 680,000. Only 100,000 soldiers were planned to be absorbed into the new military. The rest of the layoffs, as U.S. officials said have to be left to fend for themselves, some other officials suggested recruiting them in the other civil ministries (Vieth, 2003).

The hundreds of thousands of officers and soldiers who mostly were from the west of Iraq, and used to be sponsored by government paycheck before the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, were very angry for being left with no

jobs after the invasion. Few months after the invasion, insurgency movements started in Iraq against the United States and its allies in Iraq, with a rapid external support mainly by Al-Qaeda. They started in some areas around Baghdad such as Al- Latifiya and Abu Ghraib, and other cities mainly Fallujah, Ramadi, and Diyala Governorate. The emergence of the insurgency in Iraq had been the main reason for the United States to rapidly rebuild the Iraqi armed forces (Gaub, 2013).

In the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq by the foreign forces led by the United States, several armed groups had been activated in Iraq. They were involved in a mixture conflict, some insurgents were fighting as a reflection of the political situation, and the rejection of the United States' presence in Iraq, or fighting for political power in post-Saddam era. Other armed groups were motivated and affected by sectarian agendas, specifically Sunni against Shia, mainly al-Qaeda. Some other groups adopted Jihad as a large global straggle, against, what they believe as, the enemies of Islam, represented by the West and Israel. The last type of violent groups were the criminals, and the opportunists, such groups were largely active because of the war and the security circumstances (Pirnie, & Connell, 2008). There are sever hypothesis about the real party behind the disbanding of the Iraqi army.

One of the Ba'ath party leaders said to al-Sharq al-Awsat (Middle East), the Saudi newspaper, published from London, that Saddam Hussein had met the leaders of Ba'ath party and the trusted military officers and ordered them to disappear, disband the Iraqi armed forces, and seize as much as they can of the weapons, and hide them in secret places. It goes to his awareness of his disability to face the United States and coalition forces in a regular war, therefore, the plan was to face the invaders in an irregular warfare after they take control over Iraq, and this is what happened later. The order was that the officers take money and weapons and just go home. Leaving the United States and its allies confused, know nothing about their enemy (Hussein, 2011).
The evidence of this order was what really happened in the beginning of the war. The United States' troops entered Iraq very easily with no real confrontation, except some battles in Um Qasr in Basra and Baghdad International Airport between the US troops and Fedayeen Saddam "Saddam's Men of Sacrifice". All the Television Channels showed many Iraqi military young officers and soldiers escaping wearing only underwear, after they took of their military uniforms in order to avoid being targeted by the Americans, and because they lost their connections and orders from their leaders. For the north western provinces, the home of Ba'th and military leaders, had not fought the invaders. They (the leaders of Ba'th party and Iraqi military) gave their provinces as well as Baghdad to the coalition troops without even shooting one bullet (Hussein, 2011).

"There wasn't any army to disband, the Pentagon's own term was the Iraqi army had 'self-demobilized'." This was what Paul Bremer said in an interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy in the beginning of 2008. In order of this claim, the Bremer's decision of disbanding the Iraqi armed forces was just a procedural decision, as an introduction to the decision of recalling for the new army (Coolben, 2008).

In war, it is normal that any army seeks to destroy the enemy's power, and disband its armed forces. That what happened in the WW1 with Japanese and German armies. However, unlike the Japanese and German militaries, the case of Iraqi army was different, because the Iraqi army had not confront the Coalition troops. Although the Iraqi armed forces had not really fought against the Coalition power, the United States with support of the Iraqi opponents officially disbanded the Iraqi armed forces and ordered to establish a new one. In May 2003, the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and the top Civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had ordered respectively: CPA Order Number 1, which banned the Ba'ath Party in all forms, and CPA Order Number 2, that disbanded the Iraqi armed forces. (Hussein, 2011).

2.3 The Suppression of Former Iraq military officers

The United States had targeted many senior officers of the Iraqi armed forces because, as they claimed, they still have connections with the leadership of the overthrown regime. The United States' Authority had believed that the high-ranking officers of the former Iraqi armed forces still took orders from Saddam Hussein who had still been hiding. Many officers of the Iraqi armed forces had been arrested in the early months of the invasion in order to be under investigation to get information about the place of Saddam Hussein and his close team, and for being accused for leading and training new insurgent armed groups.

Abu Ghraib Prison had become the United States' military prison in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many former officers had been arrested and had been taken as prisoners. In Abu Ghraib Prison in the west of Baghdad. In additional to the criminals, the suspected of security detainees of actions against the coalition forces. They arrested number of suspected former high-ranking officers who had been leaders of the resistance as well as the leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces (Hersh, 2004).

Over 200 Iraqi officers of the former Iraqi armed forces had been arrested by the United States' forces in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and 2004, and put in prisons in the center and south of Iraq. Some of them had been captured or arrested during the battles between the United States forces and the former Iraqi armed forces in late March and early April 2003. They had been kept in prisons until the United States had withdrawn at the end of 2010, to deliver them to the Iraqi government before leaving Iraq. The Iraqi government had subjected the former officers to show trials that ended with sentences ranging from life imprisonment to execution (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

Most of the officers in the detainees or prisons had been high-ranking officers of brigadier generals onwards, Iraqi military pilots and officers of the Iraqi Special Forces, the Republican Guard officers, the Iraqi Navy officers, and infantry and the Iraqi Missile Forces officers, as well as experts and scientists at the Military Industrialization Commission. Most of them have been kept in al-Hout prison in the south of Iraq, al-Kadhimiya prison in Baghdad, prison in Babylon, and other in Basra (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

The former leaders of the Iraqi armed forces had seen what the United States' forces had done with their fellows. They had not felt safe in Iraq, and they suddenly had become unemployed and threatened. Therefore, they had no choice but leaving Iraq for their lives to other countries, or leading insurgency in order to return the former regime, or to regain their rights again.

Most of the opponents of Saddam Hussein had entered Iraqi as soon as the United States and the Coalition forces had entered Iraq, even before the United States had occupied Baghdad, the Capital City of Iraq. The opponents of Saddam Hussein had been political parties and some of them had militias such as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which had been leading the Badr Brigade, which has been named later as Badr Organization. Badr Brigade and Jaish al-Mahdi, the militia that had been established inside Iraq by Muqtada al-Sadr. The two militias started immediately to be organized separately. And the first tasks they had done had been to target the former officers of the armed forces as well as other security forces.

In the early days of the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, the Badr Brigade had entered Iraq. In order to not to be disbanded by the United States, Badr Brigade had changed its name to Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development to appear as a civilian group. Badr Organization had started to be engaged in violence fighting against Sunni Arabs. The organization had been accused of murdering, kidnapping, and torturing Sunni officers of the former Iraqi armed forces as well as Sunni clerics (CISC, March, 2019).

Badr Organization's actions against the officers of the Iraqi armed forces as well as the Iraqi former leaders came from their history of dispute between them and the Iraqi forces during the 1980s and 1990s. Since the Iraqi oppositions declared the establishment of the Badr Brigade in late 1982 in Iran. It had been involved in the Iraq-Iran War, fighting beside the Iranian army against the Iraqi army. After being trained by the Iranian army, Badr Brigade took responsibility for several military operations against the Iraqi forces. It had become the second Iranian most effective and successful foreign policy intervention after Hezbollah in Lebanon (Daragahi, August 16, 2018).

Therefore, as soon as the Badr Brigade had returned to Iraqi, they looked for the leaders they fought for about 20 years. They believed they cannot share power with them. And believed the former officers had been responsible for all the disasters Iraq and its people had suffered from. According to Badr Brigade and generally to the Saddam Hussein's opponents, they all had to be punished and not being allowed to be part of the new regime.

As the head of the Arabic Center for Justice in the United Kingdom, Dr. Mohammed al-Shaykhli had announced in Elaph newspaper, in the early months of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the former officers of the Iraqi armed forces had been suffering from the militias that had been activated in Iraq. Over two hundred former officers had been assassinated by the militias of Badr and Jaish al-Mahdi. In the early months of the invasion of Iraq. And other hundreds had escaped from their cities, or from Iraq to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Jordan, and from there to Europe, other western countries or Malaysia (Mahdi, May 27, 2018).

Badr Brigade's campaign of targeting and assassinating the former officers of the Iraqi armed forces had been highly organized. They had lists of former officers of Security forces, armed forces, and they mainly targeted the Air Forces. Some claimed that Badr Brigade had led that campaign in order to get revenge on the armed forces for the Iraq-Iran War during the 1980s, as the Badr Brigade had been part of this war supporting the Iranian army, and suffered from the Iraqi Armed forces and had history of armed conflict with the Iraqi military officers as well as the leadership of the Iraqi armed forces.

The Badr Brigade had been the first organized opponent's militia that had been activated in Iraq in the aftermath of the war in 2003. Because it had been already organized in Iran since 1982 as it had been established by Iran in order to be part of the Iranian forces. Therefore, when the Saddam Hussein's regime had fallen in the 2003, the Iraqi opponents entered Iraq, Badr Brigade had been the most activated in Baghdad and many other cities. The welcoming and the help they got from the Iraqi people who hated Saddam Hussein and considered the opponents, who became the new leaders of Iraq, as their saviors and their bright future. Therefore it had been easy to get help from the civilians to fill the list of the former officers of the Iraqi armed forces, with their locations.

Several human right organizations had accused Badr Brigade, which had changed its name in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein to Badr Organization, for human rights violations. That accusation had come from their campaign against the former officers of the armed forces' lives. Which resulted the displacement of many military officers as well as Ba'ath party members and security officers.
Then, when the Federal Police and the National Guard had been established, the members of the Badr organization and other Shiite militias had joined the service, they continued their policy of persuading the former officers of the armed forces, security forces, and the Ba'ath Party leaders. As a result of establishment of the Federal Police and the National Guard the militias continued seeking power by weakening their potential enemies by targeting the military and security officers, but it had become official because they had become officially parts of the new government.

As it had been very well known that the majority of the former military and security officers as well as the leaders of Ba'ath Party had been Arab Sunnis. Therefore, the policy of the Federal Police and the National Guard against those officers and leaders had been understood as a suppression against the Arab Sunnis. On the other side, the new security forces with the majority of Arab Shia had not trusted the Arab Sunnis, as they claimed that they hid or cooperated with the criminals of the former regime of Saddam Hussein.

In return of those changes and policy led by the new security forces, the former military officers had not trusted the new government of Iraq, therefore, they had not responded to the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer's recall to rebuild the Iraqi armed forces, and they had chosen the other side. Leaving the country or building and training the new insurgency groups.

Before the United States had left Iraq in late 2010, they, as previously mentioned, delivered the prisoners to the Iraqi government. High ranking officers of the former Iraqi armed forces had been among the prisoners. The Iraqi government had subjected the former officers to show trials that ended with sentences ranging from life imprisonment to execution. Many of them remained in prisons, and some had died inside them (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

Among the officers of the former Iraqi armed forces who died in prisons had been Ayad Khalifa al-Rawi, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, and the Commander of the Republican Guard. He died in May 2018 in the age of 76 years old, after he had suffered from stroke in the prison's hospital (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

Al-Nasiriya Hospital announced that General Hussein Rashid, 75 years old, a former commander of the Iraqi armed forces had been brought from the prison and died shortly after arriving the hospital (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

Some Iraqi media and television channels announced on 27th of May in 2018, that the former Minister of Defense Sultan Hashim had been taken to Baghdad from the prison to the hospital after he had become sick (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

There have been announcements that some commanders of the former Iraqi armed forces had been dead in prisons. Such as, major general Ahmed Abdul Majeed, commander in the Iraqi Air forces, aged 71, Major general Hussein Mohammed al-Hamdani a commander in the Iraqi army, aged 69, Muaed Yassin, commander in the Iraqi army, aged 73, and brigadier-general pilot Khalid al-Jboory a commander in the Iraqi Air Forces, and many other officers of the former Iraqi armed forces (al-Jaff, May 28, 2018).

Conclusions
The present study has concluded the following :
1. The main factor that led to the disbanding the former Iraqi armed forces in the Iraq war and its invasion by the United States and its Coalition in April, 2003 is that the Iraqi forces had been disbanded only.
2. According to interviews with former officers of the Iraqi armed forces, the Iraqi armed forces had been very weak to defend Iraq against the greatest power in the world, the United States and its allies, the Coalition forces which had been the most powerful and the largest forces deployed since the end of the Second World War. The invaded country that had been under sanctions for about 13 years. Iraq had been isolated since 1991 with destroyed armed forces, and weak communication between the leadership and the bases. Therefore, the Iraqi armed forces had been disintegrated before the United States' army arrived Baghdad. That is why the United States had entered Baghdad and many other cities without any resistance.

3. The disintegration of the Iraqi armed forces had not come from the disbanding order "number two" by Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq in May 2003. The Iraqi armed forces was destroyed in April 2003 by the war itself, not because of Bremer's order itself. The United States administration had admitted that it was a mistake using the term "disbanding"

while there had been no army to disband, Bremer says. The Iraqi soldiers and officers had dropped their military uniform on the roads and just escaped leaving the fields.

4. The disintegration of the Iraqi armed forces had been a logical consequence of the technological factor. As it is very well known, the United States' most modern military abilities, weapons, faced the Iraqi traditional weapons that was rehabilitated the Iraqi-Iranian war 1980-88, and the Gulf War 1991, and being almost completely destroyed.

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