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THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN NASSEERIAN IRAN

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the power structure in the Nasserian era in Iran and the structure of power in two categories like one framework of power structure and the nature of domination and authority. Characteristic of the structure of power in Iran during the Nasserian era was dictatorship. The king was the center of gravity and the distribution of power. In this structure, the government, the court, and the king were indivisible consequently, they constituted obstacles to the formation of legitimate institutions and the emergence of a bureaucratic and political structure outside the purview of the autocratic system Existing was not possible. In such a structure, develop social classes outside government was not possible. Introduction of new ideas and first attempts to reform Iran the first challenges with the power structure in Iran were in the Qajar era. On the other hand, with the rapid growth of foreign trade and the increasing collision of Iranian businessmen with the west and foreign trips and acquaintance with the achievements of western civilization They became aware of their class status and their class interests against the Qajar government.

Introduction

In Explaining the Political Structure of Iran, Theories in historical and political sociology of feudalism, oriental despotism, alienation and patrimony historical accounts about Iran are cited *

Patrimonialism is one of the dominant discourses in Iran before the constitutional revolution. Patrimonialism in Max Weber's political sociology, evolutionary form of gerontocracy" process or patriarchalism or traditional folk favorite, with inherited succession rules. (Weber,1995:p328,340) Unlike the first two forms of royal domination, patrimonialism is a form of traditional political rule in which a royal family seizes compulsory power through the court apparatus. Patrimonial ruler selects the executive apparatus From among 1. Relative relatives 2. Trusted incarcerationand puppet 3. Choose from among the freelance employees who respect the ruler and they ruled first from the personal table and then from the articles and the right to assemble. Taxes and taxes given by the ruler live on. In such a system of inheritance, the administration of affairs and political power is in the direct personal control of the ruler contract. In this traditional structure, the king is at the forefront of power and forms bureaucratic relations and the hierarchy of power. The staff of this system are the king's servants, The leader has unlimited power. (Haman:page 324,327). Traditional patrimonialism was the discourse of a particular kingdom under certain circumstances which was shaped by the Safavi and Qajar periods. Traditional Iranian patrimonialism in general emphasized on absolute authority and obedience to the king, vertical and unilateral power structure, etc. Traditional patrimonialism was a barrier to formation individualism and political practices and freedom of thought and action. Instead, it made pressures for the king's obedience, opportunism, authoritarianism, passivity political inactivity, silent protest, widespread fear, cynicism, and political mistrust. In the cosmos of patrimonialism, on the one hand, a space of skepticism and mistrust was made between the people, and on the other hand, between the people and the rulers. Such a culture, It reduced the ability of citizens to live in civic and civic life. Main features of this culture were the mistrust of people, the aptitude and suspicion of government, the overwhelming fear, the feeling of inadequacy and like this. (Haman:p381,359,351)

In the political structure of Iran, the basis for the combination of political power namely, the heads of the Qajar tribe, the princes, the courtiers, the high bureaucratic elements, the great aristocrats, the governors of the provinces and provinces, and the chiefs of the tribes and the readers was the Shah and the key elements. In this structure of power, loyalty to the royal family, court office and ownership the land was one of the three major elements of the power structure. Qajar King was at the top of the power pyramid. He played a central role in the hierarchy of authority and authority as the principal actor of power in the distribution of political power. Its important cultural and social consequences, the disappearance of individuality and human differences, expanding the culture of flattery, closure of thought and criticism, loyalty to the king, and pure obedience His demands were a lack of interest in the country. In the structure of power in The Nasserian era king was centered and the Qiblah of the universe, and all the rest were slaves even courtiers. The ruling ideology was also trying to show that oppose such a power structure with king at the top was to be considered an enemy of God. The present text is based on the question: What factor challenged the structure of power in the Nazareth age? This research claims: reformed intellectuals, businessmen, and clergymen influenced by modernity, power structure in they challenged the Nasserian era.

The nature of domination and authority in the Nasserian era

Studying Iranian political history without researching the history of tribal ups and downs and the nomads will not be possible actually. The main basis of the political power of the Qajar government like any other The period of Iranian history was based on tribal structure and tribes had real power of the country. At the end of the eighteenth century with death Karim Khan Zand and the decline of the political power of this family, the Qajar tribe was able to influence and expand his authority. Qajar's coming to power is actually a kind of shift power in Iran's provincial structure. Like the Qajar kings, Nasser al-Din Shah was more influenced by the tribal and provincial glory in his structure. The tribal culture in the construction of power leads to patriarchy or monarchy (patrimonialism). According to this model of power, people are ruled by respect and have no right to compete. In this The political system is always regarded as the enemy of the political opposition, and therefore, politics is more about the elimination of competitors, and the success of the system politics depends entirely on the repudiation of popular participation, and indeed on this power structure It faces a culture of citizenship rather than a culture of participation. According to the tribal culture, the king Qajar ,as the main actor of power, was the protector of the political and economic power of the Qajar tribe and the epitome of stability and system in society. According to the structure of power in Nasserian age , formal political culture (1) had elements such as: absolute obedience to government, the sanctity of government and the ruler, the inheritance of power, the king as shadow of god. Government, sanctity of government and ruler, inheritance of power, king as shadow of god. The Shah, since he had the status of shadow of god, made decisions and commands without question and people must obey him. Therefore, in the Qajar political system, as in the previous dynasties in Iran, the Shah was the center of gravity of power, and all powers and responsibilities were given to him, and the people were all slaves of the Shah, and he was the benefactor of them all. The Shah had vast and absolute power. Tasks such as declaring war, concluding peace, tax determination , assigning fief, and so on. He was the highest judicial authority in the country, (Etemad Al-saltane, 1995 : 174-1/175) Al-Saltaneh, in his work "The Trance", also refers to the personality of the saintly Qajar king, and he declares his authority free from any questions. (Hemo,1978:42) The dominant ideology sought to introduce the Qajar king from the human race to be considered a royal authority among the people and fight against him as a fight against God(Hemo,1970:141-142) The cruelty of the Qajar kings was also in the hands of the Western people as when Nassereddin Shah visits Farang, the german emperor says in a farewell manner to the Iranian king: "It is as if justice cannot be done without a neck" (Hedayat,131:1996) In a report by Mirzayahya Dolatabadi on the condition in Iran in 1921 AH, he points out that the power of Nasser al-Din Shah's personal power was expanded because of the death of the great men and the great princes, and the taking of the affairs of the country into the hands of those trained under the king.(Dolatabadi,1957:1/100) He believed that the situation in the country was such that it had to getting involved with the transgressors or accept miseries .(Haman:120)

This tyranny was reinforced by flattery, hypocrisy, and lies by the Shah's entourage, so that every nonsense he considered to be heavenly, regarded every act as justification, blasphemy and righteousness and deprived him of all imperfections and errors. (Sayyah, 1980:75) Nasser al-Din Shah had become so overwhelmed in the orphanage that he had no opportunity to handle the affairs of the country. (Majdolmalek, 1942:2-3; Dolatabadi, 1957:1/46) and he prevented new thoughts that made them disrupt their livelihoods as far as it could and bring more traditional thinkers to work, while person such as Mirzaalikhan Amin al-Dawlah, who was reformist and familiar with new ideas gives assigned to the heading the council of the court and the post ministry. While he had authority and dignity in and out of Iran. (Dolatabadi, 1957:1/46).

The hierarchy of power and authority in the structure of power

Seeking to elucidate the structure of political power in the Nasserian era, this paper seeks to address the hierarchy of authority and the major actors of power and the distribution of political power in the Nasserian era. In the political structure of Iran, the basis of the combination of political power is the "Shah" and the "principal elements" namely the heads of the Qajar tribe(2), the princes, the courtiers, the supreme elements of the divine court, the great aristocracy (Al-saltanehs, Al-Dolehs, Al-Maleks, Al-Mamaleks) the monarchs, the rulers and the chiefs of the tribes and khans, who held government offices and monopolies in their own regions. Since the king was the distributor of next up power, the removal and installation of government agents was carried out at his command, with all the details of the government income and expenses to his signature, and Provincial instructions and customs clearance orders and rentals were approved by him. (Mostofi, 1958:1/394; sheikholeslami, 1971:vol.IV/105) The Shah, by his own will, ordered the seizure and confiscation of the property of others, as far as Ehtesham al-Saltanah declares: Their uncles, brothers, nephews, sons, and the people of the country, and the elders were not immune from such attacks by the Shah. (Ehtesham al-Saltanah: 124)

One of the special problems of the Qajar system was the existence of numerous princes during the reign of Fathalishah who existed until the end of the Qajar dynasty. (hedayat, 1984:53-56) The designated successor to the king at the head of the princes was the crown prince who was chosen as a child according to the Qajar custom. He was appointed to the government of Azerbaijan and resided in Tabriz. With the rise of a number of princes, at the beginning of the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, a considerable number of cattlemen received their attention. There was a certain division in this class. The issue of blood and race was the basis of this divide that had a class and political identity. Accordingly, during Fathali's reign, the princes were divided into two groups: one who was the son of the king or his eldest son, Abbasmirza Baqi. And others who were other children of the king and were not attributable to the Qajars through their mother.

Provincial government, which in itself led to the seizure of landowners, was often at the disposal of first-rate princes who were the most senior government officials. For

example, we can mention Abdolhossein Mirza Farmanfarma (Mirza Farmanfarma, 12-24/1) and Abrahimkhan Zahir al-Dawlah (Bastani parizi, 1979: 14-10). The second group of princes relied heavily on bureaucratic pensions, and they had little role in governing the country and in the structure of power. The Qajar kings gave them government-owned real estate and farms to cover the expense of the princes and princesses, and thus, in addition to having the title of princess and governing the provinces and states, they were great landowner. Other key elements in the structure of power were the courtiers and the supreme elements of courtship, which were considered to be the most important elements of the Qajar government, consisting of three groups:

The royal family(3), the grand chancellor and the high court officers, the large group of bureaucrats, means the grand chancellor and all the court clerks, together with the high court officials, also administered the affairs of the State.

and they did the most influence on the government. (Pollock, 1989: 37)

The largest bureaucratic authority was the Supreme Chancellor, who was called by various nicknames such as Etemad al-Dawlah, Amir, Amir al-Dawlah, vice-chancellor and the supreme chancellor. The chancellor was the true representative of the government. He used the elements of justice, the political, social and economic affairs to govern the country. The chancellor and the ministers were the main bureaucrats of power at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid. In the bureaucracy of the Nasserian era, the chancellor was always regarded as a servant of the king, favored by the king for managing all affairs, Meredith ,1971:IV, Bakhsh,1971:vol7 and Often there was a disagreement between him and the Shah, sometimes at the expense of the chancellor, indicating the lack of independence of the supreme court. The Shah's decision-making was always decisive in all matters of staff recruitment, promotion and dismissal. The Shah was the source of all authority. He knew all government positions were his own and was free to delegate them. All the revenues of the government were also in the possession of the Shah. The right to exploit all the resources of the country and the public facilities such as the drag telegraph lines, road construction, the construction of railways and the mining belonged to him.

The growth of the bureaucratic system during this period was confined only to the organization of the public administration, and other political, economic, and partly educational activities were still traditionally administered.

The official system and bureaucracy of the Nasserian era was not based on the division of professionalism, rationality, and meritocracy to help the functioning of the political system, but was on the vesting of officials and offices in the context of kinship and tribal bonds and even selling Jobs(4)(Sayyah, 1980: 78; Etemad al-Saltanah, 1971: 804; Karzen, 1983: 1,438; Kermani, 1967: Introduction / 126) that caused to weakness and inefficiency of government.

In the structure of power, the bureaucracy was in fact expanding the influence and sources of income of the Shah's family so that government offices were transferred to others as income, and government officials regarded it as their ancestral property.

The administrative jurisdiction was also defined by the extent to which the Shah was designated as long as the ministries as the highest institutions of the country were nothing but the Shah's monopolies. (Sheikholeslami, 1997: 139-171) Thus, wealth and power in Iran in the Qajar era coexisted perfectly, so that wealth was often necessary and sufficient to achieve political and administrative office.

power, on the other hand, created sufficient conditions to earn money, which in turn led to a higher political office, which in turn led to greater political power. (Zounis, 2008: 223)

One of the peculiarities of power structure in Nazarene Iran was that it was only possible to gain and maintain political power, to enter the class of landowners, and to rely on landlordism. (Lambton, 1984: 286) So far in the structure of power, the royal family, high-ranking administrative and military officials, as well as the heads of tribes, as the largest landowners in the country they were considered. A report on the situation in the country shows that the landholders and fief holders means princes and the nobles and chiefs of the tribes and army commanders forced the Russians to pay heavy taxes. At the end of the 19th century, Massoud Mirzazil al-Sultan occupied two-fifths of the country's territory and officially owned it. (Karzan, 1983: 1/ 546)

For 22 years, the Natanz area was held by Hesam al-Saltanah. (Amin al-Dawlah, 1971: 30-31) The "Nye" area was held 100-year-old house of the mausoleum (Masoutofi, 2009: 1/ 476) The "Ravand" and "Nooshabad" districts of Kashan were the Permanent property of Isa Biglerbigi's family. (Trustees, 1971: 32). The above examples illustrate the profound link between the economic structure and its major part means landholding with the power structure in Iran in the Qajar era. (Keddie, 2008: 7/176) Thus, in the power structure in the Nasserian era, dependence on the royal family, the Obtain of courtpost and land ownership were among the three essential elements of the power structure. One of the notable points in the structure of power in the Nasserian era was overlapping structure. That is to say, in this political system, in addition to the existence of the head of the power pyramid, the king, the subnational networks also played a role in determining the fate of the country. And by conspiracy, deceit, enslavement, and mercy, they changed the orientation and early access to the top of the pyramid of power for the benefit of the king. This overlapping power has been well studied by Mirzamohammadkhan Majdolmalek. He attempts to expose the influence of these power networks on Nasser al-Din Shah.

Failure of reforms to challenge the power structure

The power structure in the Qajar era of Iran has treated any change as deviation and breakthrough. The influence of tribal culture on power structure, sugarcane culture, pure adherence followed and hampered the flourishing of the culture of reasoning, comment and criticism, and the principle of accountability in the political and social system. And people instead the right to protest was merely an obligation rather than a social right.

Contemporary thoughts and first attempts to reform Iran by state bureaucrats and practitioners and the delegates sent by the Qajar court to the Western, Russian and Ottoman countries, observing the institutions and manifestations of modern civilization in those countries and comparing the situation of Iran with a new world, with the wish of a developed country, they thought of adopting new systems and new ways of living by Europeans. The Qajar kings opposed the formation of new political and social institutions and saw it as a threat to their political power. . Nasseral-Din Shah did not hesitate to suppress elites and statesmen such as Amirkabir. . The reforms were approved by the Qajar king until they challenged their tyrannical rule, and their view of the reforms was in fact nothing to reinforce their tyrannical system. Therefore, reforms in the era of Amirkabir and Sepahsalar, which sought to establish the authority of the central Iranian government, led to an increase in the efficiency and power of the tyrannical Qajar government, leading to political participation and development.

The reformist ideals of the Nasserian era failed to realize in the 19th century Iran's transition to a modern state through "reforms from above". In the first place, the Qajar government's reforms were not the result of the functioning of the independent social classes and the modern bureaucratic system, but rather as a result of Western influence and influence incompletely on Iran's political structure. One of the major obstacles to the Qajar government's reforms was the influence of the tribesmen on the power structure, with the royal family and their rulers at the forefront.

They had a privileged socio-economic status, supported by a patriarchal bureaucratic bureaucracy that was responsible for provincial government and through the acquisition of large tracts of land and villages, and the taxation of the wealthiest Iranians. Reforms aimed at strengthening the authority of the state in the first place necessitated the change of the patriarchal system of appointment of provincial governors, the imposition of strict and stringent regulations on the treasury, and the reduction of court costs, in opposition to provincial and provincial governors and clergy. In the face of these opposition, Nasser al-Din Shah sacrificed two of his reformist chancellors, Amirkabir, and ousted him. On the other hand, Amirkabir's reforms were a serious obstacle to the resources of Russia and Britain. Eventually the wave of opposition to Amirkabir intensified and led to the assassination of Amir.

Nazimoleslam Kermani believed that in the fifty years of Nasseral-Din Shah's reign, Iran did not take a step towards reform and lost 50 of the best moments of the Iranian society free of charge. And anyone who sought to promote Iran's progress was assassinated and, as he put it, "as if he were not in Iran a nobleman who did not tear down his tyranny," and any minister who gained little power and power immediately. It weakened him. (Kermani, 1967: introduction/127)

Reforming Iran's affairs on the basis of new world interests was in conflict with the Qajar kings. When the power structure evaluates reform as opposed to maintaining a framework of its interests, it will clearly resist it. Reforms were needed because the scope of authority and social control of the Qajar kings was restricted or completely lost. Nasser al-Din Shah's attention was to those parts of the reform that would

enhance his personal financial and political interests, and you would never find sections such as law-making. He was worried that he would not be able to restrain the speed and speed of the reforms and feared losing his monarchy and government.(5)Nasseral-Din Shah was an enemy of education that led to the freedom of pen and thought.(Kermani,1967:introduction/127). According to Ehteshamal-Saltanah, Nasser al-Din Shah was unwilling to promote European-style education in Iran,because he believed his kingdom rested on the shoulders of the illiterate masses.(Ehtesham Al-Santaneh,1988:315-316) In a report that Nazim al-Islam Karamani gives to Naser al-Din Shah's view of reform, Nasser al-Din considers the king so tyrannical that if his most beloved son would speak of reform, they would lose sight of him. And drives them to the black soil, stating that anyone who favors reform will be the same as Nasser al-Din Shah.(6)

Mirza Yahya of the Abadi government believed that if internal and external considerations did not stop, Nasser al-Din Shah would shut down Dar al-Fonoon and leave no trace. (Dolatabadi,1957: 1/47) to the extent that Nasser al-Din Shah, even with the teaching of a french teacher outside of Dar al-Fonun, is heavily in charge of Dar al-Fonun Jafarqul Khan. And she asks him to go to the French Embassy and tell the french minister that we have Dar al-Fenoun If this french teacher wants to teach, he should teach at Dar al-Fonun and the french teacher's class will eventually close. According to Mirzayahya Dolatabadi's analysis, Nasser al-Din Shah's insistence on restricting education and overseeing Dar al-Fonun and preventing him from obtaining education outside his jurisdiction was due to the fact that he taught french to the french among the Iranians while teaching french. (Haman:48)

The struggle of intellectuals with the power structure

Iranian intellectuals were a new social group who, in the Nasserian era, were more concerned with the rule of law and with the constitution and the establishment of a constitutional government, in the face of the power structure, the main characteristic of which was authoritarianism.They did not believe in the divine right of the Qajar kings. Iranian intellectuals have identified structure of power as one of the major obstacles to making fundamental changes in the economic, social, political, and religious structures of Iranian society.

In the time of Nasser al-Din Shah, tribal authority was decreased in the face of the new world, and with the introduction of concepts such as law, citizenship, liberty ,... and concepts of traditional Iranian political culture such as respect and respect, dignity and dignity . It was challenged by Iranian intellectuals and Shah Qajar, who had the highest office of political power in Iranian political culture, was subjected to rapid and endless criticism by intellectuals.Businessmen and intellectuals came closer to each other because of their intellectual convergence in making reforms and understanding the important relationship of economic and political development.The intellectuals recognized the necessity of political transformation for cultural and economic change and came to the realm of enlightenment and political reform.By comparing Iranian society with western societies, they turned to studying the causes of backwardness in Iranian society.. These enlightenments brought the intellectuals

closer to the big businessmen, in view of the economic developments in Iran and their connection with the social and political developments. And these two groups pursued Iran's economic independence. (Torabi Farsi, 2005: 54-53) The close and sincere relations of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asad Abadi and Amin al-Zarb can be mentioned. (7) In these meetings, Amin al-Zarb and merchants became familiar with the thinking and ideas of Sayyid Jamal concerning the law, freedom of thought, reform of Muslim affairs, alienation from the country's economy, and the struggle against colonialism and despotism. (Rahbari, 2008: 59)

Amin al-Zarb visited Russian factories in Moscow under the guidance of Seyyed Jamal al-Din. Factories such as Mahoot, Cheet, smelter, melting iron factory, road and rail, Sayed Jamal sought to make Amin al-Zarb more familiar with Russian industry. He sought to acquaint Iranian businessmen with the achievements of Western civilization and modernization and encourage them to invest. (Mahdavi, 2001: 203) Amin al-Zarb in Moscow met two brothers, Mirza Mohammad Ali and Mirza Mohammad Hussein, who were Iranian specialists active in the road construction sector in Russia. Amin al-Zarb invites them to build the railways and return them to Iran, and they refuse, pointing out that there is no guarantee of investment due to the lack of law and therefore security. (Haman) Amin al-Zarb in Iran was well aware of the necessity of legalization also, such as Mirzamalkam Khan, and Iranian businessmen had realized that their presence in large investments to modernize Iran was similar to Amin al-Zarb's determination was depended to establishment of the law to rebuild Iran. The establishment of law also requires significant changes in the structure of power.

The struggle of businessmen with the power structure

In the economic structure of Qajar, businessmen were among the most powerful and richest social classes of Iranian society. The accelerated growth of foreign trade and the increasing collision of Iranian merchants with the West and foreign trips made them familiar with the achievements of western civilization earlier than the other classes. (8) (Ashraf, 2002: 106-107; Katouzian, :100) Their acquaintance with Iranian intellectuals made them aware of their class status and their class interests against the Qajar Despotic rule. (Ashraf, 2002: 131) This awareness increased their political, social and economic power and social status in Iranian society, and eventually led to a series of political, social and economic developments resulting from the concession of power by the Russian and British colonial states also did the discriminations between the Iranian and western merchants, and their awareness of economic liberalism meant that the government was not involved in the economy and private ownership freedom that led to a movement against the Qajar government. And the formation and effective role in political and economic movements such as the Tobacco movement and the Constitutional Movement.

Like the other classes in the Qajar era, the business class was not only independent of the state but completely dependent on the state and political power did not allow for the development of independent social classes. So the government, was not agent of any class, including businessmen, but these classes were dominated by the

government, and these classes were legal before the state. Thus, the merchants had no choice and must resist against the power structure to achieve their class independence.

On the other hand, the power structure, and above all Nasser al-Din Shah, sought to obtain economic independence from the merchant class by selling domestic resources to foreigners. From the reign of Agha Mohammad Khan to the era of Nasser al-Din Shah (until the end of Amir Kabir's rule), there was no transfer of economic concessions to foreigners. Merchants had considerable influence with government officials due to their high liquidity levels and were respectful to the king and courtier and come to the aid of the government in severe financial crises. (Gobino, B: 30-30) For example, Abbas Mirza, borrowed a businessman after the defeat of the Russians, can be cited. Or, since the government of the cities was sold for cash, the rulers would take the necessary cash from the merchants before purchasing the court. In some cases, merchants were assisted in paying deferred tax or government debt. (Sepehr, 1966: 4/17) The struggle of the businessmen with the power structure after the victory of the Constitutional Revolution made the businessmen gain their political power and become a political class by obtaining the agent of the first Majlis. (Rahbari, 2008: 12)

On the other hand, intellectuals and businessmen are concerned about the gainst the economic concessions that the Qajar government had monopolized the western colonial governments. (Teimuri, 1944: 89) And Increase in import of green goods into Iran and the subsequent decline of national industries as a result of wrong customs policies (9), It caused merchants to enter the struggle on two fronts, one Tyranny and the other colonialism. It first sought the creation of a parliament of businessmen's lawyers in Tehran and large cities, and later their movement peaked in the tobacco movement and then reached its full potential in the constitutional movement.

The focus of colonial powers was primarily on purely political profits and then with the emergence and expansion of the world market at the end of the thirteenth century, their economic profits along with their political interests came to their attention. Foreign commercial boom was due to the export of raw materials and the import of products from the growing western industries and the dependence of domestic markets on international markets. But the rise of foreign businessmen and the widespread trade relationship between Iranian businessmen and foreign businessmen have led to the dependence of Iranian businessmen on Western business institutions. And, according to Hajj, " Business became a foreign dealing, not the promotion of Homeland products" (Sayah, 1980: 472), such as Cheza Mirza Ali mentions that the discriminatory customs policy of the Qajar government against the merchants of Iran caused the merchants have more profit in Buying and selling goods from European merchants where as Isfahan merchants represented the European businesses and bought mainly goods from European businesses and gradually they sold to the market. (Genab, 1925: 118; Ashraf, 2002: 96) Zainalabidin Maraghey calls these merchants mercenaries who are enemies of their own home (Maraghey, 1966: 164-163). Etemad al-Saltaneh, while referring to the events of the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, refers to this issue as " Complete prevalence of foreign goods in Iran". (Etemad

al-Saltanah, 1995: 118/1) Hajj Sayyad about the adverse effects of the boom in green goods believed that Iran's industries would be destroyed in a short period of time and that the Iranian people would become distressed and hungry. (Sayyah, 1980: 211-210) Due to the proliferation of green goods and especially rich textiles, the country's textile industries and especially the textile industries of the central industrial cities of Isfahan, Kashan and Yazd declined. (Ashraf, 2002: 91-92; Flanden, 1978: 125) Thus, the historical obstacles to the growth of new and modern industrial capitalism and democracy in Iran are the result of the interplay of nomadic production with other modes of production and the domination of tribes over urban and rural communities and on the other hand, it is the result of external obstacles to capitalist growth from the semi-colonial situation and the economic and political changes of Iranian society under colonial domination. (Ashraf, 2002: 126)

Businessmen's lawyers congress

At the time of Mirza Hussein Khan Mushir al-Dawlah was chancellor in 1911, the ministry of Commerce and agriculture was established that was in charge of protecting the profits of the businessmen and defending their rights against the violation of the divine agents and to provide the means of growth and development of commercial transactions in the country. But in practice, the ministry, like other court systems at the time, became a tool to subdue businessmen and an excuse for the intervention of the court practitioner like Zal al-Sultan and Kamran Mirza and Amin al-Sultan and the representatives of the Ministry of Commerce were not allowed (Malekara, 1947: 102-103, 169).

Businessmen's frequent traders and their protests come to the Shah's ears by Amin al-zarb and Nasser al-Din Shah removed Nassir al-Dawlah from the Ministry of Commerce, and in a handwriting in Shawwal in 1923 AH ordered the formation of a congress of Business Lawyers. (Adamiyat, 1978: 310-311) The Statute provisions of Businessmen's lawyers congress express the preservation and safeguarding of the class profits of businessmen by limiting the authoritarian (power structure) and colonial powers and the lack of a proper judicial system and the violence of provincial rulers against businessmen.

The Businessmen's lawyers congress was the first organization to reflect the political demands of an important economic group whose members were chosen from among themselves. However, despite the efforts of Amin al-Zarb, these organizations did not have enough impact, and it was clear that the formation of a House of Business Lawyers with the authority that businessmen favored, regarding to the power structure in Iran, caused limiting the authority of the rulers and the authority of the rulers and also eliminating One of the major ways of their intervention was to eliminate them. Therefore, most of the state and provincial and religious rulers stood up to the House of Business Lawyers and did not abstain from all kinds of corporations. The ministers of Kamran Mirza Nayeb al-Saltanah and Mokhber al-Dawlah, the minister of commerce and the chancellor, and the governors of the Nayib al-Saltaneh, Zal al-Sultan, Asif al-Dawleh and Motman al-Saltaneh provinces opposed the House of Commons. (Haman:362-363). Finally, they could In the jet of

their own interests, businessmen's lawyers congressbared their influence as a cruel court system and prevented the formation of class interests of businessmen from a politically, economically and socially institutionalized form of power. Thus, the businessmen's lawyers congresswas the first economic organization with political character before the constitution, the elected agents of one of the social classes, with their own efforts and attempts, came into being within the ruling system.

They existed within the ruling system. (Haman: 369)

Conclusion

According to the characteristics of Iranian patrimonialism and authoritarianism, dictatorshipis a prominent feature of the power structure in the Nazarene era. The Shah's power did not depend on any social class and the foundations of his power were not taken away from society, and this was due to the continuation of power's autocracy. It never had the opportunity to establish an independent, impartial and legal class that could legally restrict the king's power.

However, the Nasserian era was a transition from the traditional tribal and bureaucratic system to the modern monarchy and bureaucracy But the Qajar era's power structure in its approach to reform was focused on those parts of the reform that reinforced financial and political interests and did not affect sectors such as customary law.

Nasser al-Din Shah, in spite of his familiarity with western civilization and the need for reform, sought to consolidate the power structure at the top of his pyramid, and to use the reforms to strengthen his autocratic rule and centralize autocratic government. In this regard, the reforms of the Nasserian era were not infrastructural or more precisely structural and only led to Formal expansion of the state administrative systemor bureaucratic inflation and since the Iranian government in the Qajar era relied on the existence of a large centralized administrative organization with political and economic power was in the hands of their kings with autocracy. Also the government could not be separated from the court and a modern state was formed.

Understanding modernity in Iran and explaining the performance of reformist intellectuals and businessmen and their impact on shaping tobacco and constitutional movements will be difficult without examining the power structure in Nazarene Iran. In fact, these movements can be considered the starting point of the challenge to the power structure in Iran. Thus, the Qajari patrimonial government, which was based on traditional legitimacy in the context of the social experience of the Iranian people, was challenged only in the late nineteenth century when intellectuals came to terms with new concepts and western views such as the rule of law. And since the Iranian economic system relies on the existence of a large, centralized bureaucratic organization with a focus on political and economic power at the hands of the authoritarian and dictatorQajar kings. Thus, the root of the political and economy backwardness of Iran goes back to the power structure, which is authoritarian and dictatorship. Iranian intellectuals in the Nasserian era sought to liberate the political

and economic, social and cultural systems of Iranian society from the power structure at the top was Nasser al-Din Shah.

Footnote

1. Iranian political culture is the result of political and economic structures in Iranian history. Political culture goes beyond the political system and its continuity is more than the political system.

2. After the heads of the Qajar tribe, other tribes played a role in the structure of power, especially the military officers elected from the heads of the tribes. Including tribes during this period may refer to the great Iranian tribes such as the Bakhtiari, Qashqa'i, Kurds, Baluchis, Afshars, Qargoslohas, Arabs and Turkmen. (Zounis, 2008: 216)

From the second half of the thirteenth century, especially after the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, followed by the revolt of the tribal leaders against the central government, especially after the siege of Herat during the reign of Mohammad Shah and the tribes incitement by the British, made it the Central government internal policy to unify the tribes, by Appointment one of the most high-ranking king as Ilkhan at the head of the tribe.

and he was committed to the government in order to regulate the tribal order and to receive taxes regularly, in the preparation of soldiers and corps, as at the beginning of the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah in 1878 AH, for the first time, Shah issued the Ilkhani verdict for Hossein Qoli Bakhtiari. After Ilkhan II Big post, acting as his deputy or assistant, were two important posts in the tribal community. The Ilkhanids ruled over a tribe, and the Ilkhani official was the only social authority with all the absolute authority and power. (And Rahram, 2007: 228, 230)

(For more information about population of Iran's Tribes and nomads Refere to : (Karzen, 1984: 2 / 322-336)

3. As Etemad al-Saltanah refers, the royal family were the king and his harem and the heads of the Qajar tribe that had the pulse of government. (Etemad al-Saltanah, 1995: 1)

4. Abbas Mirza Malek Araa, brother Nasser al-Din Shah, has also mentioned that to get the Ministry of Commerce has been forced to pay ten thousand tomans to Nasser al-Din Shah and one thousand tomans to the Supreme Chancellor (Amin al-Sultan). (Malek Araa : 1947: 102)

5. A German diplomat in a report from Iran points to the Shah's concern over the political situation in the country during his travels to Europe: Soroush Tagalibakhs, "The Situation of Iran in the Era of Nasser al-Din Shah by a German Diplomat", Ayandeh, ninth topic: No8-9 / 625- 632.

6. (Kermani, 1968: Introduction / 128) Nazim al-Islam Karmani's theory is not true of the reformists like Mirza Hussein Khan Moshir al-Dawlah, Mirza Malkam Khan and Mirza Ali Khan Amin al-Dawlah.

7. Amin al-Zarb was the host of Seyed Jamal in Tehran and while Seyed Jamal was in Russia

Amin al-Zarb would send him money: (Codi, 1980: 27; Mahdavi, 2001: 240)

8. Including the Ottoman constitution of 1294 AH translated in Akhtar newspaper and hand in the Tabriz market. Businessmen who had business relations with Russia and the Ottomans were aware of the situation in those countries and were discussing about Iran's economic dependence.

(Behnam, 2004: 36)

9. The internal discrimination that hurt businessmen was that foreign businessmen who paid only 5% of the price of the goods as customs duties and were exempted from domestic customs duties, while Iranian businessmen not only paid taxes on the entry of goods into the country rather they had to pay for toll effects and other tolls in cities where goods were passing. Consequently, in return for goods that Iranian merchants would pay 14 to 22 percent of the money,

Foreign traders paid only 5 percent. (Peter, 2005: 7/254)

10. Case file of Amin al-Zarb quotes (Adamiyat, 1978: 39)

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