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THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTEGRITY: A NOVEL APPROACH TO PREVENTING CORRUPTION AND ENHANCING ADMINISTRATIVE HEALTH

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Abstract

Corruption needs to be studied and assessed, not just because it is a matter of ethics (which it truly is) but because of the damage it inflicts on economy and trade (which it truly does) and for the sake of individuals (most notably in countries in transition) who have to pay the price for corruption everywhere. The novel approach adopted by various countries to prevent corruption and enhance administrative health is known as the National Integrity System (NIS). According to the approach, all sectors must move in concert toward a NSI to hammer out policies to tackle corruption. The approach states that successfully fighting corruption calls for a widespread alliance and close cooperation between all sectors of society and that the sectors must support those policies. The NIS also says there is a broad range of players (such as parliament, the executive branch of government, the judiciary, civil service, political parties, regulators, police, media, etc.) that are involved in identifying the root-cause of corruption, placing it on the policy-making institutions and government and eradicating corruption agenda. Among these players are watchdog agencies and police. The present paper aims to take a look at the role and place of regulatory agencies and police in the NSI via dealing with questions as follow: What is the NSI? What are the features

of regulatory agencies (police) in the NSI? The paper's methodology is qualitative data analysis, and the data have been collected using documentary and library research method.

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Introduction

Different authors and scholars have offered different definitions of policy of public. Harold Lasswell as scientist of political describes policy of public as a "a projected program of goals, values, and practices". The consequences of government activity were defined by David Easton it whereas Austin Ranney describes policy of public as "determined courses of actions" or "expressing demands". The definition of policy of public offered by Thomas Dye is "anything governments choose to do, why they do it, and what difference it makes". What all these definitions have in common is that they are speaking about a procedure or model of government practices or decisions aimed at resolving public problems, be it real or virtual. Policy of public is often regarded as a conveyer belt in which problems are first treated as critical issues and various phases of an action are studied and policies are determined. The policy of public is then put into practice by staff. In the next stage, it is evaluated and modified. Finally, it is ended depending on its success or failure. Therefore, the key element of policy of public is the problem on which a decision has been made and the most important stage in starting policy of public is the identification of that problem (Ashtarian, 2010: p33). For example, such problems as crime, inflation, environment, etc. are only a few of the challenges faced by policy of public and they have ignited many debates in various fields.

Social problems are phenomena including structural situations or action models which appear on the path toward development. This is the road between the status quo and the target desired by individuals and social groups. These problems prevent a society from achieving its goals and threaten its values and ideals. The elite and the public opinion are concerned about social problems and view them as undesirable. This creates a unity and collective readiness to tackle those problems and prompts officials to seek solutions and take practical measures to resolve or prevent them (Abdollahi, 2007: p12). Today, corruption is a major social problem in any country as far as policy makers are concerned. Disillusionment with traditional approaches to development and recognizing that development institutions and government measures play a key role in economic development have increasingly drawn attention to corruption. (ibid: p13) Alongside development, an increasing interest in policy-making to fight corruption can be attributed to a number of factors. The first factor is corruption's adverse impact on impoverished nations. International financial institutions can no longer afford to turn a blind eye to corruption because if it diverts resources in domestic management, most development efforts and anti-poverty strategies will be doomed to failure. Therefore, international financial institutions have started tackling corruption and are treating

the fight as a top priority on their development agenda. Secondly, a very tangible outcome of these institutions' interventionism to combat corruption is the collection and dissemination of concrete data that enable us to conduct previously impossible research. Accessibility of the data, along with using new assessment techniques, made it possible to create a set of information about national corruption measurement. Information about corruption coupled with making the issue a concrete subject has helped invalidate old myths and calm the public outcry over the matter. One of the myths questioned by newly developed data regarding corruption is the belief that only developed nations can reduce corruption to a minimal level (Vazque,Granado,Boex,2007:p10). Thirdly, there's a widespread consensus that such problems as poverty and corruption are part of a global phenomenon and equally affect all nations in real terms. It's increasingly becoming clear that these problems are interrelated among world nations. Diseases like AIDS do not discriminate between countries based on race, religion, geographical location, or per capital income. As a result, it is necessary to adopt containment policies in nations most affected by these problems in order to prevent an out of control global pandemic. Recognition of corruption as a global phenomenon makes it clear that fighting the problem is not about international help but it is about global survival ((Ibid: p15).

1-Preventive approach of corruption and enhancing administrative health

McCusker (2007) and Maeti (2011) state that there are three pronged holistic approaches to anti-corruption policy-making.

1-Interventionism, where the authorities being relevant are waiting for the action of corruption to take place and after that intervene and punish or arrest individuals who were involved in corrupt behavior. Such school arouses punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation then again there remain an obstructive variables number. The variables include: the hurt already has been done and not reversed; the crimes majority stay unreported; the finite resources demand will be infinite inevitably given the supervision degree essential for ensuring that the deterrence influence operates.

2-2nd, managerialism, where such agencies or individuals in quest of engaging in behavior of corruption can be prevented or discouraged from acting as a result via establishing suitable systems, protocols and procedures. Fundamentally, managerialism promotes minimizing eliminating chances i.e., such that in general benefit from them terminate to be able to pereform so. Also, limitations there are along such thought school. The limitations key here is the element that persons do not essentially function in line with the managerialism principles predetermined (McCusker, 2006, Maeti, 2011). Organizations have 3 broad individuals classifications that differently react to corrupt effects: classification one- individuals who need

to make sure of the right thing and need guidance on how to attain such; classification 2- individuals who are so timorous to take the operating outside rules risk that have been established; classification three- individuals who are corrupting and will entirely operate rules outside. Managerialism efforts to provide one rules set for deterring a differently motivated individual's number. Such approach consequences are that the anticorruption effort success is disjointed, the less scheming corruptee intercepting but not the more highly damaging planned others exploits. According to McCusker and Maeti, in previous approaches, the private sector, civil service groups and media were ignored as key factors in bringing about fundamental change and the focus was on the executive branch of government with less emphasis on the judiciary and parliament. Meanwhile, more attention was paid to budgets and actions instead of economic achievements and the outcome of these activities. Finally, this three-pronged approach was based on vertical accountability, and the transparency of the government received no attention.

3-New approach

In the 1990s, Transparency International (TI) and the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization suggested a NIS (NIS). In this system, a balance of powers is set up to create accountability between different state agencies and organizations. The NIS manages interest conflict in service of public and lays down prohibited conduct instances, the incidence where adversely would affect public interests (ibid: p36).

Failure of vertical accountability in the face of horizontal accountability

McCusker and Maeti say there are 2 accountability forms at work in a democracy: "vertical accountability" by where the governed electors stress control over the governors: and "horizontal accountability" in which such that govern, the governors, to other agencies are accountable, namely watchdogs. Principly, the governed and governors are not different. Meanwhile, special group is there of no political power. The individuals themselves vest political power in the representatives they elect for a definite time period. When individuals are not satisfied with the representatives' job performance, they can remove them, either via box of ballot or by trying that they resign or even be punished (Pope, 2000: p24). However, history has shown mere "vertical accountability" is insufficient to the job. When governors fail to get re-elected by support satisfied populace, they do so by using a secrecy combination (hence, electors do now know at all what is transpiring) and by building patronage systems. Also, the governors might pander in short performances term as populist. Such might be to the public longer-term detriment. Not just politicians have a tendency to expand the authority and power limits as to rule with as little disapproval as probable, sometimes they will take a step further and multiply their interventions with the mere aim of proving their private standing. Furthermore, the class of political that appears with politicians being professional mostly shares values set that are at likelihoods with ideals as democratic

along promises of sharp contrast to their activities on power being assumed i.e., the Labour Government in 1997 came to authority in Britain after making strong pledges to end official secrecy. However, they later watered down their subsequent reforms upto point that some spectators say the reforms resulting, distant from creating the government further transparent, could to the contrary upsurge secrecy areas (ibid: p25).

However, the ancient world democracies documented these contradictions and wriggled with them. In ancient Greece of Athens, the Court of individuals, designed via citizens group randomly-selected convened to judge on controversies of public. Meanwhile, the court was of reverse decisions power made via body being legislative, namely the Assembly of Individuals. Likewise, in ancient Rome, the citizen's right for appealing to the plebs tribune versus decisions prepared through magistrates was conceived as a liberty cornerstone (TI Source Book, 2000: p24). Systems considered as democratic because they were applied by citizens, and were described via accountability as horizontal, as courts being popular were autonomous effectively and were self-governing bodies of politics. By comparing, the later empires of Roman, the ancient Chinese, and the old European monarchies adage a class emerge being bureaucratic which in its time, worked as a buffer among the governors and individuals. While their feelings were overstepped, they indulge in resistance being passive, in which to delay, to question, and to redirect the orders impact from above, and so exercised a limited vertical accountability form in environment being non-democratic. So the notion is as vertical accountability flops to work for reasons number - the individuals are not informed adequately of the governed activities; of no power to precisely investigate what abuses might have occurred; and the elections process is just periodic, hence eventhough in elections being free the administration is adjudged on its performance totality over time as supposed by an electorate, more than apprehended to account for specific abuse acts. But in "vertical accountability", across a horizontal plane, actors are accountable to each other, more than upwards accountable in a hierarchical diminishing width structure. Essentially, this means that no single institution or person is in a place to rule the rest (POPE, 2000: p27). No system able to role in a way that promoting the publics interests more than of private in control interests. Fundamentally, the task in transition countries and countries being developing is to move far from a system that is principally top down: one where autocratic governing elite provides instructions that are followed, to lesser or greater degree, via such down the line. The method is to transfer as a substitute to "horizontal accountability" system; one where power is dispersing of none of a monopoly, and of eachone is accountable separately. In fact, in a system of horizontal accountability, a "virtuous circle" is perfected in which every actor is both watched and watcher is monitored and a monitor (ibid). In this system, there should be press being free. Where the press should respect definite limits executed via law i.e., evading defamatory assaults on individuals. For eventhough


free press is accountable, not just possibly to Council of Press (that might or might not be body as statutory) but as well, and eventually, to the courts. Meanwhile, the courts are no longer ruling elite servants, but more of acting along independence and enforce the Law Rule and the rule of law. Still, this independence is of no absolutility – juries are responsible for their individual decisions by appeals system, and every judge is accountable for her or his competence and integrity to different body, be it a commission of judicial services or a parliament (TI Source Book,2000: p32). Such body, sequentially, is elsewhere accountable and eventually to the individuals via the box as ballot. Hence, accountability strands tie the several elements, or “pillars”, and therefore connecting that they strengthen and brace each other. Under “horizontal accountability”² system of a “virtuous circle” that is perfected: one where every actor is both watched and a watcher is both monitored and a monitor. A circle is avoiding, and at the similar time answers question of age-old: “Who shall guard the guards?” (ibid).

Thus, the shift is to horizontal accountability one from system being vertical - be it a tyrant or the one party state leadership where watchdogs and restraint agencies system are tasked and set up along checking power abuses via other government branches and agencies. Such watchdogs are including the courts, independent tribunals as electoral, general auditors, banks as central, organizations being professional, parliaments, and free and media being independent, etc.

What’s the NSI?

Jeremy Pope coined “NSI”, the head of TI in the 1990s. The concept’s first sparks appeared at an anti-corruption workshop in 1995 in Tanzania. The workshop was held by TI and the World Bank (WB). From then on, this concept was developed and carved out a very important place in anti-corruption policies and programs (Glynn et al. 1997:16-24). After it was explained in detail in the TI Source Book, 2000, the NSI became a basis for assessing the infrastructure of integrity in various world countries. Since then, many books have been written on the NSI by scholars. According to this concept, a system will not be stable or sustainable unless there are some solid pillars which can undertake their necessary social tasks and are supported to this end. Pope states that the task of reforming integrity and the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies cannot be assigned to a single institution or a single law and that these issues call for a group of powerful bodies, effective laws, proper moves and established code of ethics. Pope also maintains that individuals in a society where powerful bodies support national integrity will soon reap the benefits like “quality of life”, “rule of law” and “sustainable development”. In a situation where all pillars fail to function properly and effectively to guarantee sustainable integrity, social interests are in danger. Pope believes that no reform plan can serve as the sole key to enhancing integrity. According to Pope, achieving this goal calls for a combination of programs and reforms. Pope likens a “NIS” to what he calls

temple of Greek in which all institutions or agencies (pillars) are engaged in the fight against corruption. Pope says it is highly unlikely that a single law or agency will be able to be a ‘silver bullet’ to overcome corruption and the answer to corruption is the establishment of reform laws and various programs to achieve a desirable level of integrity (TI 2001; Doig & McIvor 2003a; 2003b; Larmour & Barcham 2004). After Pope proposed the Greek Temple architectural metaphor, other scientists conducted research into the concept and offered their own definitions. Brown believes that the concept of the NIS can be best described as follows. He says the system consists of bodies, procedures, laws, measures and approaches that promote and encourage integrity in exercising power in any culture. Therefore, integrity regimes are meant to guarantee that power is trained in such a way which would be in line with the values, goals and tasks constituting the rationale behind the delegation of power to bodies or individuals (Brown,2005: p2). Aulich believes in administration being public, the integrity relates normally to tackling corruption means, maladministration and misconduct along a view to founding ethical behavior culture among all members in the system political-of administrative . (Aulich, 2011: p4). According to Aulich, system of integrity is practices and institutions series which aim collectively to build transparency, integrity, and accountability in sector as public. The system is laws, institutions, codes, regulations, policies and procedures mix which provide balances and checks framework to raise great quality decision making environment and to address and identify unsuitable behavior include corruption. Meanwhile, Larmour believes that an effective and functioning integrity system calls for a range of interdependent practices, procedures and rules that collectively help produce the effective culture of integrity (Larmour,2005: p5). Spigelman says the NIS mentions to a pillars network which reinforce integrity and make reforms as anti-corruption as possible. Such pillars include processes, institutions, attitudes and individuals set that are related to integrity. System being guaranteed is according to the notion which taking action against corruption does not just happen by invoking a single law or body but it takes place through the agency of a set of organizations, laws, practices and ethical and behavioral standards (Spigelman,2004: p78). Kaufman asserts that the integrity system is undercut via behaviors that flop to strengthen principles and values in organizations and government bodies. This may include a broad range of behaviors from simple errors in tasks of administration to willful trust breach of and activity of crimes. Kaufman shows this behavior chain in the following figure.



Kaufman divides the range into three bad behaviors: maladministration, misconduct and corruption.

Maladministration: Maladministration is the actions of a government body which are not undertaken properly or carefully. This concept may include inefficiency, incompetence, and making decisions based on poor judgment.

Misconduct: Misconduct is more serious than maladministration. This goes beyond neglect and motives behind misconduct are beyond maladministration. Misconduct is way more serious than carelessness or failure to make efforts. It may include breaching the code of conduct and lack of good faith.

Corruption: This also goes beyond misconduct and constitutes various forms such as “abuse of power or abuse of authority”. In a broad sense, the WB added the element of personal gain to it and defined corruption as “the abuse of public power for personal gain” (Kaufman, 1997: p8). Corruption undermines public trust and harms an organization’s reputation. In its 2009, the OECD, said:

“Individuals have the right to expect public officials to act with integrity and in good faith and to address corruption and misconduct. Citizens also expect public servants to strengthen values like honesty and trust and serve public interests in their daily actions. Justice, reliability, and systemic decision making in public organizations increase public trust and confidence. Integrity is a must for the government to acquire legitimacy and to be trusted. Therefore, it is the core of governance” (OECD, 2009).

Misconduct, maladministration, and corruption might be regarded as a systemic public failure management and bad governance sign. Such integrity lack might have a negative influence on individuals’s perceptions and the public confidence in decisions made via public servants.

Kaufman believes that the NSI is practices and institutions series which aim collectively to transparency, build integrity, and accountability in sector of public. The system is codes, institutions, procedures, regulations, laws and policies mix which provide balances and checks framework to raise great quality decision making environment, and to address and identify unsuitable behavior include corruption (Kaufman, 1997: p8). He says the integrity role of system is to enhance the integrity standards across the sector of public and to also investigate and identify and respond to maladministration, misconduct, and corruption. He maintains that the main functions of integrity and anti-corruption systems are:

- Setting expected behavioral standards for public servants through laws, regulations and code of conduct.
- Educating public servants and instructing them on expected behaviors and standards.
- External and internal oversight according to codes and standards and by audit, investigation and overview.
- Supervising and responding to complaints in respect to practices and administrative decisions.
- Investigating and prosecuting misconduct, maladministration and corruption.

Langseth also outlines the components of the NSI as below:

- Preventing corruption through increasing accountability.
- Focusing on prevention instead of execution through increasing public awareness.
- Enhancing the capacity of the integrity pillars for fighting corruption.
- Concentrating on providing outcome-based services for individuals.

Langseth believes that failure to hold national and international politicians and public servants accountable is probably a key reason why sustainable development does not take place in many countries worldwide. This approach seeks to change the attitude of public servants.


To establish government transparency and accountability, we need pressure as external and internal. Accountability should be produced by a grouping of political will from the public pressure and top from below. Eventhough when political leaders are effective in altering government attitude bureaucrats, it will take more determination since < 2 % of the population in countries being developing are working for the government (Langseth: p8). This new attitude to governance is according to the hypothesis which only via involvement, education, and rehabilitation of the left 98 % of individuals including those in the media, private sector, and civil service we will be able to enhance accountability in the public sector. Langseth also says educating and involving individuals in the establishment of integrity is the key factor in preventing corruption and, as a result, it is the main challenge of the comprehensive approach and its cornerstone and can have various forms:

- Education and public awareness promotion campaigns (radio, television and newspapers).

- Holding nationwide educating workshops where all beneficiaries are invited to put forth problems and propose reforms.
- Promoting awareness among citizens regarding their rights and empowering them for monitoring the government by periodical polls and surveys regarding service provision.
- Setting up and publishing a national integrity strategy and conducting annual corruption surveys at national and subnational levels.
- Teaching investigative journalism and information dissemination through media and other tools.

Langseth believes that this new approach emphasizes the significance of good faith and proper leadership and mentality among public servants. Mentality and thinking habits refer to the views and mental condition of policy makers and public servants in work environments (Ibid: 12).

Dye and Stapenhurst say to guarantee an environment supporting the active participation of the public and private sectors in sustainable development, it is necessary that we create a NSI or relevant supporting pillars. The integrity pillars in any society are players outside the executive branch of government. The players are the integrity pillars because they are responsible for supporting measures aimed enhancing integrity and public honesty. Dye and Stapenhurst believe that the NSI is built on various pillars including the executive branch, parliament, the judiciary, regulators, watchdog agencies, the private sector, the civil service, auditor-generals, and international players. These pillars are independent but weakness of any pillar will spread to others. If several pillars decline, these systems can no longer backing development as sustainable. To study a NSI calls for pinpointing the loopholes and opportunities of corruption in each pillars and coordinating between the government, civil service, media and others. The rational for creating a NSI may differ from a country to another. However, three main goals can be named: the law rule, life quality and sustainable development (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1998: p1).



Bunge (2004: p188) maintains that the NSI contains all constituents i.e., practices, institutions, policies, and integrity guardians, which are all involved in the solid and proper (coherent) functioning of the government. The main feature of the NSI is that it creates an environment and a series of elements that are vital for integrity and coherence of the government. Integrity systems involve efforts toward managing organizational ethics inside government departments and also guardians of integrity outside the departments such as external (independent) auditors, regulators, police and the judicial system. A guardian of integrity is a system that wields control over and supervises wrongdoings regarding integrity.

Huberts puts forth a range of prospects in this regard that fall into a range of the definition of integrity as a whole to integrity as an example of ethical integrity or behavior as the action quality in line with values and laws. According to Huberts, integrity means the quality of action conforming values and generally accepted norms in line with public interests. The breach of integrity involves corruption, fraud, conflict of interest, abuse of authority and so on (Huberts et al, 2008). Huberts divides the breach of integrity in the public sector into several types¹ and says different policies cannot target all of these violations at once and external guardians of integrity are incapable of supervising all these abuses.

4-Pillars of the new approach

Jeremy Pope depicts the “NSI” as temple of Greek: a temple of a roof - the integrity of nation, reinforced at either end through pillars series– the Judiciary, the Parliament, the Regulators, free media, civil service and the likes (Ibid: p11). There are 3 balls as round on the roof: “quality of life”, “rule of law” and “sustainable development”. These are balls as round to underline that it is critical that the roof be retained level when such 3 balls as round and the values they cover are not to roll off. The “temple” itself is constructed on and continued through foundations that include values of society and public awareness. When values are robust and public awareness is great, both will back the “pillars” that is resting on them, providing them extra strength. Alternatively, when public is not watchful and apathetic, or when the values are missing widely, so the foundations will be not strong. The “pillars” will be ineffectual and empty, and

¹Hubert divides violations into: corruption (bribery, patronage and favoritism), misuse of power, conflict of public and private interests, abusing and tampering with information, gender discrimination, waste of resources, time abuse.

miss the underpinning essential when they are to safeguard the integrity of nation. The “pillars” are inter-dependent but might be of varying strengths. When one pillar declines, an enlarged load is flung onto one or more of the others. When numerous pillars decline, their load will eventually tilt, so that the “round balls” of “sustainable development”, “rule of law” and “quality of life” will roll off, smash to the ground and the whole structure will breakdown into chaos. The concrete “pillars” might and will differ from society to society. Some will be weaker and others will be stronger. Still, always there will be trade-offs to provide accommodations as such (TI Source Book, 2000: p35). Whereas there are global variations, the mostly typical society “integrity pillars” that is looking for to govern itself in fashion being accountable (ibid) including:

- Executive;
- Parliament;
- Judiciary;
- Civil service;
- “Watchdog” agencies (Public Committees Accounts, Auditor-Generals, Regulators, Police, Anti-Corruption Agencies, etc.)
- Mass media.

Pope believes that a genuine NSI needs the systematic recognition of threats, opportunities, strengths and weaknesses of pillars through separate surveys and assessments of each pillar’s situation based on dimensions and special indices with the aim of strengthening or sustaining the pillar within a comprehensive framework. Once the deficiencies of each pillar are dispelled, an effort is made to create a logical balance between the pillars. If the system depends on one pillar or a few pillars, it will be susceptible to collapse. But the lack of an effective integrity system will make the spread of corruption inevitable. Hence, the NSI offers a new diagnosis form and potential corruption treatment.

5-Police (watchdog agencies) indices in the NIS approach

The formation of watchdog or regulatory agencies in any society calls for the existence of some components and indices that would help the agencies play their role. In light of this, the dimensions and performance indices of these watchdog agencies in the NSI are as below (TI, 2001: pp83-90):

Dimensions	Index
Capacity	1-Resources 2-Independence
Sovereignty	1-Transparency 2- Accountability 3- Integrity

Role	1-Special indices of the column, like efforts to fight corruption
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Capacity: Capacity is a prerequisite for integrity and for regulatory agencies to play their role in enhancing the integrity of the entire system. Thus, watchdog agencies should have some capacities. These capacities are structural, human and financial and are assessed through 2 indices.

1-Resources: This index assesses watchdog agencies' access to human resources, expert human workforce, methods of training workforce, financial resources for action in line with integrity and also assesses the agencies' playing of their role to the full as one of NSI pillars. The availability of proper resources is an important index for watchdog bodies and enables them to avoid corruption and other violations of integrity. The quality of the activity of these institutions, among others, depends on the availability of resources. Proper funding is essential for the oversight agencies to perform their tasks. If pay is good, talented individuals will be employed to work at these agencies. Hence, sufficient salaries will minimize to zero staff motivation to abuse their authority to make more money.

2-Independence: The index evaluates the degree of the watchdog agencies' independence. It looks into whether these organizations act independently of external players. On the one hand, the agencies' external independence interference in their activities is conceived as significant index of undertaking their tasks independently. On the other hand, the independence guarantees proper control and balance. Anyone working in any of the integrity pillars will serve organizational or public interests and should not be influenced by personal interest or the interests of other groups or players. If external interests are internalized, the independence of the pillar will be compromised seriously and, as a result, other individuals will no longer be serving organizational and public interests and objectives and will, instead, pose a threat to integrity.

Sovereignty: Each pillar including the watchdog agencies need rules and practices that are basic requirements to prevent the pillar from engagement in corruption. Sovereignty is assessed using the following indices:

1-Transparency: This index assesses the transparency of watchdog agencies and looks into whether they follow proper policies and procedures regarding the free flow of information and freedom of access to information. If the watchdog bodies act transparently, it will become possible to gain information about their activities and review the information and see if they have acted in an impartial and fair manner. For example, terms and conditions that are meant to reveal information about putting procedures or declarations in place will enable the pillars to control the method of funding such activities and any resulting impact on them. The degree to which the pillar is legally bound to reveal information is an index

that shows whether the integrity of the system is preserved. The index is scored based on the existence of a legal groundwork and also the feasibility of allowing individuals to gain access to information about watchdog agencies.

2-Accountability: This index is meant to assess the degree to which the watchdog agencies are held accountable for their practices. It also looks into how much individuals and other pillars are held to account for their activities. This is a very important index of integrity because it demands individuals involved be responsible regarding their practices. It is highly important for violations of integrity. The index is evaluated on the basis of proper conditions and rules that would guarantee accountability and reporting by the watchdog bodies and those working in the sector.

3-Integrity and honesty: This index looks into whether conditions and rules about integrity and honesty and their implementation are proper. The major parameters for integrity and honesty are independence, resources, accountability and transparency. Despite such parameters put forth the idea of preserving and guaranteeing integrity within the watchdog agencies, they do what they do in an indirect manner. The fifth parameter for integrity and honesty is the existence of conditions and rules that are designed explicitly to guarantee integrity and honesty.

Role: This dimension evaluates the commitment of watchdog bodies to fulfill their role and tasks in respect to enhancing health and integrity across the whole system being institutional. Certainly, such means that the role parameters are precise to every pillar and they depend on what special functions of each pillar are involved in health and integrity. The indices of the watchdog bodies with regard to the dimension of role are the amount of investigation into corruption, the simplicity of the investigation procedures and following up on complaints, the number of complaints that have been investigated by the watchdog agencies, individuals's perception of these institutions and their performance, etc.

Conclusion

Different concepts have been put forth over the years about the integrity systems. The major goal of TI's proposed approach known as the NSI is to enhance the governance integrity in society. This system is predicated on pillars that constitute social values and. When awareness being public is great and values are strong, this will be of great help to the pillars on which they rest. The NIS approach will work by institutions number, basic activities and sectors that are the very pillars. Among such pillars, there are a parliament that works toward achieving and establishing good governance, watchdog (regulatory or oversight) agencies and police tasked with supervising the health and integrity of affairs, a judiciary responsible for safeguarding the rule of law, regulations, media, a private sector, etc.

Only when risks of integrity are absolutely limited will the integrity systems be effective and operate soundly. In other words, if authorities act in good faith and with integrity and avoid violating the principles

of integrity, the system will function normally. There are different players or actors inside a NSI at 2 levels of internal and external. Inside the first level, the players have a bureaucratic or a traditional politico-administrative relationship like parliament, the executive branch, etc. The second level comprises a network of players with powers to exercise oversight and control across hierarchies. These players are accountable to one another in a horizontal manner like the judiciary, media, civil service, regulators, police, etc.

The final aim of creating a NIS is to create corruption a “high risk” and “low return” attempt. Thus, this system is designed to minimize the possibilities for corruption to occur in the first place rather than relying on punishment after the occurrence of corruption (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1998: p1).

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