HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF TREATIES ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL LEGISLATION

Abstract

There is no mechanism for reciprocity in human rights treaties, which sets them apart from other international organizations. Other states suffer adverse consequences when they breach their commitments through established international institutions, such as trade agreements.  They have the option of retaliating by increasing duties on imports from the offending country. They have the option of retaliating by increasing duties on imports from the offending country. As a result, these treaties raise several intriguing questions about why governments agree to and follow them.  Human rights literature has gone a long way toward explaining governments’ human rights behavior about human rights institutions. However, here we approach the problem from a fresh perspective of strategic network relationships. The intersection of networks and human rights is only just starting to be examined qualitatively in the human rights literature, so this research aims to contribute to this burgeoning area of research. With that aim in mind, we examine the effect of IGO, trade, and alliance dependence on human rights treaty ratification and compliance. We argue that such dependence on states that respect human rights creates significant ties that states will not want to risk having severed. As a result, those states will join and comply with the same human rights treaties that the states they depend upon have joined and complied with. That said, we argue that this dynamic will only hold for states that depend highly on others, not for states that others depend highly upon. The thinking here is that if dependence runs in both directions, the punishing state will not be willing to sacrifice its benefits from the relationship to make a point about respecting human rights